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ABSTRACT
A theological doctrine of eternal life raises certain qualitative and existential questions.
Considering the unfathomable duration, one may rightly ask, what will that experience be like
and will it meet the experiential needs of human beings so that there are no intimations of
boredom. Eternity, then, creates a potential existential problem for humanity. The problem is
potential because eternity creates a certain need, a need which can concisely be stated in this
way: quality must overcome quantity. Both Christianity and Islam teach human beings are
intended to live forever so both religions must overcome this problem if eternal life within that
religion is something to be desired. In this study, the problems of eternity are divided into two
distinct classifications: the Qualitative Gap Problem (QGP) and the Teleological Gap Problem
(TGP). The QGP is an objective problem and considers the relation of the divine to humanity as
a solution to eternity. The TGP is a subjective problem and considers how the ultimate good of
the afterlife aligns with human telos and consequently, human flourishing. This study argues that
the Islamic afterlife does not have the theological and philosophical resources to meet both gap
problems simultaneously and must compromise on one in order to meet the other. Subsequently,
the study submits that the Christian view of afterlife overcomes both gaps because of the
God/man relationship in Heaven focused supremely on, in, and through the God-man Jesus
Christ. It is it our holistic relationship to the Triune God that grants eternal joy for all of
redeemed humanity.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THESIS, RATIONALE
Introduction
British moral philosopher Bernard Williams once stated, “nothing less will do for eternity
than something that makes boredom unthinkable.” 1 A simple yet profound statement, Williams
elucidates a fundamental assertion about eternity that follows from thorough reflection
concerning said reality. This statement emphasizes the cause of existential angst some people
have towards an eternal afterlife. For many people, the idea of living forever is a blessed reality
met with welcome arms. It is welcomed because the opposite – death and non-existence – is a
sobering and even terrifying thought. Human beings naturally seek to preserve their existence
and typically do not will or wish their own non-existence. On the other hand, however, for some,
the prospect of never ceasing to exist can likewise be haunting. Because that future life is not
empirically accessible there is uncertainty about what it will be like. What are we going to do for
an eternity? What will it be like to have an infinite amount of time ever and always before us?
How will that impact the decisions we make or how we choose to spend our time? Will it have
an adverse effect on the quality of life? Almost every aspect of our earthly human experiences is
rooted in finitude and thus our cognitive capacity is limited in the sense that we cannot grasp the
expansive nature of eternity. Furthermore, our empirical access is also limited because we cannot
at once say that we have experienced eternity. There is no point on the continuum where one
reaches his destination if eternity is the journey, for we will only ever be on the journey.

1
Bernard Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” in Problems of the
Self, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973), 95.
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Rationale and Need for this Study
These thoughts on eternity highlight the impetus for this study. Thinking about eternity
leads to questions about what it would be like to experience it. If the hereafter is desirable, then it
must be of the kind and quality to satisfy human beings for an incomprehensible duration.
Williams succinctly captures the human sentiment that an eternal existence, if it is to be good
and desirable, would have to be of a certain kind and quality so as to eradicate boredom from
human experience entirely. Another way to conceptualize this is the relation of the subject to the
pleasure. That is, are the pleasures of afterlife, whatever they may be, of such a quality that they
could fully and forever satisfy the human qua human? This is no small consideration as the
eternal plane of existence is just that – eternal – and if there is eternal life after death the reality
of its duration is unfathomable. In this life things satisfy us for a while, and then when we
become bored, we desire something else. Will the afterlife be the same? Are our desires satisfied
for a while and then we become bored, or does the qualitative nature of a particular afterlife
render boredom unthinkable? What will existence be like a billion-trillion years from now when,
at that future moment, there will still be the same amount of duration remaining in eternity as
when it first started?
A salient feature of the three great monotheistic faiths – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
– is the belief in an embodied afterlife. Jews, Christians, and Muslims all believe that at some
eschatological moment, God will gather the living and resurrect the dead, exact judgment, and
usher the righteous into an eternal paradise prepared by God himself. Those who are there, those
who have been counted among the faithful, will enjoy a life of unending bliss in the presence of
God. When we consider, however, the many different religious faiths that have a doctrine of
afterlife, the comparative question naturally arises, is there one view of the afterlife that is more
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desirable than the others? The idea of desirability may seem a subjective criterion upon which to
judge a system. What one person deems desirable may not seem so to the other and vice-a-versa.
Here, however, the level of desirability is not reducible to individual wants of individual human
beings; instead, the kind of satisfaction in mind is holistic, one that encompasses not only the
whole human person but all of humanity. What is it that brings pleasure, fullness, and completion
to human creatures? Will the afterlife possess the necessary resources to achieve these ends?
Both Christian and Islamic doctrines have historically affirmed that part of man’s
intended telos is immortality, and as such, the desire to live eternally is woven into human
nature. At a basic human level, a conversation about the afterlife will engage that longing and
encourages people to think deeply about it. An eternal life means that human beings will spend
the incomprehensible majority of their existence in a reality quite different from the one
experienced now. It would seem then that our attention, reflection, and motivations should be
drawn to this life to come. This life is but a mere vapor, a wisp in the wind, yet so much of
humanity’s thoughts and efforts are focused immanently on this present world.
Reframing one’s perspective to include a present awareness of afterlife is an important
feature within Islam. Among the list of fundamental doctrines, William Chittick writes that the
return to Allah is “the third of the three major principles of Islamic theology, after Tawḥīd and
prophecy.”2 One of the things to appreciate about Islam is the emphasis on living this life in light
of eternity. Classical Islam and Christianity both teach that the choices we make have eternal
significance; but the significance is demonstrated even more so in Islam where the level of
spiritual development in this life subsequently influences one’s proximity to Allah in Paradise.

William Chittick, “The Ambiguity of the Qur’anic Command,” in Between Heaven and Hell: Islam,
Salvation, and the Fate of Others, ed. by Mohammad Hassan Khalil, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013),
68.
2
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The importance of Paradise and its attainment cannot be understated. Furthermore, a robust view
of Heaven/Paradise provides answers to deeply felt needs. 3 Human purpose, human identity, the
problem of evil are all issues that find answers and resolution from this doctrine. On the
Christian view of Heaven Walls writes, “To recover heaven as a positive moral source is to
recover our very humanity.”4 This too can apply to Muslims as human telos in classical Islam is
intimately linked to the afterlife. The doctrine of the afterlife – Heaven or Paradise – deserves
one’s utmost attention and people should strive for thorough and sound understanding of it.
Broadly speaking, my hope is that both Christians and Muslims will benefit from this
study by first challenging them to think about the doctrines of Heaven and Paradise coupled with
the concept of eternal duration. More specifically, however, this study is apologetic in nature and
as such I wish to equip the Christian reader with resources that help him/her to engage their
Muslim neighbor in fruitful dialogue concerning the nature of the afterlife. This is done by
showing the qualitative good that results from personal relationship with the Triune God
consummated in the final abode contrasted to the seemingly restrictive relationality of the
Muslim believer and tawḥīdic Allah. For the Muslim reader, this study is polemical in nature but
is not meant to turn the reader away. Applying the doctrine of tawḥīd faithfully generates certain
commitments which Islam’s own scholars have wrestled with for centuries and my intent is to
apply that conversation towards thoughts and implications about Paradise.

3
Our desire for something to be true does not necessarily add veracity to a thing nor does it give good
reason to believe it is true, but, as Walls rightly notes, “…at the same time I would insist that we should not dismiss
it out of hand because it does so.” Jerry Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 200.
4

Ibid., 200.
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Research Problem
The quantitative nature of eternity is incomprehensible, unfathomable to the human mind.
What humans can project into eternity, however, is the impression that eternal existence, while
initially garnishing existential appeal, could quickly become a hellish reality.5 To provide some
perspective about the sheer quantity of time, think about the adverb quickly relative to eternity.
Take any amount of time that is comprehensible to the human mind, or, for our purposes, even
an amount of time that is not, then imagine that once you reach that designated point of existence
the pleasure of paradise has diminished. This sequence happens quickly relative to eternity for
there is still an infinite amount of existence remaining for one to experience. What is left then for
human beings for the rest of eternity? Would we still desire to exist, to go on in a reality of
diminishing return?
Eternity, then, creates a potential existential problem for humanity. The problem is
potential because eternity creates a certain need, a need which can concisely be stated in this
way: quality must overcome quantity. Both Islam and Christianity teach that mankind is intended
to live forever and so both religions must overcome this problem if eternal life within that
religion is something to be desired. Furthermore, in both Islam and Christianity, God is revealed

5

The first intimation of trouble would likely be boredom, but as human beings experience the temporal
succession of paradise, boredom could conceivably give way to a more dark and demented existence. Boredom is
not the only concern that some philosophers and theologians have towards immortality. Matters of the self, the
mind/body distinction, personality, the soul, etc., and their relation to immortality are all questions which give rise to
concerns about a future existence. For more on this subject see: Brian Ribeiro, “The Problem of Heaven,” Ratio 24,
no. 1 (March 2011): 46-64, accessed January 25, 2018, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/10.1111/j.14679329.2010.00482.x; Erland Ehnmark, “The Problem of Immortality,” The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 44,
No. 1 (Jan., 1951), 1-23, accessed January 25, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508414. Michael Martin,
“Problems with Heaven,” in The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case Against Life After Death, ed. by Michael Martin and
Keith Augustine, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 427-439. A popular level source: Valerie Tarico, “10
Reasons Christian Heaven Would Actually Be Hell,” Alternet, accessed January 25, 2018,
https://www.alternet.org/10-reasons-christian-heaven-would-actually-be-hell. For responses to the purported
problems and or positive cases for immortality see: John Martin Fischer, “Why Immortality is Not So Bad,”
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2 (1993): 257-270; Charles Taliaferro, “Why we need immortality,”
Modern Theology 6, no. 4 (July 1, 1990): 367-377.
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as a merciful and beneficial deity who provides and sustains the well-being of his human
creations. God as provider is a common motif and this trait carries into the afterlife. Since God is
good, and he is an all-loving provider then we are justified in assuming that the Afterlife will be
good. It would seem then that if eternality was a good thing and immortality worth possessing
there must be, to quote Anselm, “something which nothing greater can be conceived,” that can
overcome infinite duration. To meet the qualitative need posed by the quantitative demand
nothing less will do than a maximally great being – i.e. God.
The solution to the problem of eternity rests in the Divine because He is the Ultimate
Good, and possesses infinite resource, virtue, power, knowledge, etc. 6 I would submit even
further that part of the solution (at least) rests in our capacity to have knowledge of and be able
to relate to the ultimate Good. A significant feature of creaturely goodness is relationality which
consists in knowing and being knowing by others. Knowledge of another leads to love. When
directed towards Allah, knowledge of Him leads the Muslim to love Allah above all else and so
love is the condition for proper belief;7 and when that belief obtains, Allah, in return, will love
those who love Him and do good (Q. 2:222). Similarly, we see in the gospel of John that
knowing the Father and the Son is eternal life (John 17:3). Knowing the Triune God is eternal
life but in Christianity, knowing is much more robust than knowledge of propositional attributestatements about God. Here, knowledge is relationality, of knowing a person and being known in

Immanuel Kant writes, “The end of all things which go through the hands of human beings, even when
their purposes are good, is folly…Wisdom, that is, practical reasons using means commensurate to the final end of all
things – the highest good – in full accord with the corresponding rules of measure, dwells in God alone; and the only
thing which could perhaps be called human wisdom is acting in a way not visibly contrary to the idea of that [divine]
wisdom.” Here Kant purports that God is the grounding of the highest good. The virtue of wisdom comes from the
divine wisdom and insofar as humans as wise directly corresponds not to a human end but to the divine. Immanuel
Kant, “The End of All Things,” in Religion and Rational Philosophy, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di
Giovanni, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 228.
6

7

Sahih Muslim Book 1 (The Book of Faith), Hadith 67, 68 https://sunnah.com/muslim/1

7
return. This emphasis on relational knowing (and by virtue, a certain kind of love) is non-existent
in Islam and this is, by necessity, due to the ontology of Allah. Allah and the Triune God share in
benefaction, mercy, justice, and in these ways, they both display similar loves. However, the
very ontology of God in these respective religions necessitates a very distinct foundational kind
of love that differentiates Ultimate Goodness. The Islamic doctrine of Tawḥīd teaches that Allah
is unitarily undifferentiated, one, without distinction or comparison. Allah’s love is
fundamentally reflexive, directed back onto itself in singularity. Ultimate goodness in the context
of love is thus self-love. The Trinity, however, is both unity and plurality, a singular essence
(ὁμοουσια) yet three distinct asymmetrical persons. Trinitarian love is fundamentally othercentered, seeking the good of the other, in an eternal perichoretic fashion. 8 Here, ultimate
goodness in the context of love is other-centered love.
Contrasted in this way, we have two fundamental statements about Ultimate Goodness.
Thus, we have two distinct ways God relates to man and man to God in the Afterlife. I will argue
that only a Trinitarian God, as described in Christianity, can provide humanity with the most
robust version of eternal life, one that will better satisfy human beings for eternity. Furthermore,
I submit that the Christian view of afterlife meets the demand of eternity because of the God/man
relationship in Heaven focused supremely on, in, and through the God-man Jesus Christ. It is it
our holistic relationship to the Triune God that grants eternal joy for all of redeemed humanity.
Sub-Questions
The sub-questions laid out in this section reflect the remaining chapters in this study and
are presented sequentially.

Peter Leithart’s book on the relational considerations of the Trinity in comparison to human relationship
and interaction is helpful for a greater understanding of the perichoretic relation within the Trinity. See Peter J.
Leithart, Traces of the Trinity: Signs of God in Creation and Human Experience, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press,
2015).
8
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1. What is the nature of Paradise in Islam?
A robust understanding of Islamic Paradise is needed if Christians are to engage with
Muslims in fruitful apologetic dialogue. Christians must be able to move beyond sexual
caricatures of Paradise and address its most salient features. In many ways, Paradise and Heaven
share similar physical characteristics although the former described in much more detail than the
latter. Because of the need for greater understanding, Chapter 2 will unpack certain motifs of
Islamic paradise integral to the study.
2. What is the nature of the relationship between God and man in Islam?
If one speaks of union, experience, and love of Allah, a particular set of questions arise.
As mentioned before, the primary teaching of Islam is that Allah is one (Tawḥīd), that He is
wholly other than creation. However, the Qur’an also teaches that Allah is closer to man than his
jugular vein (Surah 50:16). On the one hand Allah is radically transcendent and on the other he is
intimately immanent, and so Chapter 3 develops the Islamic conceptions of divine knowledge,
love and relationality.
The 11th Century Medieval Muslim scholar Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad alGhazālī (1058-1111),9 a prominent and influential philosopher, theologian, jurists, and Sunni
mystic, will serve as a middle ground between the majority Sunni tradition and the Christian
view of Heaven.10 He was a reformer of Islam in his time and suggested that central to the
eternal joy of Paradise is the Vision of Allah rather than its physical pleasures. Within the
highest levels of Paradise is a spiritual encounter with Allah which far surpasses the physical

9

Hereafter al-Ghazālī

Quasem notes that Al-Ghazālī has sometimes been acclaimed in both the East and the West as the “the
greatest religious authority of Islam after the prophet Muhammad,” and Muslims have given him the title of the
“Proof of Islam” (ḥujjat al-Islām) and the “Ornament of Religion” (zayn ad-dīn). Muhammad Abul Quasem, The
Jewels of the Qur’ān: Al-Ghazālī’s Theory: A Translation, with an Introduction and Annotation, of al-Ghazālī’s
Kitāb Jawāhir al-Qur’ān, (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1977), 10.
10
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bliss of the Garden. The highest levels of Paradise, however, are reserved for those whom in this
life attain a certain level of spiritual illumination and practice.
Al- Ghazālī was influenced by the spiritual and mystical experiences of the Sufi
traditions. His writings help to move the pendulum back towards a theocentric view of Heaven.
Thus, it would seem that discussions about God’s love become of paramount import. Of the
Islamic theologians who stressed the centrality of love in the human-divine relationship, as alGhazālī did, Chittick writes, “the fact that they focused on loves show that they were writing
with the goal of bringing humans and God together…”.11 Sufi scholars stress the human side of
the divine-human relationship and seek to demonstrate how one can partake in the Beatific
Vision. Al-Ghazālī moves in the right direction suggesting that the highest form of Paradise is
the experience of Allah. But as his view develops two critical points (at least) arise: first,
considering the doctrine of Tawḥīd, relation to Allah is at best mystical and impersonal; and
second, how then does Allah love humanity if he only loves Himself as ultimate? One of the 99
divine names of Allah is love but what is the nature and essence of this love and to whom is the
referent? Does, in fact, Allah demonstrate agape love towards creation as some suggest? Is it, in
this way analogous to the agape love of the Trinity or is it merely an equivocation of terms?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between God and man in Christianity?
As was done with Islam, Chapter 4 will address Christian conceptions of divine
knowledge, love, and relationality as it relates to the God/Man relationship. First John 4:7-8 is
such a profound theological passage for it is one of the few passages in Scripture in Scripture
where God essence is revealed. At the end of verse 8 the copulative verb applies the predicate of

11
William Chittick, Divine Love: Islamic Literature and the Path to God, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2013), 4.
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love to God. These verses go on to say that if you do not know love you do not know God.
Furthermore, in John 15:9-17, Jesus tells his followers that he loves them and that they are to
abide in his love. They can abide in the love of Christ by keeping his commandments. Jesus tells
these things to his disciples so that “my joy may be in you, and that your joy may be full.” There
is a connection here between love, obedience, and joy. Having fullness of joy is found in abiding
in the love of God. This applies to the Afterlife as well. Eternal joy will derive from abiding and
partaking in the love of God in Heaven where human beings will know and be known, love and
be loved by the Triune God.
Limitations
1. Perspectives about afterlife
For some, death brings an existential quality to current life because every choice, every
decision, every action is given a significant weightiness. Because we have only one life to live,
what we chose to do with our limited time gives a heightened value to that decision. Conversely,
the more the ability to choose and decide in a finite context is infringed upon or removed
entirely, the more tragic the circumstance. Thus, if the possibility of non-existence is taken away
and human beings are to life forever, life becomes meaningless to some degree. This perspective
of immortality has been discussed in academic writings and popularized in a number of literary
works as well as movies. Quite often, immortality is seen as a curse rather than a blessing and
death and finitude provide a romanticized emphasis on human decisions. The negative
relationship between immortality and meaning is misunderstood and I would submit that an
eternal afterlife is a positive thing even something to be desired. Eternal life does not limit the
existential quality of this current life for if humans are to live forever, then this ‘existential crisis
of sorts’ misses the point. If, from a Christian perspective, part of mankind’s telos is immortality
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then existence is woven into the very essence of humanity. Decisions in this life are important
because they will have a significant impact on the life to come. The same can be said in Islamic
theology. From an Islamic perspective, man’s telos includes immortality, an eternal existence
either enjoying the pleasures in Paradise or experiencing torment in Hell. Thus, this study will
proceed under the supposition that eternal life is a good to be desired because it is part of our
telos as human beings.
2. Variation within the Christian Tradition
Christian eschatology is broad and diverse. There are many camps within the broader
tradition each beholden to various doctrines concerning the time of Christ’s return, the nature of
His coming, the role of the Church, the Tribulation period, the Millennial reign, etc. Variations in
Christianity regarding the nature of heaven exist as well though commitment to them are
seemingly less dogmatically held than the doctrines just mentioned. Throughout the history of
Christianity there has traditionally been two ends of the spectrum concerning the foci of
heavenly pleasure. 12 On the one end of the spectrum is a theocentric view of heaven. In its most
extreme form, heaven consists of eternal contemplation of the infinite reality of God (i.e.
Aquinas). Eternal joy then, as Walls writes, “consists entirely of the beatific vision, requiring no
dimension of human fellowship to be complete.” 13 On the other end of the spectrum is the
anthropocentric view of heaven. Heaven, on this end, resembles life here on earth yet in a
glorified sense, void of pain and suffering. We would be reunited with our loved ones and
“Heaven thus construed,” as Walls again writes, “would include poetry, pianos, poppies, and sex,

12

Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2001), 177ff.; 302ff.
13

Walls, Heaven, 7.
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all at their best.”14 Down through the ages, theologians, church confessions, writers and poets
have fallen along the spectrum in one degree or another often like the swing of a pendulum
through time.
Considering the array of belief regarding heaven, it is difficult to establish one position as
orthodox. As with any spectrum, however, the poles are typically to be avoided as they tend to
traverse too far in one direction. I would submit that the middle of the spectrum is where we
should reside. It is the place where heaven and earth come together, where God and Man meet,
where lover and beloved are united in perfect love and relationality. The middle is found where
God (θεός) became Man (ἀνθρωπος) – Jesus Christ. That Jesus Christ is the middle ground in the
spectrum provides a balanced view of Heaven. Following the resurrection, Jesus possessed a
spiritual body which means that the second person in the trinity remains incarnated in space and
time. Thus, if Jesus was fully human, then it suggests that human telos includes, but is not
limited, to a physical spacio-temporal existence in eternity. To be human is to possess a physical
body albeit one that has put on immortality. 15 This would further suggest that the eternal joys of
afterlife are analogous in some respects to this life. Chiefly among the correspondence is the
human need of and satisfaction in love and relationality. Yes, Heaven will consist of
contemplation of the Divine and yes it quite likely possesses physical pleasures brought on by
food, drink, nature, etc., but of central importance is the intimate relation to God, where we will
love and be loved, know and be known, where all persons – Divine and Human – are not mere
means to pleasure but are end in themselves where pleasure ultimately and perfectly derives.
3. Variation with the Islamic Tradition

14

Ibid., 7.

15

1 Cor. 15:42ff.
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Just as there is variation of doctrine and belief in Christianity, so too is there in Islam.
There are of course fundamental dogmas in Islam where if one were to deny them, they would
not be Muslim. The doctrine of Tawḥīd and the creedal Shahada represent two such dogmas.
Moving out from that foundation, however, variation and distinction begin to form in all manners
of Islamic doctrine (i.e. Sharia Law, Jurisprudence, succession from the Prophet, philosophy of
religion, etc.). The same can be said of Paradise, that is, there is both commonality and
distinction within Islam concerning the eschaton. 16 Because of the broad range of eschatological
views in Islam the scope will inevitably need narrowing. There are the same two traditional
camps in Islam as there were in Christianity – a theocentric and anthropocentric view. The
theocentric view, like Christianity, emphasizes the Beatific Vision – contemplation of the Divine
– as the source of unending joy. A literal reading of the Qur’an and Hadiths support a more
anthropocentric view and it is the view arguably held by a greater number of Muslims
throughout the history of Islam.
The second chapter will present a basic understanding of Paradise in Islam, addressing its
salient features. This survey will tend towards a Sufi (mystical) tradition of Paradise. I do not
wish to trivialize or misrepresent the literalist reading of the Qur’an in relation to Paradise but
nonetheless, it appears more susceptible to critical analyses than does the more mystical
theocentric traditions due to the latter’s emphasis on Divine encounter. As such, the overall
dialogue will be directed toward the Sufi perspective.
4. The degree of speculative theology.

16

For further study of Islamic Eschatology, one can reference these sources: Christian Lange, Paradise and
Hell in Islamic Traditions, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016); The Islamic Understanding of
Death and Resurrection by Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Haddad (Oxford Scholarship Online); Jerry Walls, Ed.,
The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Admittingly, our epistemic access to things concerning the eschaton delimits what can be
known about every aspect of the afterlife. This study takes seriously the revelatory comments
alluding to the idea that a heavenly afterlife will be beyond human imagination. Throughout any
critical point of the study, a Muslim may claim that Allah or YHWH has prepared a place that is
beyond our imagination (Surah 32:17) and by this resort to mystery and trust. I would certainly
hope this is the case and agree that God’s creative capacities are more elaborate, powerful, and
complex than human capacities. The Afterlife would not be a place to long for if its design were
left up to creaturely imaginations. However, even though humanity is limited in what can be
known, it does not necessarily follow that nothing is known. Beyond our imagination is not the
same as beyond our comprehension. We may not be able to imagine the richness of Paradise but
if the reward of the afterlife is to be enjoyed forever shouldn’t it be within our capacity to
comprehend on some level now especially since this world is teeming with God’s goodness? In
both the Christian and Islamic holy texts, the revelatory disclosure includes content concerning at
least some aspects of the nature of afterlife. People can at least know some things about it
however limited it may be. But, if, at the conclusion of this inquiry into Islamic Paradise,
someone responds with “we do not fully know what Allah has prepared for us but we trust that it
will be eternally satisfactory” then it will be difficult to continue a fruitful discussion on this
specific topic.17 At some level the statement has merit, yes our understanding of Paradise is
limited – by location, knowledge, perception, etc. – but based on what we do know through
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revelation, not only about Paradise but Allah’s nature and thus relation to it, I believe one can
form sound opinions and beliefs concerning it.
Full-disclosure and ultimate comprehension of what Paradise is like would not be
expected nor could it be achieved in this life. If we faithfully apply revelations concerning its
nature, then we must admit that parts of its reality are beyond our current ability to understand
both in comprehension and experience. At the same time, the Qur’an and Hadiths strive to great
lengths to describe the Gardens as a reality that seemingly corresponds to this one. Thus, I am
asserting that it is possible within that correspondence to evaluate and make certain judgments
about the nature of the blessed afterlife prepared for the faithful followers of Allah.
5. Paradise on its own merits
In Islam, the eternal fate of mankind subsists in two contrasting realities – Jannah (the
Garden or Paradise) and Hell. Paradise is for those who are faithful followers of Allah and upon
whom He has desired to show mercy and reward. Hell, on the other hand, is for those who have
denied the oneness of Allah, have rejected his prophet Muhammed, and have not heeded the
revelation of the Qur’an. The same dichotomy exists in Christianity. Heaven is the abode of God
and where those who are called His “sons and daughters” will spend an eternity in His presence.
Hell is reserved for the Devil, the fallen angels, and those who have rejected the Father’s Son –
Jesus Christ. For this study, Paradise and Heaven will not be considered in comparison to Hell.
Given the option of Paradise/Heaven or Hell, the only sane and rational choice is the former.
Thus, Paradise and Heaven will be analyzed in themselves and then compared to one another and
not in comparison to Hell.
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Key Terms
This section will present a number of key terms in the study. Most of the terms presented
are Islamic terms and they highlight central theological aspects of Islam 18:
islām, īmān, iḥsān
These three words represent a threefold attitude adopted by Sufis. The Qur’ān speaks of
the first two terms: islām and īmān. Obviously, islām is familiar as it is the name of the religion
and it means “the complete and exclusive surrender of the faithful to God’s will and his perfect
acceptance of the injunctions as preached in the Qur’ān.” 19 A Muslim who practices sharīʿah has
the attitude of islām which is the externalizing of the religious form. Īmān, “faith,” in contrast,
constitutes the internal aspect of Islam. Thus, as Schimmel notes, “a muslim need not be a
muʾmin “one who has faith,” but the muʾmin is definitely muslim.”20 The last term, iḥsān, was
added – according to most traditions by the Prophet himself – with the meaning that you have
continual contemplation of God and worship Him as if you see Him. Of course, man cannot see
Allah, but the Qur’ān teaches that Allah sees everything – all the particulars of reality21 – and so
man, as Schimmel writes, “must never fall back into the “sleep of heedlessness,” never forget the
all-embracing divine presence.”22 Iḥsān is the completion of the internalizing of Islam and is the
goal of every Sufi disciple.
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“Going back” ma‘ād
Islam teaches that human creatures were pre-existing souls prior to the creation of the
world. Following the creation of the world, human beings were sent to the earth but most of them
forgot about Allah because they were separated by the “veil of createdness.”23 Thus, part of the
Muslim journey is remembrance, remembrance of Allah and subsequently the immanence of the
return. Islam views the whole of human history as moving towards the “going back” or ma‘ād.
This concept of returning is a fundamental principle and it concern the manner in which a person
returns. As Chittick notes, “The issue of salvation and its opposite, damnation, arises in
discussions of this third principle [ma‘ād ]…In the texts, the contrast between salvation and
damnation is frequently expressed in terms of “felicity” and “wretchedness,” a pairing derived
from a verse about the resurrection” (Q. 11:105). 24 Every person will return to Allah, but the
manner in which they return – salvation or damnation – depends on remembrance.
“The Path” ṭarīqah
This is the term for the Sufi path to God as well as to denote a Sufi brotherhood. 25
Ṭarīqah or “path” is the doctrines and methods of “the foremost”. Regarding the method of “the
path” they are practiced in addition to what the sharīʿah, the sacred Law, prescribed for every
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believer. In some ways ṭarīqah is the internalization of sharīʿah – the essence and the form
respectively. The sharīʿah is and outward form of an inner dimension of meaning, disposition,
and spirituality. Carrying out the commands of sharīʿah are necessary for all Muslims and it
directs those who follow it precepts to right living. “The Path” leads Sufi adherents from right
living to the way to approach God. 26
“Gnosis/Cognition” maʿrifa
Gnosis or Cognition here refers to knowledge of the Divine. It is not to be confused with
Christian Gnosticism prevalent in 1st and 2nd century which purported to have a secret knowledge
of salvation, reserved only for its adherents. In Islam, gnosis is related to the telos of the human
soul. A properly functioning rational soul pursues its end and loves the pursuance of its activities
– knowledge of God.27 On the nature of the rational soul, Abrahamov writes:
The perfect state of the rational soul is to be always existent perceiving things as they
really are, knowing them, and taking pleasure in this knowledge. The rational soul is
delighted with knowledge because knowledge, by virtue of itself makes the rational soul
perfect and brings it to its goal. Since the rational soul knows its beginning and its end, it
longs for its Creator as a lover longs for his beloved. 28
Seeing Allah is not a seeing of form or matter; rather, it is a spiritual seeing that is achieved
through knowledge of the Divine Attributes (the 99 beautiful names). Pleasure in the afterlife
will coincide with this gnosis as the rational soul will fulfill its telos contemplating the Divine.
“Love” ḥubb and ‘ishq
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As with most languages other than English, the concept of love is linguistically diverse
with multiple terms employed to capture the robust nature of love. For the purposes of this study,
we must delineate between two terms for love used by Arabic speaking Muslims – ḥubb and
‘ishq. The former, ḥubb (or maḥabba) is the wording used in the Qur’ān to describe God’s love
for man and vice-a-versa as seen in Surah 5:54 “He loves them, and they love Him.” In early
Islam, ḥubb was the accepted term for talk of God’s love even though His love and man’s love
were not to be understood univocally as the term referred to love as a type of longing. Over time,
certain Sufis began to use ‘ishq in reference to God’s love. This was initially controversial
because of its connotation of the kind of love expressed between two passionate lovers. Used in
relation to man’s love for God however, ‘ishq need not denote a sexual connotation but can refer
to the awakening of man’s soul to deeper passions and the ascension to the spiritual realm. 29 AlGhazālī referred to ‘ishq as the last stage of love this side of Paradise and that few would attain
this level of love for Allah. 30 A Muslim who has ‘ishq for his Lord will experience the highest
realms of pleasure in Paradise, the Beatific Vision of Allah.

Literature Review
In the chapter entitled “A Christian Approach to Eternal Life,” Peter Vardy seeks to
reframe a prominent aspect of Thomistic theology concerning the Beatific Vision in the Christian
Afterlife (i.e. Heaven). This chapter is pertinent because the conclusion Vardy puts forth is much
in line with the argument proposed in this comparative study. In Summa Contra Gentiles,
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Aquinas writes on the Beatific Vision of God that awaits Christians in the afterlife. Throughout
this portion of the Summa, Aquinas builds his cases chapter-by-chapter and point-by-point,
towards the conclusion that the highest level of happiness for humanity is achieved in the
Beatific Vision.31 Aquinas contends that the highest good of human function is the contemplative
life demonstrating his commitments to Aristotelian philosophy. 32 Not only is Aquinas committed
to an Aristotelian anthropology, he also demonstrates his commitments to a Platonic view of
God. Aquinas rightly identifies God as the summum bonum but is also overly committed to other
Greek influences regarding the attributes of God: “literally timeless, utterly immutability,
bodiless, spaceless and without parts.” 33 Thus, in relation to the Beatific Vision, man’s relation to
God is the Afterlife is understood within the bounds of these essential attributes. Aquinas’s view
helps the believer to see that his only end is in God “yet”, as Vardy notes, “a God identified with
the supreme Platonic values.”34 The subsequent development of the Beatific Vision in the
Summa is fraught with theological and philosophical difficulties. Vardy discusses a few of the
challenging implications of this Thomistic theology and proposes a new way forward that is
seemingly more consistent with Scripture and avoids many of the problems of the Thomist view.
His conclusions elevate the relational components of Afterlife, a heavenly society where “the
wolf and the lamb shall lie down together, and a little child shall lead them” (Isa. 11:6). This

31

Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke, ed. by Joseph Kenny, III.63.
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm Accessed, Sept. 14, 2017.
32
In III.37 of the Summa, Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 10.7 in establishing that man’s
ultimate happiness is found in contemplation of the highest level of speculation (See Aristotle, Nichomachean
Ethics, trans. by David Ross, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 194 (10.7.11-18). It should be noted that
Aristotle does not make the theological move that Aquinas will in resting the highest human good in the
contemplation of God in the Afterlife.

Peter Vardy, “A Christian Approach to Eternal Life,” in Beyond Death: Theological and Philosophical
Reflections of Life After Death, edit. by Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Christopher Lewis, (London: MacMillan Press:
1995), 19.
33

34

Ibid., 20.

21
picture of heaven depicts a social environment that has been transformed in a spiritual sense, that
is, “a spirit of individuals who have put self into second place and have devoted their lives to
love of others and of God. They have become, literally, transformed by love.” 35
Lastly, yet equally relevant to the study, is the analogous relationship of Aquinas’s
Beatific Vision with the Islamic equivalence in the Sufi traditions.36 In Ch. 51 of SCG Aquinas
writes, “For God Himself understands His own substance through His own essence; and this is
His felicity…And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy to eat and
drink at God’s table, seeing Him in the way that He sees Himself.” 37 This description of the
Beatific Vision is remarkably similar to the Sufi tradition on a number of fronts. First, it places
the highest good in God. This placement is obviously consistent with general theocentric view of
Heaven. However, second, and more unique, both conceptions of God in the Afterlife are
committed to an utterly immutable, transcendent and bodiless deity. Here is where the two views
distinguish themselves from the evangelical view. Evangelical theology emphasizes the bodily
resurrection of Jesus and understands this resurrection state as extending into the present. Jesus,
the second person of the Trinity, remains in bodily form and as such, experiences temporal
succession.
Building on the first and second points, human pleasure and enjoyment in the afterlife,
being found in the highest good, i.e. God, is consistently derived from the same manner God
experiences delight – in Himself. Thus, for both Aquinas and al-Ghazali, humans enjoy God in
the same manner that God enjoys Himself, namely, God enjoys Himself by reflecting on His
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essence. God enjoys Himself and humans can enjoy God – the summum bonum – in the Afterlife
by enjoying his attributes and contemplating His thoughts. 38 The problem with both of these
conceptions is not that humanity finds their end in God nor that that end correlates to the manner
in which God enjoys or loves Himself; rather, it is the conception of God in relation to Himself
and others. Al-Ghazālī’s God is radically unitary and Aquinas’s God, while retaining an
orthodox trinitarianism, is utterly immutable thus diminishing the capacity of God to truly and
genuinely love humanity and vice-a-versa. It is only the Tri-unity of Persons, i.e. the Trinitarian
God of Christianity, free from Platonic bonds of immutability, that can meaningfully display
love. The essence of the Trinitarian God is love and not merely a self-absorbed, equivocal love,
but a dynamic, other-focused love existing eternally in the Tri-unity of persons of the Godhead.
Brian Scalise’s dissertation, Tawḥīdic Allah or the Trinity In View of Inherent Human
Relatedness, adds to the corpus of theological comparison between Islam and Christianity,
chiefly focusing on the nature of deity in each respective religion. Beginning with the
assumption of the inherent relatedness between human beings, Scalise works out abductively
seeking to “inquire into the nature of Deity in view of human relationships.” 39 Human
relationships exist and are a definite part of human existence, which Deity best accounts for
and/or has greater explanatory depth to offer the best explanation for the kinds of human
relationships we have? Is it the Tawḥīdic nature of Allah or the Trinitarian nature of the God of
Christianity? Chapters 2-4 of the dissertation develop the prolegomena and theological content
necessary to conclude with what is Scalise’s most significant contribution to the field, the
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implications of Tawḥīdic Allah in relation to the concepts of otherness, relationality, distinction
and, most importantly, love. 40
The concluding chapter is both intuitive and profound as a summation and confluence of
his in-depth theology study. 41 Before beginning his “paratactic comparison,” 42 Scalise first
readdresses the issue of Islam’s affirmation that humans are not made in the image of Allah. This
has significant impact not only on Scalise’s conclusions but the arguments of this study as well.
Claiming that Allah does not have similarity to human creatures means that He is utterly
dissimilar in all manner of comparison and knowledge. Regarding Scalise’s purposes, Allah’s
dissimilarity would “affirm that Allah does not explain human reality and relating,” implying, at
least prima facie, that God as Trinity has greater explanatory depth for human reality.
Furthermore, the consequence of such dissimilarity reaches far beyond explanatory scope for it
would a priori suspend any possibility of theological knowledge altogether. The Muslim would
seemingly not want to hold such a commitment considering all the theological language and
content purportedly revealed in the Qur’an. At risk would be the very names/attributes of Allah,
the 99 beautiful pronouncements of His character. Thus, it must be assumed, if human creatures
can possess any meaningful understanding of Allah’s attributes, there must be, as Scalise rightly
notes, “human realities to give a basis by which to understand those names applied to Allah –
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analogically of course.”43 To what extent, then, is Allah wholly other if He can meaningfully be
known through human realities?
Lastly, Scalise also addresses the ethics of love in concert with Tawḥīdic Allah and
Trinity. Love for the other is one of the highest forms of love along with the love one has for
God. If we are to hold this kind of love is such high regard, as such a great good, it would be
problematic if we could not attribute this type of goodness to God. Once again Islam is plagued
by the notion of otherness because the nature of Allah provides no ontological grounding for the
concept of otherness. 44 Unlike Trinitarian love, there is no basis for Allah to love the other which
means that Allah’s love is purely self-absorbed, ever reflexing in upon itself. This poses both
ethical and relational challenges for Muslims; how do we account for such a great good apart
from Allah when His own nature does not allow for it and, what are the implications for Afterlife
if humans are not the recipients of Divine love? To the former, Scalise rightly argues that only
God as Trinity best explains love for the other and to the latter, it is part of the goal of this study
to demonstrate that Tawḥīdic Allah does not overcome its singularity and thus has profoundly
negatives effects on the human experience of the Afterlife.
Miroslav Volf’s Allah: A Christian Response is significant in a general sense in that
Volf’s expressed purpose for writing the book is to encourage fruitful dialogue and improve
understanding between Muslims and Christians something this work aims to do as well. 45 More
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specifically, Volf focuses on the doctrine of God throughout for his interest is, as he states, “the
proper Christian stance toward the God of the Qur’an,” which will hopefully help both Christians
and Muslims “live together well in a single endangered world.” 46 Volf’s study is partly
dialogical, and in chapters 8 and 9 – “God’s Mercy” and “Eternal and Unconditional Love” –
this methodology is beneficial as he focuses on the character of God as love. In both Christianity
and Islam, one of the concrete theological doctrines is: God loves. But this proposition ‘God
loves’ is quite ambiguous both because the word ‘love’ itself has a broad scope of meaning and it
can be unclear how love stands in relation to God (i.e., as part of his nature and regarding His
relationship to creation). Volf dispels many misconceptions Christians have towards Islam, most
importantly are those in relation to love. He notes, with regard to God’s love, that Muslims and
Christians share similar convictions: “God loves, God is Just, God’s love encompasses God’s
justice and human beings should love their neighbors as themselves.” 47
But this, however, does not tell the whole story for these similarities do not cover the full
range and aspects of love nor does it address the more fundamental claim of Christianity that
God is love. Volf notes that both faiths agree that God loves in a compassionate, giving manner
but to say that God is love makes a more fundamental statement about God’s eternal being.
Muslim scholars are divided on this issue and have debated ascribing love to God in any
essential manner. Those who do ascribe love to God prior to creation are committing themselves
to a particular set of consequences. Tawḥīdic Allah is not internally differentiated (unlike the
Trinitarian God of Christianity) and so the proposition God is love means there is a unitary self
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who loves himself as the ultimate object of that love. This means that God’s love for creatures
and the creature’s love for God and one another is intimately linked to this kind of self-love
originating from Allah. 48 Thus, we have, as Volf rightly indicates, a comparison of loves – selflove and love for the other – in Islam and Christianity respectively. 49 Which love is ultimate?
The implications of the two loves are profound and directly impact the divine-creature
relationship, moreover, the profundity extends even to the very foundational fabric of reality. 50
Volf’s contribution to the Muslim-Christian dialogue is profoundly beneficial in this
book especially as he elucidates the affinities Muslims and Christians share in their conceptions
of divine love. I would agree with Volf that there is more affinity than many Christians would
typically assume and that this is cause for improve relations; however, I would disagree with his
claim that the differences that exist are not as “deep” as many think. 51 Furthermore, the
implications of divine love and divine-creaturely love extends into the Afterlife and impacts both
the metaphysical and experiential components of the life to come. If God is the highest good in
Paradise (and the Christian Heaven) as Muslim theologians suggest, then how the creature stands
in relation to the divine will be significant.
Jerry Wall’s, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, contributes rich theological and
philosophical conceptions of Heaven and the goodness of God. One of the major themes of
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Heaven is the centrality of heaven to Christianity and the interrelation of this doctrine to most of
the core doctrines of the faith (i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity, incarnation, atonement,
resurrection, etc.).52 The Afterlife impacts many aspects of theology and, as Walls notes, it
(heaven) “is not a mere appendage on the main body of Christian doctrine.” 53 The doctrine of
heaven also has significant philosophical implications on morality, theodicy, and overall
meaning of life.
The first chapter of Walls’s book is the most significant for this study. His stated thesis
was to “show that any meaningful account of God’s goodness implies some notion of heaven.” 54
Walls dialogues with Hume’s desire not to live forever and the impetus for such a seemingly
nihilistic desire. At the end of his life, Hume stated in an interview that he did not want to live
forever because he did not know what kind of life it would be and did not want to risk that life
being worse than the life he had already lived. The uncertainty of the life to come, for Hume,
was linked to his belief that God was an amoral being. Being neither good or bad, God would
have no moral commitments to securing a certain kind of afterlife for his creation. Through his
analysis of Hume’s dialogue partners in Dialogues, Walls argues, agreeing with Demea, that it is
implausible to believe that God is amoral and more reasonable to believe in the goodness of God
based on the way we have been created. 55
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The notion of heaven is a foundational doctrine in the Christian faith and Walls is to be
praised for his rigorous theological and philosophical defense of the afterlife and prayerfully, a
faithful renaissance of this doctrine is to follow. Furthermore, his work is fundamental in
drawing the connection between God’s goodness and what we might expect heaven to be like.
Thus, analysis and conclusions about what God is like in both Islam and Christianity and God’s
relationship to his creation profoundly impacts what one can expect of the quality of the life to
come.
Another significant text is Heaven: A History by Bernhard Lang and Colleen McDannell.
This text is essential because it supplements the study with a very thorough history of the
development of the doctrine of heaven in Church history. Beginning with the early church
fathers, the authors trace how the doctrine of heaven has developed within a spectrum that has
vacillated through the ages from one end to the other. The two poles of the spectrum are a
theocentric and anthropocentric view of heaven. On the one end, the theocentric view places God
at the center and emphasizes a heaven in which the highest good is the beatific vision –
contemplation of the divine. This view tended to be more static and was not dependent on
human-to-human relationships. Life in heaven was contrasted to life on earth as life in heaven
will have little to do with life on earth. 56 Concerning the theocentric view, McDannell and Lang
write, “The saints do not have to do anything, they merely experience the fullness of their being
by existing with God.”57 On the other end is the anthropocentric view of heaven. If the
theocentric view of heaven stands in contradistinction to life on earth, the anthropocentric view
depicts a heaven that is much like life on earth although to a magnified degree. In its extreme
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version, the goodness of heaven lies in reuniting with lost loved ones and being together again
with one’s spouse. The landscape of heaven is as a lush garden with houses and tents for people
to live. On this view the authors write, “In the anthropocentric heaven, where all attention was
directed toward the saints – and not to God – motion, variety, and endless diversity supplied the
keys to eternal happiness.” 58
As the authors move through history and discuss the development of doctrine concerning
heaven, it becomes apparent that the particular developments, the paradigm shifts, are intimately
connected to the context of the time. This book reveals that the doctrine of heaven is relatively
malleable and has been shaped by various cultural, theological and philosophical factors and
commitments. From at least the time of Augustine and moving forward, however, there is a
common motif that is prevalent throughout the doctrinal development of heaven – love. Whether
love was connected to contemplation of the divine, as Aquinas suggested, or love existed in a
sensual way in the paintings of the Renaissance, it is pervasive, to one degree or another, along
the theocentric-anthropomorphic spectrum. That love is a central motif in the historical
development of the Christian heaven supports the thesis of the study; love is a central component
in thinking about the goodness of heaven.
Timothy Tennent’s Christianity at the Roundtable provides further theological discourse on
challenging topics through his dialogical project with Muslim interlocutors.59 Tennent’s
methodological approach is encouraging because he builds conceptual relationship with other
religious backgrounds by engaging in cordial theological correspondence. In his treatment of
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Islam, Tennent discusses the theology of Allah’s oneness or tawḥīd, that Allah is an “absolute
unity, with no distinctions or associations.” 60 To add to Allah’s unicity or to associate any
partner with Him is to commit shirk which is an unpardonable sin in Islam. He points out that
from a Muslim’s perspective, this is exactly what Christians do when they speak of God as
Trinity and teaching of the divinity of Christ, they are committing shirk by adding to Allah a
partner. In this section, Tennent also notes the tension and conceptual difficulty which exists for
any serious student of Islam between talk of Allah’s essence and His many attributes. 61
Navigating the relationship between Allah’s essence and attributes is a delicate endeavor.
Affirming both tawḥīd and the predication of attributes seemingly implies that there is distinction
within Allah’s nature. The two main schools of theology in Islam – the Muʿtazila and Ashʿarite –
differ in their resolution, the former purports that Allah’s essence and attributes are the same, the
latter that the attributes are not to be identified with His essence. 62 Tennent is correct to assert
that any serious discussion about Allah and relationality must take seriously the relation between
His essence and attributes.
Furthermore, as part of the section on Islam, Tennent defends God qua Trinity in a
dialogue with Sunni, Shiʿite, and Sufi interlocutors. He eloquently and astutely discusses the
deeper aspects of Trinitarian theology as well as both the internal relationality of God and the
divine/man relationship. His correspondence with the Sunni and Shiʿite Muslim will be useful
throughout this study but it was his specific discussion with the Sufi that interests us here. From
the Sufi discussion two things become clear: first, Sufism is not as concerned with the
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ontological nature of Allah as a mere mental abstraction. In response the Ṣūfī writes, “Tawḥīd
refers to the experience or tasting (dhawq) of God’s being by becoming one with Allah in a way
that supersedes all discussion or debate about him.” 63 Second, Sufism makes a distinction
between Allah’s essence and Allah’s acts. Again, the Sufi author writes, “In our view, his acts
are the extension of the eternal light of his being.” 64 Sufism seeks union with that light which
transcends the mind and debate, leading ultimately to complete union with Allah.
This chapter’s primary focus is not the afterlife; rather, it is a chapter on the nature of
God and his relationality and knowability. However, because any notion of relationality in both
Islam and Christian has its ultimate end in the Beatific Vision, Tennent’s work is beneficial to
the study. His explication of the difficulties in Islamic theology concerning the nature of Allah,
are the same difficulties that arise when one thinks about Paradise and its bliss, that is, assuming
that Allah is the ultimate good.
Christian Lange's Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions is a necessary source for anyone
wishing to study the features of Paradise in Islam. His is a very thorough study covering the
doctrinal development of Paradise in Islam as well as the points of disagreement between the
various sects. Diversity within Islam led to diversity of eschatological doctrines. Various
theological and metaphysical commitments about Allah and the world influenced hermeneutical
approaches to the texts creating differing views of Paradise. While there is much diversity of
thought, there remains, however, a strong traditionalist view that emphasizes a more literal
reading and thus a tangible Paradise which emphasizes embodied sensuous reward. 65
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It is important to note that it was in Lange’s book where first was discovered any internal
criticism of a material emphasis view of Paradise (i.e. overly sensual view). Lange notes that the
Muʿtazilites were skeptical of a purely corporeal paradise (which included such phenomena as
Allah’s physical throne) but never went so far as to fully spiritualize it either although they
tended toward a more metaphysical reading of the text. In several passages, there is some
occasion of sarcasm in which they react against such sensuous views. Nonetheless, a thorough
spiritualization of paradise did not occur in early Muslim theology and Lange suggests this was
because the language of the Qur’ān and the Hadiths did not allow it. 66
The pinnacle of the spiritualization of paradise coincided with the influence of peripatetic
philosophy of whom Avicenna was the most noted adherent. It was al-Ghazālī who took issue
with such non-corporeal spiritualization but in his writings, he did not fully reverse the spiritual
elements. He argued, in contrast to Avicenna, that paradise is an embodied reality but at the same
time affirmed that the highest dimension of paradise – and thus the highest manner of pleasure –
is an embodied yet spiritualized experience with Allah. Al-Ghazālī holds a somewhat median
view of paradise that incorporates both physical and spiritual dimensions. On the one hand he
keeps with traditional views and preserves the embodied existence; on the other, he maintains a
distinction in levels of pleasure, that is, a lower level of sensual pleasure and the higher spiritual
level reserved for the prophets, saints, and all “pure Muslims.”67
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Fadlou Shehadi’s book Ghazālī’s Unique Unknowable God is an essential philosophical
analysis of Ghazālī’s theology concerning Allah as utterly unique and unknowable. 68 At once the
problems discussed in Shehadi’s book are revealed in the title itself, if Allah is utterly unique and
truly unknowable, then how does one know anything about Allah, including the positive
attribute-statements made in the Qur’ān. The problem is elaborated more fully in relation to alGhazālī’s pursuit of knowledge and union. Shehadi notes that in Ghazālī’s thought the mystical
goal or union is threefold: qurb (likeness), subjective tawḥīd, and objective tawḥīd. Qurb or
‘likeness’ refers to the goal of enriching one’s character, to reach a level of spiritual development
where “nothing remains in the character of the mystic which is not God-like.”69 Subjective
tawḥīd denotes a disposition where the human subject shuts off all other attention to anything
that is not-God. Man’s thoughts are attuned solely on God so that it is Allah alone who occupies
his thought. Lastly, objective tawḥīd, what Ghazālī views as the highest attainment, is the
realization that God is the only being that is necessarily existent and that everything else in
creation derives its existence from Allah. From this realization, Shehadi writes, “the mystic
attains an intuitive perspective from which he sees that there is naught in existence except
Allah,”70 that is, if mystical union is fully achieved only Allah remains because He is the only
one of whom the predicate “objectively real” can be applied.
With each aspect of the mystical union, some measure of knowability of Allah is
affirmed whether in likeness, knowledge, or of essence (that He is objectively real). This
highlights the more fundamental issue at hand and Shehadi demonstrates how al-Ghazālī
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reconciles the seemingly logical discrepancy between Allah’s uniqueness and unknowability and
positive attribute-statements made of Allah. Shehadi labors to show how Ghazālī’s thought does
not lead to logical inconsistency by developing the nature of religious language. He points out
that insofar as Allah is the objective subject of a positive attribute-statement, that statement is
non-descriptive and patently false. However, this religious language, while not having a
descriptive function, has a “practical directing function” in relation to man’s religious life. 71
This language about God is functioning in two different ways and so cannot be
contradictory according to Shehadi, but while that problem may have been avoided another set of
difficulties arise. If Ghazālī is correct, it implies at best a Muslim is ultimately relegated to be
agnostic about God. Descriptive statements about God are meant merely for religious living but
what value do those statements really possess if they do not in any way correspond to what Allah
is like? They may elicit praise but what or who is the referent of that praise? Ghazālī would
affirm that Allah is that referent because the creedal formulas in the Qur’ān are authoritatively
given and divinely inspired. This last statement shifts the locus of the problem to be
fundamentally about revelation, that is, the possibility of divine revelation from a unique and
unknowable divine being. 72
While Shehadi does not discuss the relation or application of Ghazālī’s thought to the
afterlife, the questions about Paradise naturally arise. Since Ghazālī and others affirm that
humans derive the highest pleasure in Paradise from the beatific vision of the Ultimate Good (i.e.
Allah), in light of the agnostic reductionism one cannot help but ask what this beatific vision
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may be like qualitatively or, the more extreme consequence, of its possibility. If Allah is utterly
unique and unknowable, from whence comes satisfaction? Objective Goodness is unknowable
and thus, it seems, must be essentially derivative of something other than God – psychological
and subjective, finite and limited.
Another significant source regarding al-Ghazālī’s thought is Kenneth Garden’s The First
Islamic Reviver: Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī and his Revival of the Religious Sciences.73 One of
Garden’s primary tasks throughout the book was to properly frame Ghazālī’s thought in the
Revival. He states that reading of al-Ghazālī among Western scholars has been dominated by “an
image more in keeping with modern Western notions of religion as a thing properly understood
as a matter of personal conscience”, furthermore, “Among the desires of his modern Western
readers has been to find a Muslim intellectual with an interiorized, mystical spirituality rather
than a ‘scholastic’ or legal one…”.74 The Revival or Iḥyāʾ is a move away from the extreme
exoteric form of Islam which had come to dominate the Caliphs whom Ghazālī served. Seeking
to revive what he believed was the true form of Islam, Ghazālī does not go to the other end of the
spectrum, the overly esoteric practice of Sufism. Ghazālī appreciated Sufism but he found
balance in religious practice by incorporating other disciplines such as philosophy and guidance
found in prophecy. That Ghazālī’s approach is balanced is consistent with his goal in Revival of
guiding the whole Islamic community in the science of the hereafter. Thus, as Garden notes, we
should understand Ghazālī’s Science of the Hereafter “not as Sufism by another name, but as a
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discipline of al-Ghazālī’s creation, a new synthesis of Sufism and philosophy that is reducible to
neither.”75
More specifically, Garden discusses a number of specific Ghazālī thoughts concerning
the attainment of felicity in general and its specific relation to salvation. On the latter, we see that
Ghazālī clearly taught there was gradation in Paradise based on one’s religious attainment in this
life. While felicity was not attainable in this life, reaching felicity in the hereafter was predicated
upon the actions in this life. Felicity is also different than salvation and Ghazālī taught that most
will not attain felicity. This felicity is achieved through knowledge of the Divine and achieved
when one attains a “monistic vision of Him” 76 or as Shehadi labeled it “objective tawḥīd.” It is in
the earthly process of seeking knowledge of Allah where Ghazālī combines theoretical,
philosophical training with Sufism. He sees the former as necessary for proper guidance through
the spiritual experiences of the latter. Without proper rational investigation, however, one can
easily be lead astray in the practice of Sufism.
Love plays a central role in this study, not only because it is intimately linked to the
concept of the Beatific Vision, but also because the types of love to be considered will prove a
comparative tool to evaluate both the Trinitarian God of Christianity and the Tawḥīdic God of
Islam. Binyamin Abrahamov’s work entitled Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism helps to develop
an understanding of divine love in a Sufi context in general and in the theology of al-Ghazali
more specifically. In the introduction, Abrahamov provides a cursory yet extremely beneficial
synopsis of the categories of love as they are found in Greek philosophy, Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. Using the Greek categories established in Plato’s infamous Symposium, Abrahamov
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purports two interesting assertions about divine love in Islam. First is the category of eros or
desire. Love as eros is desire for something that is lacking and in this manner, it cannot be a love
displayed by Allah because He does not lack anything, He is unitary perfection. Abrahamov cites
the Ashʿarite theologian al-Juwaynī who said, “God is too exalted to incline to man or to be the
object of man’s inclinations.”77 Man’s inclination to God or God’s inclination to man would
infringe on Tawḥīd, on God’s radical transcendence. Second, Abrahamov asserts Allah’s love is
more akin to the agape motif. Allah’s love for man is to be understood in terms of a two-fold
benefaction towards man, of giving man the ability to come near to Allah and the removal of the
“partition from man’s heart” so that he can see God (in his heart). 78
Perhaps the most crucial point of Abrahamov’s work is the conclusion brought to the fore
from al-Ghazālī’s work on love. The majority of Book XXXVI from the Ihya focuses on man’s
love for God and the causes of that love. There is relatively little discussion of God’s love for
man and this is consistent with the Qur’an and other Sufi theologians. Human beings cannot
apply a creaturely definition of love to God because all perfections are present in him eternally. 79
Abrahamov writes, “Since the existence of everything except God derives from the existence of
God, which means that there is nothing but his essence and acts, God does not look at anything
except at his essence and acts. Consequently, he loves only himself in which all creation is
included.”80 This statement is made passively but has profound metaphysical and theological
implications. Allah’s love is self-contained. He loves Himself and contained in that love for the
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Self is, by extension, love for the world which happens to be a reciprocal loving of an extension
of Allah himself. It is evident that Abrahamov, and by extension al-Ghazali, is committing Islam
to a form of panentheism in which Allah is in all and all is Allah. Any discussion of love in Islam
will inevitably highlight the problem of Tawḥīd and the other and there is seemingly only two
ways to reconcile it, either God does not love us or, we have to commit, as al-Ghazali and
Abrahamov do, to the illusion of otherness, a commitment few are naturally willing to make.
Continuing with the theme of love in Islam, Annemarie Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions
of Islam, develops some of the implications of mystical love. Schimmel is widely known as an
expert in Sufism and her section on love and annihilation in this text delves into the nuances of
the concept of mystical love as well as discusses the development of this doctrine within the Sufi
tradition. Schimmel begins this section affirming that love and gnosis are the last stations of the
mystical path. The two are complimentary to one another but fluctuation exists in which is
considered superior. This section however focuses on the mystical currents of which love is the
highest state.
Love is a topic of divergence in Islam. Orthodox Muslims tended to understand love as
obedience to Allah but for Sufis the term was too complex to be bound into one conception. To
them, love was a personal and existential commitment, an experience of the divine that went
beyond obedience. 81 Love for Allah is a process of purification wherein the self is completely
submersed in the divine attributes. As one plunges the depths of the divine, s/he becomes more
enraptured with Allah and experiences intimacy, proximity, longing, and desire. 82 It is in this
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state that the self is slowly annihilated as all creaturely distinctions fade out of view and only the
divine attributes remain.
Schimmel’s development of love from and love of the divine in Sufi thought shows that
the doctrine of Love in Islam is complex, diverse, and ultimately mystical. Furthermore, it shows
that Sufi philosophical thought is highly subjective, focusing on the experience of the believer in
connection to Allah. Not much is said of Allah’s love for man beyond his merciful bounty and
the removing of the veil and this is because there is not much that can be said. Allah is selfcontained unity and as such the Sufi believer experiences Allah in some mystical, existential yet
impersonal way in Paradise. In this state the Sufi attempts to always and forever achieve closer
proximity to his Lord by drawing near to His divine attributes.
Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s work, The Garden of Truth, provides further understanding
Islam’s mystical tradition – Sufism. Dr. Nasr is a world renown Islamic philosopher and himself
a practicing Sufi. Sufism is the mystical tradition within Islam and as such, the philosophers,
theologians, and poets of this tradition have written and developed far more, both in material and
doctrine, on man’s relation to the divine. This book is meant to serve the serious Western seeker
in the ways of Sufism and as such it discusses deep universal truths and questions about
existence, telos, and the path to the Truth (i.e. the Divine, Allah). 83 Many of the topics in this
book will supplement the study overall but two particular topics are of significant import: the
centrality of gnosis (knowledge) to Sufism and the role of love and beauty in the spiritual life.
The book itself unfolds like a journey which is seemingly intentional because of the journey or
path motif in Islam. Islamic anthropology begins with man’s descent into the world (the “arc of
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descent”), the metaphysical separation from the Source of all being (i.e. Allah). This life, as
humans experience it, is part of the journey back to the Source, the “arc of ascent”. The
adherents of Sufism believe that theirs is the correct path within Islam, as it is both an outward
and inward journey back to the Source. 84
The journey or the return to the Source is the telos of humanity and achieved both
through gnosis (knowledge) and praxis (i.e. spiritual practice). Achieving the human telos first
began with the Prophet who was given the power by Allah to awaken from, as Nasr notes, “our
earthly daydreaming” which subsequently led to the fulfilling of ultimate human purpose,
“loving and knowing God.”85 One successfully completes the return when he reaches the Garden
of Truth (i.e. Paradise) and it is there where love and knowledge are manifested in their fullness
in the Beatific Vision. These two themes of knowledge and love are of central concern in this
study because of the impact they have in the life to come. The goodness of Paradise and
consequently the goodness of Allah, depend, in my estimation, on the manifestation and
experience of love and knowledge as they relate to and emanate from the Divine in the Afterlife.
Nasr’s work helps the seeker chart the course to Divine by thoroughly explaining and developing
both themes from within the Sufi tradition.
Joseph Lumbard’s “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq: The Development of Love in Early Sufism”
provides useful insight into the relationship between these two kinds of love as well as the
development and implementation of the oft controversial use of ʿishq in early Sufism. This
development is significant because the notion of ʿishq became the predominant use of love and a
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central theme in the Persian Sufi tradition in the 7th/13th Century, most notably in Rūmī (d.
627/1273), who was both a significant Persian Sufi and contributor to the notion of love. 86
Lumbard’s goal in this work is to connect the later developments of ʿishq in Sufism to the
earlier traditions. He notes that the concept of ʿishq did not take on a robust metaphysic until the
work Sawāniḥ (508/1114) by Aḥmed al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid’s brother. In the Sawāniḥ, Aḥmed
makes the strongest metaphysical claim of love to date in Islam by linking love to the divine
essence of Allah. He further suggests that all of reality is the “unfolding of love (ʿishq) through
complex interrelations of loverness and belovedness…” which will eventually culminate in the
return to the origin of said love. 87 Furthermore, Lumbard’s work demonstrates the specific uses
of ḥubb and ʿishq in Abū Ḥāmid’s Book 36 of the Iḥyā. There, Lumbard points out that alGhazālī employs ḥubb while discussing the five ways in which man love which correspond to
the ways in which God is loved. But when al-Ghazālī discusses the highest form of love, and
thus the highest level of delight, he switches to ʿishq, a degree of passionate longing for Allah
akin to infatuation, where love for everything other-than God fades away, the goal for all but one
that few will attain. Another important insight from Lumbard is highlighting the connection
between love and gnosis. Al-Ghazālī identifies love with gnosis, a move, according to Lumbard,
first seen in the Sufi and poet al-Daylamī (d. late fourth/tenth century) but was not repeated in
the extant literature (and often reject) until the publishing of the Iḥyā.88
Literature Survey Summary
The survey has shown a number of things which will be summarized here. First, it has
shown that both the doctrine of Heaven and Paradise in Christianity and Islam respectively is
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diverse and robust. Second, the sources in this survey were selected because they each add pieces
that will be used to construct the argument in the remainder of the paper. Themes such as a
theocentric Afterlife, God’s oneness or Trinity, the love of God and love for God, all play
significant parts in our understanding of the qualitative nature of eternal existence. Lastly, this
survey has demonstrated support for a study of this kind – support through absence. With the
increase of religious intersection there has also been a subsequent increase in religious dialogue.
In the literature, there have been comparative studies done between Christianity and Islam, Allah
and Trinity, etc. The most cordial of these studies and/or conversations strive for further
clarification and mutual understanding while, at the same time, offering respectful critique. What
is lacking, however, is a study of this kind that extends the focus of comparative research –
between Christianity and Islam – into questions about the afterlife and its quality. The extant
literature has laid the groundwork for asking such questions, especially with regard to the Divine
nature and the God-man relationship, but it is here in this study where those comparative and
qualitative questions will be brought to the fore.

Methodology
There are number of direct fields of relevance in this study – philosophy of religion,
theology and apologetics. The goal of the study is to ultimately make a positive case for
Christianity and so the methodology is both comparative and apologetic. This section will
discuss the methodologies – both apologetic and abductive – that will be applied throughout.
Firstly, a discussion about the overall disposition of the apologetic endeavor is in order. Human
creatures are a certain kind of being and if Paradise is to satisfy us for an eternity, it would entail
pleasures that engage the whole person. The same can be said of Christian persuasion. Because
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humans are complex beings, Christian persuasion should be holistic in nature. In this LateModern era, the effects of Modernism are still felt even in apologetic method. 89 Christian
apologetics must caution against reductionist methodologies which make limited appeals. James
K. A. Smith writes that human beings are more than thinking things reducible to mere “brains on
a stick,” we are “desiring beings” beings who have longings and desires at a gut (visceral)
level.90 A Christian apologetic should avoid a reductionist “thinking thingism”91 and instead
appeal to the whole person (i.e. mind, body, soul). Therefore, a Christian apologetic, if it is to
truly engage the whole person must move beyond the rigidity of intellectual arguments aimed
solely at logically dismantling another’s worldview and plausibility structure. The apologetic
method employed in this study appeals to both the head and the heart, both at an intellectual and
visceral level. It makes an appeal to our most basic, yet consistently one of the strongest,
experiences of our humanity – love and relationality.
One aspect of comparative methodology entails conclusions made through abduction. 92
Abductive reasoning begins with a set of facts in need of explanation. From there one or more
hypotheses are considered and an inference is made to the best possible explanation, that is, the
explanation that best fits and accounts for all the data. Here then are the facts in need of
explanation. First, the quality of the experience must match the demand of the quantity, that is, if
the afterlife is to be desired, the qualitative nature of the Afterlife must be such that it meets and
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surpasses the quantitative demand of eternity. 93 Let us call this the Qualitative Gap Problem
(QGP). In light of this problem it would seem then that the qualitative nature of the afterlife
would have need to be derived from and sourced in a maximally great being (i.e. God). Only a
being of that magnitude and greatness could overcome such a great expanse. That God is the
Ultimate Good in the afterlife is agreed upon by both Muslims and Christians and thus this fact is
not in need of thorough development insofar as the divine is understood as the source of
goodness. The QGP is an objective, ontological consideration and it seems reasonable to assume
that if the demand of eternity is matched and the problem overcome, it will be matched in and
through the Divine.
The next three facts are both subjective and teleological in nature. They consider human
experience, design and basic intuitions which form the Teleological Gap Problem (TGP) of the
afterlife. The TGP is identified by these two questions: “Will the end of afterlife match the end
of man?” “How well does the theology of either religion explain and account for the teleology?”
Both faith traditions teach that the afterlife will be an embodied existence and human beings will
retain their physicality to some extent. If we assume that the afterlife is a bodily, physical reality,
then human creatures will possess the same essential properties as they do in this life premortem. It is necessary, then, to consider those essential elements of human existence. Based on
human experience and observation, it seems there are a number of human dimensions which
constitute the human good and the conditions for human flourishing. First, human beings are
physical embodied creatures who have both longings and desires. The goodness of human
existence is linked to physical pleasures enjoyed in creation. Unlike prevailing Greek
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philosophies which have traditionally viewed the physical realm as lesser-than and a shadow of
the metaphysical realm, the natural world in these traditions has been created by the Divine and
is thus inherently good. Both orthodox Islam and orthodox Christianity also affirm a physical,
embodied afterlife, although one that is renewed and redeemed. It is plausible to suggest then
that the goodness of the afterlife is connected, to some degree, to physical pleasures Second,
human beings have a mental/spiritual dimension. Unique to all other created things, human
beings have individual agency, capacity for choices, creativity, introspection and deliberation.
They are able to make plans for the future and reflect on and analyze the decisions of the past.
For all human creatures there is a unique self which persists through time, and, we could assume
eternity. Thus, the teleological goodness of the afterlife intuitively includes the retention of
individual agency and function. Third, human beings have a very strong social dimension.
Human beings are inherently relational creatures and live in community with one another. They
form relationally intentional groups and intimately unite their individual lives into larger familial
units. Individual human lives become uniquely bound to and derive meaning from these
relationships.
In relation to the afterlife, the significance of the social dimension is two-fold. First, the
goodness of the afterlife would seemingly need to entail some level of relationality towards or
with the divine. In this life, specifically, one of the great goods of human experience is selfgiving love and relationships shared between human creatures. How much more would the
goodness of heaven be heightened if there was a loving, relational correspondence between God
and man? Second, is the desire for our loved ones to be with us in the afterlife. As the
philosopher Luc Ferry notes, “What we would like above all is to be reunited with our loved
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ones, and, if possible, with their voices, their faces.” 94 Himself an atheist, Ferry highlights this
strong human intuition and also recognizes that, in the history of thought, this is one of the great
strengths of the Christian tradition of salvation. 95
It would seem then, that an afterlife worth desiring, an afterlife wherein eternal joy is
experienced, will provide holistic satisfaction to human creatures. A reality which meets the
multi-dimensionality of human creatures. It can also be assumed that there can be some
comparison of pleasures and experiences drawn between this life and the next; especially of
those virtues which are so fundamental to human existence (i.e., love, peace, justice, mercy,
etc.). If the Qualitative and Subjective Gap Problems are met it would seem they would be met in
and through the Divine. If, then, the eternal happiness of the afterlife is found in and derives
from the Divine and the human experience of the good consists of the virtues, especially of selfgiving love and relationship, it would seem that eternal happiness would consist of that same
experience of the good experienced in and through the divine in the afterlife. From this point, the
comparative question naturally arises: which theology best meets the objective and subjective
needs as expressed in the argument? As stated in the thesis earlier, the Triune God of Christian
better meets these problems and it will be argued that the Christian view of Heaven better
accounts for human flourishing in the afterlife.
Not only do I want to demonstrate that Christianity is true, I also want to make an
apologetic appeal to Muslims regarding Christianity’s truthfulness. Therefore, interwoven into
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the study is an apologetic methodology called the Inside/Out method.96 Islam, and more
specifically the Sufi tradition following al-Ghazālī, is not entirely devoid of truth. Their tradition
possesses elements of truth, but it is not the full truth. A proper and effective apologetic method
does not strip the opposing view of every true belief; rather, it appeals to those beliefs which are
true and challenges the ones that are not. 97 The first part of the Inside/Out method – the Inside
portion – entails entering into the worldview of the opposing view and assimilating their
plausibility structures. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests this approach (not specifically by name but
in methodology) whenever one hopes to defeat the claims of a rival position. He writes, “A
necessary first step would be for them [the Protagonist] to come to understand what it is to think
in the terms prescribed by that particular rival tradition, to learn how to think as if one were a
convinced adherent of that rival tradition.” 98 From this position two things must be assessed;
first, it must be determined what can be affirmed and what needs to be challenged; and second, is
to trace out their assumptions and see where they would lead if applied consistently. In this
Inside portion, MacIntyre’s methodology is useful; he instructs the rival, from within the
viewpoint of the other tradition to, “identify, from the standpoint of the adherents of that rival
tradition, its crucially important unresolved issues and unsolved problems – unresolved and
unsolved by the standards of that tradition – which now confront those adherents and to enquire
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how progress might be made in moving towards their resolution and solution.”99 This is what
takes place in Chapters 2 and 3 of the study – the nature of Paradise and the doctrine of Love in
Islam – and concludes with final analysis in Chapter 5. Through this I will highlight some
problems that remain unresolved yet are crucial to the overall explanatory scope. We can
naturally ask why these problems remain unresolved and it is perhaps that the tradition lacks the
resources to address the issues. Because Islam does not possess the full truth, this step will, as Os
Guinness notes, “press them to the logic of their assumptions and their faith will prove neither
true nor adequate.”100
On the other hand, Sufi Islam possesses some truths and so, as Guinness continues,
“Equally, the experience of those who listen to the real truth in what they believe, even when it
runs counter or goes beyond the rest of their beliefs, will be in touch with desires and longings
that point them beyond what they believe and toward the full truth.” 101 Taking the beliefs and
doctrines which can and ought to be preserved, the transition can naturally be made to the
Outside portion. This portion of the method asks the question “How does Christianity better
address our experiences, observations, and history?” 102 In this way, the Outside portion of the
method is similar to the final steps of the abductive method. Because Christianity possesses the
full truth, it will naturally tell a better story about this life, or in the words of Charles Taylor,
“capture the rich texture of this life and history.” 103 The truths of Islam which point to the fuller
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truth of Christianity must be built upon and used as a mean to persuade Muslims of the Truth.
Chapter 4 of the study serves the dual role of both part of building the abductive case and the
Outside portion of the method. Through discussing the nature of love in Christianity, the nature
of Trinitarian love concurrently aligns with the deep desires and longings which point beyond
and towards the full truth. Finally, in Chapter 5, the comparisons will be made and the
conclusions drawn – that Christian theism is the best explanation for human flourishing in the
Afterlife.
Criteria
As a comparative study, an effective set of criteria is needed upon which to judge the
merits of one particular religion over the other. Given that each person approaches any research
question with a set of presuppositions, it is challenging to remain as objective as possible. It is
still possible nonetheless to make value judgments. Specifically, with abductive reasoning there
are criteria from which to assess the competing hypotheses. Three criteria will be used here:
explanatory scope, explanatory depth, and simplicity.104 Explanatory scope considers the ability
of the hypothesis to explain as wide a range of the data as possible. This criterion refers to the
hypothesis’ capacity in terms of breadth. Of all the facts in need of explanation, which
competing hypothesis can account for more of the facts in itself with fewer ad hoc components.
Explanatory depth considers the ability of the hypothesis to explain in as much detail as possible
the facts in the range of consideration. Does a hypothesis explain part of the individual fact but
not all? The better inference will be the hypothesis that has a more robust explanatory depth of
each of the facts as they are presented. Lastly, there is the criteria of simplicity. Simplicity, or the
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simpler explanation, is often misunderstood to mean the logically simpler hypothesis, that is, as
Charles Peirce notes, “the one that adds the least to what has been observed.”105 This was the
assumption of Peirce, that simplicity meant the hypothesis which adds the least, but as he further
notes, this assumption was misguided. 106 The simpler hypothesis is the one that is more “facile
and natural, the one that instinct suggests.”107 Here, Peirce suggests that in making an inference
to the best explanation we must be able to see what is a better fit or else we have no opportunity
of making evaluative judgments at all. His is a basic assumption about reality that must be true if
any abductive argument is to get off the ground. Furthermore, being able to determine what is a
better fit is assumed to be recognized by its aesthetic qualities. It seems that one could not make
an intuitive appeal without also appealing to its aesthetic qualities for simplicity is itself an
aesthetic quality. Abduction, then, is an inference to an inherently aesthetic explanation about
reality. Thus, the task is to highlight the aesthetic quality of love and relationality that we
humans experience in this life, focus on that good, and demonstrate the locus of that good as
being found in the Triune God of Christianity.
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Chapter Breakdown
Chapter 2 – Paradise Explored
Following the present introductory chapter, chapter 2 is dedicated to the Islamic view of
Paradise. There are a number of reasons why I have chosen to only discuss the Islamic view at
length. First, in my experience there is a general agnosticism on behalf of Christians where
Islamic eschatology is concerned. Popular views tend to be reductionist in scope and become
caricatures of Islam’s eschatological tradition. Second, from within the various Islamic traditions
we see a number of key emphases and distinctions which, I would submit, have significant
implications towards this study. There is, on the one hand a literalist hermeneutical tradition that
reads Qur’ānic depictions of Paradise more literally and thus physical, while, on the other,
certain traditions read them as metaphorical and thus through a more spiritualized lens. The
hermeneutic applied to these eschatological readings is significant because it can influence
whether one has an anthropocentric or theocentric view of Paradise. Lastly, the themes discussed
in this chapter have an underlying relationality to them. Paradise is a place where one
experiences Allah, whether through the blessing of the Garden or directly in the Beatific Vision.
The sections of this chapter discuss the various pleasures of Paradise and how man relates to
both the physical and the spiritual pleasures therein.
Chapter 3 – The Islamic Beatific Vision: God’s Love for Man and Man’s Love for God
That the Beatific Vision is the highest level of Paradise is affirmed by many Muslim
philosophers and mystics. As was mentioned earlier, proximity to God in the afterlife directly
corresponds to the level of spiritual attainment in this life. Thus, the ṭarīqah or “path” is the
spiritual journey one must follow in order to reach the level of iḥsān, the level that leads to the
fullness of the beatific vision. Directly involved in the path to iḥsān is gnosis or knowledge about
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Allah. Knowledge of Allah leads to a love for Him and the more one loves Allah the more one
wants to know about Him. The relationship of knowledge and love is cyclical but also an upward
moving spiral. Belief in Islam is measured by the love for God and His Prophet. This love is
achieved through knowledge. Once a person comes to love God above all else, then, the Qur’ān
states, does Allah love that person.108
As one of the greatest revivers of Islam, al-Ghazālī’s efforts are of central import to this
study. Reconciling the doctrine of tawḥīd with the positive attribution to Allah is an ongoing
challenging for faithful Muslims. This chapter will focus largely on al-Ghazālī’s attempt to
reconcile the tension and thus provide a way forward for attaining the beatific vision. Ghazālī’s
works are an amalgam of Sufī and philosophical thought and provide robust insight into the
attainment of eternal felicity.
Chapter 4 – The Christian Beatific Vision: God’s Love for Man and Man’s Love for God
There are many Christians conceptions of heaven in the theological traditions, academic
and popular level circles. Space does not allow for a thorough treatment of the spectrum of
beliefs concerning heaven in the Christian tradition. The central focus in this chapter is the view
which is consistent to the corresponding theocentric Islamic view – the beatific vision of God.
That the vision of God is the ultimate end and thus source of eternal felicity is, like Islam, an
orthodox eschatological tradition within Christianity. In Christianity, the Triune God is the Good
and so ultimate goodness (eternal felicity) is found in God.
Furthermore, in keeping with correspondence to the previous chapter, this chapter will
discuss the conceptions of God’s love for man and man’s love for God as well as the relation to
knowledge and love. Christianity teaches that God is love and this love is conceived in terms of
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action and doing and is thus other-focused love – the Godhead eternally engaged in self-giving,
other-centered relationship. The love of the Trinity is the foundation for the love humanity
experiences, not only in terms of the God-man relationship but love between human persons. As
the Scriptures teach, the ultimate revelation of God’s love is displayed on the cross when the Son
willingly gave his life for the sake of all humanity. The kind of love displayed on the cross is the
lens through which we try to interpret and comprehend not only God’s love for humanity but His
intent to be in communion with mankind.
Chapter 5 – Conclusion
This study will conclude with the task of making comparative analyses and assessments
of both the Islamic and Christian views of the paradisal afterlife. Christian apologists in previous
centuries have written against an Islamic afterlife full of sensuous pleasures and indulgences. To
this, I only wish to add to the criticism that an overly sensuous view is reductionistic of human
creatures and is inherently limited by its relation to eternity. The main task of the study thus far
has been centered on the theocentric view of the afterlife in the respective religions. Chapters 3
and 4 provided an analysis of the salient features of a theocentric position and in this chapter, we
turn now to apply the specified method of abduction to our qualitative and comparative
assessments of both views.
Returning to the facts in need of explanation, I present the argument that Christianity
offers a more robust and satisfactory view of the afterlife because of its ability to offer more
explanatory scope and depth, as well as the simpler explanation for a satisfactory afterlife.
Christianity, and more importantly the Trinitarian God, better accounts for the facts and avoids
the problems that arise from a tawḥīdic Allah.
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CHAPTER 2: PARADISE EXPLORED
Introduction
This chapter focuses specifically on Islamic Paradise and will explore the salient features
of Islamic afterlife as revealed in the Qur’an, Hadiths, and various influential traditions. After the
theological doctrines of tawḥīd and prophecy, Paradise, is third in level of importance in Islam.
In the Qur’ān there is an abundance of revelation concerning Paradise; so much so that Mahan
notes, “It is not possible to find a single page in any conventional printing of the Qur’ān without
some sort of reference to the life hereafter.” 109 Attaining Paradise is the eschatological goal for
all Muslims. The felicity of Paradise and the proximity to Allah are that which form the deepest
longings of the soul for, as the Qur’ān states, “They abide in that which their souls desired,
eternally.”110
The chapter follows a certain thematic progression that begins with a brief discussion
concerning Qur’ānic hermeneutical principles. Following that section, we will consider the
dialectical eschatology of al-dunyā and al-ākhira, that is, the contrastive yet correlative
relationship between this life and the life to come. This, however, is not the only dialectical
eschatology in the Qur’ān; Paradise is almost always contrasted with Hell and the torments of
Hell give rhetorical force to Muslims being command to obey their Lord. 111 We can see this
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dialectic manifest in al-Ghazālī’s book on remembrance when he writes, “occupy your heart
therefore with trepidation through long meditation upon the terrors of Hellfire, and with hope
through long contemplation of the abiding bliss which is promised the indwellers of the
Garden.”112 The phraseology here and the comparative pairing in the Qur’ān suggest that the joys
of Paradise are heightened in relation to terrors of Hell. I would like to suggest this is why people
do not typically consider Paradise on its own merits. What rational person would not instantly
choose Paradise if faced with both options immediately present before them. But this is not the
focus of the study as was mentioned in the limitations section, Paradise will be considered on its
own merits (and later compared to the Christian heaven). What remains to be seen is if Paradise
loses any of its appeal when not in contrast to Hell for as Reinhart notes, “The bliss of the
Koranic Paradise derives partly from what it follows (the Judgement) and partly from what it is

With such a terrifying picture of the Hellfire, it is not surprising that Muslims place so much focus on attaining
Paradise.
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not (the Fire).”113 Without the threat of Hellfire, is Paradise to be desired and does it meet the
demands of eternity?
These considerations necessarily lead to sections covering the nature of Paradise and
relevant paradisal themes. These sections will not be overly exhaustive but will, nonetheless,
orient the reader to Paradise’s central features. The remaining themes to be covered are:
abundance of the sensual, the sexual and the sacred, Paradise as theophany, and the Beatific
Vision. The way these sections are presented corresponds to the overall nature of this study.
Because Allah is the ultimate good and thus the source of pleasure in Paradise – both causally
and existentially – there is a correlation between the experience of Paradise and the experience of
the Divine. As we will see throughout, the blessings bestowed on the inhabitants of Paradise, will
subsequently lead them to turn their praise to Allah. Also, the pleasures of Paradise are perhaps
the point wherein one can experience Allah. This latter distinction is referring to a deeper
metaphysical connection that, for some Muslims, purportedly occurs between Allah and the
inhabitants as mediated through the pleasures, blessings, and rewards. This connection is distinct
from the Beatific Vision which will be discussed in the last section. The Beatific Vision occurs
in Firdaws, the highest level of Paradise, and is reserved for only the most faithful of the
inhabitants of Paradise. As the Qur’ān and Hadith report, few will inhabit Firdaws. It will consist
of many Muslims from the beginning period of the religion (Muhammad included of course) but
few from the latter times. Firdaws is the garden wherein one’s proximity to Allah is nearest and
is the highest aim of the religious life.
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Before delving into the nature of Paradise, there are a couple of points worthy of our
attention. First, the Qur’ān is the supreme source of authority in Islam for it is the eternal word of
God; therefore, it is, as Muhammad Abdel Haleem notes, “the starting point of everything
Islamic.”114 Furthermore, Haleem states that the Qur’ān is considered by Muslims to be
categorically and thoroughly authentic. But within the Islam faith, the hadith collections are also
authoritative guides for knowledge, instruction, and practical theology. In general, they are not
considered as divine revelation and their authority is subjected to the Qur’ān, but they are
nonetheless the words of the Prophet, transmitted down through his Companions.115 Second, it is
interesting to note, there are some who suggest that within the doctrines of the afterlife in Islam,
the Qur’ān itself is not often the sole authority and does not, as Palacios states, “constitute the
main source of its dogma.”116 This is because Palacios sees two antithetical views of Paradise
flourishing at the same time in the later Muslim traditions – one coarse and sensual and the other
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the spiritual.117 In his estimation, the coarse and sensual reading comes from Qur’ānic readings
primarily while the deep spiritual depiction of the afterlife flows from external sources and
traditions of the mystics and philosophers. Lange would agree with Palacios’s analysis
concerning the paradisal emphases in the traditionalist readings of the Qur’ān and Hadiths. He
purports that the traditionalists Sunni creeds from the third/ninth century onward consistently
emphasized the material pleasures and that “a thorough spiritualization of paradise and hell did
not occur in early Muslim theology.” 118 On the traditionalist, materialist understanding of the
afterlife, Lange goes on to write, “the otherworld sketched out by the Qur’ān and the hadith may
have been too concrete to allow for this [a spiritualization of Paradise]…” 119 As we will see later
on in this chapter and into the next, Al-Ghazālī often serves as a middle ground between extreme
philosophical/theological ends. Regarding Paradise, al-Ghazālī notes that the inhabitants of
paradise enjoy “diverse pleasures” and “have all they desire” while at the same time “attending
before the Throne and gazing upon the noble Countenance of God…unceasingly they move from
one variety of blessing to the next, safe from ever suffering their loss.” 120 On the one hand, alGhazālī affirms an embodied existence in Paradise wherein the inhabitants enjoy Allah’s
blessings but he also preserves a theocentric emphasis of the beatific vision establishing its
centrality in the life to come.
The materialization of Paradise has often led to sharp criticisms of Islamic Paradise. J. B.
Taylor responds to Palacios’s analysis and while Taylor is appreciative of Palacios’s fair
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treatment of the Prophet, he believes that the analysis and conclusions of the paradisal traditions
is incorrect. Taylor argues that it was precisely the Qur’ān and the life of the Prophet from
whence the spiritualized readings derived. He notes that it was “the verses of the Qur’ān and the
traditions concerning the Prophet upon which they meditated and which they took as the
yardstick by which to judge any spontaneous or any second-hand ideas.”121 The materialists
traditions are often critiqued as overly anthropocentric and neglecting to realize the ultimate
good of Paradise – Allah. On the other hand, overly spiritualized traditions, wishing to correct
the materialists and be theocentric in focus, have perhaps neglected the fundamentally physical
descriptive language found in the Qur’ān. Surah 55 is a significant passage in this context for it
does not allow a materialistic reading to forget their Lord for Muslims are reminded that the
rewards of Paradise are permeated with Divine mercy. 122 An emphatic materialism of Paradise
does not faithfully follow the Qur’ān nor does a negation of such a material reality. Both the
tensions and criticisms in the Islamic traditions concerning Paradise highlight certain
hermeneutical and doctrinal issues. How is the Qur’ān to be interpreted? What hermeneutical
principles are to be applied to the text? How was the Muslim community to understand the
eschatological realities of which, according to the Qur’ān “No person knows what is kept hidden
for them of joy, as a reward for what they used to do.”123 It is towards this we turn to briefly in
the next section.
Ta’wīl and Tafsīr: Hermeneutical Considerations
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That the Qur’an is the authoritative word from Allah is not a point of dispute for the sects
of Islam. What is in question, however, is the meaning of the text and how one should interpret
its content. It is necessary at this point in the study to consider briefly some hermeneutical
practices and distinctions in Qur’ānic exegesis or ta’wīl. For if one wishes to know the attributes
of Heaven they must, as al-Ghazālī states, “…read the Qur’ān, for there is no discourse higher
than that of God”.124 On the lexical meaning of ta’wīl Dukake notes, “[it means] to bring
something back to its origin, and thus refers to the effort to ascertain the full meaning of a
Qur’ānic word, phrase, or story.” 125 The goal then of ta’wīl is to arrive at the original intent of
the divine author – Allah. Another common interpretive term in Islam is tafsīr, whose basic
meaning is to “quote something in detail.” 126 Scholars note that the two terms seemed to be
interchangeable in early Islam but by the 10th Century a clear distinction existed between the
two. The 10th Century scholar al-Mārturīdī made the distinction in the introduction of his
Qur’ānic commentary. Claude Gilliot suggests the distinction goes back even further to the first
half of the second/eight century and was attested in the “earliest rudimentary attempts to classify
exegesis.”127 Gilliot further notes that the following hermeneutical classifications of Qur’ānic
exegesis were attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 69/688): “The Qur’ān was [revealed] in four aspects:
tafsīr [the literal meaning], which scholars know…; [and] ta’wīl [the deeper meaning] that only
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God knows.”128 Thus, from the earliest accounts of Qur’ānic exegesis there has been diversity in
hermeneutical methodology. As Islam grew, various groups began to emerge each with differing
theological commitments (i.e., Sunnis, Shīʿites, Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites, the Literalists, Sūfīs,
etc.). These different commitments were, as Quasem suggests, the cause of differences in
Qur’ānic understanding among the various groups. 129
There are various hermeneutic approaches to the Qur’an each with varying
methodologies for interpretation. Some approach the text with a literal lens and will interpret the
Qur’an as literal as possible seeking to understand the text at face value. The Sunni tradition in
Islam looks more to the letter of the Qur’an, to its more literal meaning in contrast to the spirit of
the text. This hermeneutical distinction is referred to as ẓāhir (the literal) in contrast to bāṭin (the
hidden) meaning of the Qur’an. The revelatory content of the Qur’an is to be understood as
literal as possible. There will obviously be instances where the Qur’an itself is not meant to be
taken literally such as in the descriptions of Allah and that is because human language is
inherently limited, especially when describing such metaphysical realities. Surely Allah does not
have a hand for his does not have a material body. This is a case of anthropomorphism and it
helps the reader to understand through analogy an attribute/action of Allah. As it relates to the
afterlife, the Sunni traditions tend to emphasize a physical afterlife with all of the physical
pleasures entailed. This means that the language used to describe the realities of Paradise
corresponds at some level to our current reality. It might be that Paradise is qualitatively different
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than the current physical world, but this difference does not negate correspondence for Muslims
are called to imagine and anticipate all that their Lord has in store for them.
Much of the philosophical literature in Islam was generated within the Sufī tradition. This
is due, in part, to their creative liberties directed towards the text which led to innovations and
developments in Islamic philosophy and Mysticism. In this tradition, God is known both through
his self-giving revelation and mystical experience. As such, the reading of the Qur’an and
subsequent hadith are interpreted though the lens of the hidden meaning (bāṭin).130 This is seen
as innovation by Sunnis and is not typically accepted based on the standard of orthodoxy.
However, it would seem the Sufi traditions have elucidated a more holistic religious tradition in
that one’s whole person (body and soul) is meant to experience the divine. In this sense, one
might say that it is more spiritual than the Sunni tradition. This ‘spiritual’ bent carries over into
afterlife and Paradise becomes primarily a spiritual affair rather than merely sensual.
Sufī hermeneutical methodology has always sought to glean the deeper meaning that
exists in the text. For them there is a double-meaning within the text of the Qur’ān. The Sufi
mystic and commentator Sahl at-Tustarī, for example, seems to have been influenced by Ibn
ʿAbbas’s fourfold distinction, which is in keeping with the larger interpretive tradition, but in
practice reduces his commentary of the Qur’ān to two levels of meaning – the literal and the
spiritual/hidden – favoring the latter for interpretation, a consistent hermeneutic for Sufi tafsīr.131
Being a Sufi as well, al-Ghazālī’s hermeneutical methods are similar to that of Tustarī’s.
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According to Quasem, al-Ghazālī thought that the correct method of apprehending the Qur’ān
was to “[penetrate] into the depth of the inner, hidden meanings of the Qur’ānic verses, without
merely being content with their outward meanings.” 132 For Ghazālī the Qur’ān is like a vast
ocean in which the Muslim must immerse himself so to find the jewels and pearls which lie in its
depths. In The Jewels of the Qur’ān (Jawāhir al-Qur’ān) we get a glimpse of al-Ghazālī’s
hermeneutic commitments in the very first chapter where he writes,
I then wish to rouse you from your sleep, O you who recite the Qur’ān to a great
length, who take its study as an occupation, and who imbibe some of its outward
meanings and sentences. How long will you ramble on the shore of the ocean,
closing your eyes to the wonders of the meanings of the Qur’ān? Was it not your
duty to sail to the midst of the fathomless ocean of these meanings in order to see
their wonders, to travel to their islands in order to gather their best produce, and to
dive into their depths so that you might become rich by obtaining their jewels? Do
you not feel ashamed of being deprived of their pearls and jewels by your
persistence in looking at their shores and outward appearances?133
Clearly, al-Ghazālī is emphasizing a hermeneutic of depth and discovery, the search for the
hidden meaning that lies within the pages of the holy text. His call for those on the shore to
immerse themselves in the ocean is reminiscent of the mystical goal of immersion in the Divine.
Stepping out into the ocean and moving away from the shore is the beginning stages of the path
(ṭarīqah) to Allah.
The distinctions in hermeneutical methodology are as many as the Christian traditions
and it makes speaking in certain doctrinal generalities difficult. Various philosophical and
theological commitments about Allah and metaphysical realities impact Qur’ānic understanding.
Among these understandings gleaned from this text is the specific nature of Paradise. How are
the descriptions of Paradise to be read and understood? A literal reading of the text will produce
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a certain eschatological tradition as will the readings in search of the hidden meaning behind the
texts. There seems to be a general correlation between methodology and emphasis in the various
Islamic traditions. For instance, the literal reading of the Qur’ān tends to produce a more
anthropocentric view of Paradise, whereas, a more metaphorical reading tends towards a
theocentric view. As we will see in this chapter, a theocentric view of Paradise is rightly focused
on the Beatific Vision as the highest good in Paradise; however, the theocentric view should not
reduce the sensuous reward to the spiritual. The Qur’ān teaches that the afterlife is an embodied
existence and as such the experiences of Paradise are both sensual and spiritual. Al-Ghazālī
supports this balance. As we see in the final pages of his Incoherence of the Philosophers,
Ghazālī unequivocally rejects the notion of a disembodied resurrection and labels those who
deny a bodily resurrection as infidels. 134 At the same time, however, Ghazālī also writes that the
Beatific Vision of Allah is the highest good of Paradise, the greatest of all delights, and “which
shall cause one to be quite oblivious of the pleasures of the people of Heaven.” 135

The Nearer and the Further Life – al-dunyā and al-ākhira
In Islam, there is an intimate connection between this world and the next. This
relationship is significant not only to the chapter but also the entire study as this dialectic bears
significant influence on eternity. On the one hand, in Islam, Paradise, the further life, is thought
of in contrast to this life, the nearer. Because there is such a close connection, Paradise is
immanent in the minds of Muslims. The concepts of the hereafter are ever present in the daily
religious life of Muslims for the religious life emphasizes the need for remembrance, return, and
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nearness.136 On the other hand, this life and how one lives it in relation to their Lord has a
profound impact on the nature of their return – their return to Allah. In the beginning, Allah gave
the creative command “to be” and everything came into existence. This was not a command that
could be disobeyed for all contingent creatures derive their existence from that which is noncontingent and necessary. Mankind existed previously and enjoyed their Lord, but man was
created weak, forgetful, and heedless and eventually forgot God and disobeyed the religious
command. As a result, mankind was confined to this life (al-dunyā), a life where the religious
command must be regained through struggle and perseverance.
Life in this world is not disconnect from the next and is as Abdel Haleem says “an
inseparable part of a continuum, a unified whole which gives our life a context and relevance.” 137
This unified whole creates a linear connection of life-death-life that provides context and value
to this life as it relates to the whole measure of human existence – including eternity. People are
called to remember their Lord and this life is made more meaningful the more one’s life is full of
good actions such as the remembrance. Life in this world will lead to the afterlife but the final
destination in the afterlife is contingent upon the former. In fact, this life is a proving ground of
sorts and one’s remembrance of Allah guarantees greater favor from Allah Himself. There is a
reason for suffering and struggle in this life. Islam teaches that Allah loves those who love him
through struggle – both inward and outward. 138 Indeed, it is Allah who has power over all things
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and as the Qur’ān states, “[it is Allah] who created death and life to test you [people] and reveal
which of you does best.”139 Because Allah tests man, the hardships and struggles of life need to
be placed into a proper perspective. Since Allah loves those who love him first, and love for him
is manifested in the perseverance through and the overcoming of the struggle, these pains are
endured for the sake of demonstrating one’s disposition of love and faithfulness to Allah. But
demonstrating one’s love for Allah is only part of an upward cyclical process – love, testing, and
reward – of the Islamic life. It was reported that the Prophet said, “Indeed greater reward comes
with greater trial. And indeed, when Allah loves a people He subjects them to trials, so whoever
is content, then for him is pleasure, and whoever is discontent, the for him is wrath.” 140
Part of the general weakness of mankind is the allure of pleasurable things in this life.
The Qur’ān states, “The love of desirable things is made alluring for men – women, children,
gold and silver treasures piled up high, horses with fine marking, livestock, farmland” (Q 3:14a).
The pleasurable things of this life are a temptation and a distraction and will influence one’s
ability to remember his Lord. Yes, the desirable things may bring a temporary joy in this life, but
they will only ever be temporal and finite pleasures, mere shadows of the joys of the life to
come. Concerning this, Al-Ghazālī writes, “By God, were there to be [in Heaven] haleness of
body alone, together with safekeeping from death, hunger, thirst, and the other varieties of
misfortunes, it would be worth a man’s while to renounce the world solely on its account, and to
prefer it to what must necessarily be spoilt and lost.” 141 To the one who remembers Allah and
sets his sights on the things above and not below, for him, Allah has a better place to return. In
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this this same passage we see the promise of a future reward, “these may be the joys of this life,
but God has the best place to return to. [Prophet], say, ‘Would you like me to tell you of things
that are better than all of these? The Lord will give those who are mindful of God Gardens
graced with flowing streams, where they will stay with pure spouses and God’s good pleasure –
God is fully aware of His servants” (Q 3:14b-15).142 In order to receive Allah’s good pleasure, a
Muslim must overcome human weakness through internal struggle (jihad), rejecting the temporal
joys of this in favor of the infinite. Pursuing Allah in this life is of utmost importance. This is
what the Sūfīs teach as they focus on following the path so that they can return to their Lord. Life
on earth is a test and Allah loves those who love Him through struggle.
The Qur’ān, Allah’s eternal word, calls the people back to remembrance, back to their
Lord. Chittick notes that there are two basic functions of prophecy in the Qur’ān: “First, prophets
remind (dhikr) people of what they have forgotten, which is the universal and timeless truth of
tawḥīd…the timeless reality of God Himself;” and second, “to guide people to employ their free
will in trying to achieve conformity with God as the Truth, the Reality, the Right, the
Appropriate – a conformity that results in nearness (qurb) and felicity.”143 The immanence of the
afterlife is manifested in both the pages of the Qur’ān and the daily liturgical prayers and
rituals.144 Every day, for those practicing Muslims who pray regularly, they will repeat at least 17
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times a day their praise of Allah, “the master of the day of judgment” (Q 1:4). 145 On the contrary,
to be heedless of the of the life to come (Q 30:7) or to be forgetful of the coming judgment (Q
32:14) are signs of the unbeliever. Haleem further emphases the significance of this
interdependent relationship, stating, “In fact, the principles and details of religion are meant to be
seen within the framework of the interdependence of this life and the afterlife in to color the
Muslims conception of life in the universe and have a bearing on their actions in this life.”146 In
Islam, the relationship between this life and the next cannot be overstated. Some may consider
this immanence to be a source of constant angst as one is ever-reminded on their need and quest
to return to Allah in a favorable manner. I would tend to agree that the nature of salvific
uncertainty will definitely cause angst in this life but not the emphasis on the immanence and
importance of the life to come as a whole. If this life is significant in relation to the next, we
would do well to live in light of eternity every day, whether Muslim or Christian.

Abundance of the Sensual
Paradise is depicted as a blessed reality wherein there is an abundance of pleasure and
reward. The abundance of the sensual as I am calling it, is not overtly referencing the sexual
although sexuality is essential to Paradise; rather, the sensual here refers to the whole person, the
engaging of all the senses in pleasure. 147 An analysis of this abundance entails both the contents

nonbelievers. The plan of two worlds in the relationship between them is, in the beginning, part of the divine scheme
of things.” Haleem, “Life and Beyond, 66.
145

Ibid., 66-67.

146

Ibid., 67.

Bouhdiba sees Paradise as, among many things, a reconciling of man to nature; he writes, “Paradise is
first of all a reconciliation of man with nature, that is to say, with matter. Hence the material profusion that
characterizes Jannah. It is a feast of all the senses.” Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, trans. by Alan
Sheridan, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 83. https://www-taylorfranciscom.ezproxy.liberty.edu/books/9781135030384 (Accessed April 16, 2018)
147

69
of the Garden as well as the renewal of the body. Paradise is typically referred to as “the Garden”
or al-Jannah and is located in the heavens beyond the celestial spheres on a higher level. 148 The
symbolism of a garden in the afterlife is fitting for both the theme of abundance and for the
Arabian culture of the sixth century. In a dry and arid landscape where natural resources are
limited, visions of a garden with flowing streams and rich with vegetation, trees and shade
garnishes appeal and excites the imagination. Reinhart states that “the garden as an ideal is as
much a part of Near Eastern religion as the Judgment or the Wrath of a god.” 149 Paradise’s
connection to Near Eastern religion is found even in the name al-Jannah as it a Persian word in
origin.
According to the Qur’ān and Hadith, Paradise and the contents within are immense.
Consider some of these passages describing the vastness of the Garden. In the Qur’ān Allah
states, “Race one with another for forgiveness from your Lord and for Paradise, whose width is
as the width of the heavens and the earth…” 150 There are levels in the Garden and between each
level is “(the distance of) a hundred years.” 151 On the trees in the Garden, the Prophet is reported
to say, “Verily, in Paradise there is a tree, a rider will travel in its shade for a hundred years.” 152
The dwelling places of the inhabitants will be grand, “Indeed in Paradise there is a great tent of
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hollowed pearl, its breadth is sixty miles, in every corner of it is a family, they do not see the
others, and the believer goes around to them." 153 There is no need to worry about Paradise filling
up or becoming crowded, “Paradise will remain spacious enough to accommodate more people
until Allah will create some more people and let them dwell in the superfluous space of
Paradise.”154 The immensity of Paradise is depicted on such a scale that it challenges man’s
imaginative capacity. But this is to be expected because the Qur’ān also states, “No person
knows what is kept hidden for them of joy, as a reward for what they used to do.”155 Concerning
this passage, Ibn Kathīr states that this means “no one knows the vastness of what Allah has
concealed for them of everlasting joy in Paradise and delights such as no one has ever seen.
Because they conceal their good deeds, Allah conceals the reward for them, a fitting reward
which will suit their deeds.”156 Allah has created a Paradise that exceeds the expectations of man.
A narration of Abu Bakr bin ‘Abdullah bin Qais from his father that the Prophet said from Jami’ atTirmidhi (Sahih), Book 38 Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, Arabic Reference, Book 38, Hadith 2721,
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Man cannot perceive some of the joys of Paradise because they are beyond his finite capacity to
create and imagine. However, the paradisal language in the Qur’ān seemingly offers
correspondence at some level between the objects and pleasures in this life to the life to come.
Along with being immense in size the Garden is full of abundant rivers and food. Surah
47 gives a depiction of the Garden in which there are rivers of pure water, milk, wine, and honey.
These rivers flow perpetually and there is no diminishing of their existence nor their purity. 157 In
the same Surah we also see that there will an abundance and diversity of food: “there they will
find fruit of every kind.” Food will never not be accessible in Paradise, in fact, there is an
immediacy to whatever one desires. Surah 38:15b states, “they will call for abundant fruit and
drink” with the implication they will be granted what they desire. This notion is supported by alGhazālī when he reports a transmission of Ibn Masʿūd, “‘The Emissary of God said, ‘You shall
only have to behold a bird in Heaven and desire it for it to fall down before you roasted.’”158
Among the many things redeemed and renewed in the afterlife, human creatures are both
physically and morally transformed. The Qur’ān states in several places that at the time of the
general resurrection, Allah will resurrect all of humanity and they will have physical bodies.
Even though the Qur’ān taught a physical embodied resurrection, the question of what happened
after death was prevalent early on in the Muslim community. It is apparent that it was initially
difficult for Muslims to comprehend Allah’s ability to remake the body after it had dissolved to
dust in the grave. At the resurrection, every person will be remade into optimal form. Abdel
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Haleem suggest that this is supported by the Qur’ān where it indicates that human beings will get
new bodies, and they will not have the same ones they possessed in the previous life (e.g. 56:35,
61).159 Because Paradise is an abundance of the sensual and the sensual experience is intimately
linked to the body, human bodies are in need of transformation and renewal in order to maximize
all Paradise has to offer. The inhabitants of Paradise will eternally feast on the sustenance of the
Garden, but they will not have to worry about becoming fat or any of the negative side effects
that come with overindulgence in this life. Specifically, in relation to food, there will no longer
be any defecation or urination as human bodies will be relieved by means of a sweat that smells
like musk and after they are relieved their stomachs will return once more to their slender
form.160 According to Aziz al-Azmeh, man will have the “height of Adam (60 cubits), the age of
Jesus (33 years), the beauty of Joseph, and he will have Muhammad’s language, for each of these
descriptions is in itself consummate. 161 It is said from at-Tirmidhi that “the first batch to enter
Paradise will appear like the moon of a night that is full.” 162 Humanity will also be void of body
hair and will not need to spit nor will have runny noses. 163
Lastly, the inhabitants of Paradise also go through a moral transformation. The Qur’ān
states, “We shall remove all ill feeling from their hearts; streams will flow at their feet,” 164 and
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“They will hear no idle of sinful talk there, only clean and wholesome speech.” 165 Muhammad is
also to have been reported as saying “There is no differing among them nor mutual hatred, and
their hearts are like the heart of one man, and they glorify Allah morning and evening.” 166
Allah will remove all malice and imperfection from the character of humanity. They will
experience nothing but good will and charity toward the other companions of Paradise.
Moreover, they will feel what is the dominant sentiment of Paradise – peace.167 Peace will be had
amongst the inhabitants of Paradise but even more significant is the peace and bestowal of divine
pleasure from Allah. 168
Sexuality and the Sacred
The combination of sexuality and Paradise form a rich narrative in the Islamic traditions.
Beginning first with the Qur’an and then developing in the hadiths and later commentaries,
sexuality is a central theme of Paradise. Development happened relatively early on within Islam
and by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the paradisal traditions were relatively stabilized –

165

Q 56:25-6

166
Abu Hurairah narrated that the Messenger of Allah said from Jami’ at-Tirmidhi (Sahih), Book 38
Chapters on the Descriptions of Paradise, Arabic Reference, Book 38, Hadith 2733, English Reference: Vol. 4,
Book 12, hadith 2537, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/38
167
168

Q 15:47
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although certain creative liberties had been applied. 169 The tradition became quite descriptive of
the sexual pleasures along with the descriptions of the paradisal spouses awaiting the faithful
companions. We would do well however not to be reductionist is our analysis of this integral
feature of Paradise. It seems that the sexual activity of Paradise, while part of the greater
narrative of paradisal reward, serves a dual role in providing both physical and spiritual pleasure.
Physical pleasure is obvious and comes in the form of the actual act of sex as well as the sense
delights of the houris – the virgins of Paradise. This second suggestion of spiritual pleasure may
at first seem out of place but there is enough extant material to suggest that within Islamic
tradition, there is a place for the sacred in the sexual. That in the perpetual sexual encounters of
Paradise there is something sacred to be encountered as well. The extent to which one encounters
the sacred in the sexual will be discussed below but first the virginal paradisal traditions are
considered.
The virgins of Paradise are perhaps the most familiar feature of the Islamic afterlife to the
Western world. This is due, no doubt, to the narrative put forth that those who die as martyrs in
jihad are promised 70 virgins in Paradise as a reward for their sacrifice toward the cause of Allah
and Islam. It is true that the Qur’an does not mention the number of virgins specifically and that
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this teaching comes from one of the hadith traditions; however, I do not think it makes it any less
significant nor authoritative. 170 We see in the hadith composed by Jami’ at-Tirmidhi in The Book
on the Virtues of Jihad, that one of the six rewards promised to the martyr is that he is married to
seventy-two wives.171 Virgin spouses are promised to the martyr but it would be a mistake to
assume that maidens of Paradise are promised exclusively to them. The significance, I would
submit, of the promises given in this hadith are not the spouses; rather it is the forgiveness that
follows from the first flow of blood and the guarantee of a place in Paradise. The virgins of
Paradise are a reward to all Muslim men who enter its gates. There are multiple passages in the
Qur’an suggesting that part of the reward for the devout inhabitants of Paradise are “wellmatched [wives] with modest gaze,” 172 and, furthermore, that they are “good-natured, beautiful
maidens…Dark-eyed, sheltered in pavilions…Untouched beforehand by man or jinn…They will
sit on green cushions and fine carpets.”173 The paradisal virgins are a promise to all who are
faithful to Allah, the reward of the martyr specifically is the guarantee of Paradise.
Of the marriage companions, there exists a combination of beings – both celestial and
human. Each companion is married to earthly wives – faithful female Muslims – as well as
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celestial beings called houris – a heavenly creature created exclusively for those faithful to Allah.
As we have seen so far in this chapter, one common theme in Paradise is that of excess and
abundance. There is no lack in Paradise, all is given and then possessed in overwhelming fashion
and this benefaction reflects the good nature of Allah. The same too can be said of one’s
marriage companions for they too are numerous as they are beautiful. The number of wives in
Paradise is commonly thought to be seventy-two – two earthly wives and seventy houris;
however, in the traditions it is as Lange points out, “characteristically, numbers [of wives]
remain unstable.”174 Lange says this because there are a number of commentators who suggest
that the number of spouses in Paradise far exceeds the seventy-two. Both Suyūtī and al-Ghazali
suggest that the number could be anywhere from 500 to somewhere in the thousands. 175
Being embodied creatures, the inhabitants of Paradise are engaged in pleasure through all
of the senses. Sight is an integral part of human essence. According to Bouhdiba, “everything
begins with the look and everything ends with it.” 176 Sight leads to contemplation and
contemplation leads to happiness. Thus, pleasure is, to some degree, ocular.177 The pleasure
derived from the houris is magnified by their physical appearance. But sight is not the only sense
through which we experience pleasures. One’s sense of smell also contributes to the pleasure of
the senses. It is for this reason perhaps that the houris are also described as composite creatures
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of various smells and perfumes. Al-Azmeh again notes that the houris are said to be “made of
musk between their feet and knees, of amber between their knees and breasts, and of camphor
upwards of their chest.”178 The combination of both sight and smell creates an even greater
euphoria beyond just the pleasures of the sexual encounter itself. The gaze and the smells create
a sort of “quasi-immaterial pleasure of matter itself.” 179
One may wonder, however, at the extensive detail with which these houris are described
in Medieval and Late Medieval traditionist literature – going far beyond more basic descriptions
in the Qur’ān. Lange notes that these heavenly creatures of Paradise are imagined as “ideal
courtesans” to the Muslim man and creative descriptions and interpretations developed
accordingly.180 The skin of the houris is white enough that the man can see his reflection but
being translucent, but he can also see the marrow inside her bones like red wine in a glass. 181
What is the significance of translucent skin and being able to see the marrow of the bones? AlAzmeh discusses the reasons and points out that the skin is translucent because it is extremely
soft, as soft as the membrane separating the egg from its shell. 182 Furthermore, the skin, being of
the purest white, is also simultaneously reflective to the extent that the man can see his face in
the houri’s skin. Beyond the descriptions of the skin and marrow their beauty is also accounted
for by their eyes which are large and dark and long flowing hair. 183 Lastly, the houris are also
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described by the feminine physical features which men tend to find visually attractive – the
breasts, waist and posterior. 184 In Muslim literature, creative liberties are taken regarding the
physical make-up of the houris and men imagined what was sensually attractive to them. The
Muslim poet Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī in his narratival tour of the afterlife writes:
It occurs to him [the Sheikh], while he is still prostrate, that the girl, though
beautiful, is rather skinny. He raises his head and instantly she has a behind that
rivals the hills of ʿAlij, the dunes of al-Dahnā, and the sands of Yabrīn and the
Banū Saʿd. Awed by the omnipotence of the Kind and Knowing God, he says,
“Thou who givest rays to the shining sun, Thou who fulfillest the desires of
everyone, Thou whose awe-inspiring deeds make us feel impotent, and summon
to wisdom the ignorant: I ask Thee to reduce the bum of this damsel to one square
mile, for Thou hast surpassed my expectations with Thy measure!” An answer is
heard: “You may choose: the shape of this girl will be as you wish.” And the
desired reduction is affected.185
Al-Maʿarrī’s words depict what is considered beautiful in classical Arabic poetry but we can also
see the beginning stages of a connection between the sensual and the sacred. When the Sheikh in
this story beholds what has been given to him by his Lord, he is overwhelmed and immediately
begins to praise Allah for what has been bestowed to him. The sensual results in praise for the
sacred, but furthermore, in experiencing the sensual, the believer is experiencing the wisdom of
his Lord. Here, is it possible that through the sensual one can experience the sacred? This will be
reflected on further in the next few paragraphs.
There is a very significant hadith that makes an integral connection between sexuality
and the sacred. Not only does this saying contextualize the sexual act on earth within the sacred
sphere, it illumines the significance of sex and sexual intimacy in the life to come. In this
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particular hadith, some companions of the Prophet are pleading their case to Muhammad in
relation to the giving of alms (one of the five pillars in Islam) and the subsequent reward. They
stated that they were able to fast just as the wealthy fast and pray just as they do as well but when
it came to charitable giving, they were not able to match the giving of the wealthy. The Prophet
responds to them in the form of a question asking, “Has not Allah made things for you to give in
charity?”186 Here, Muhammad is reframing their perspective of charitable giving, expanding it
beyond the scope of simply material giving. He states that every tasbīḥ,187 takbir,188 tahmīd,189 or
tahlīl,190 these statements of adoration and worship of Allah are a charity. Furthermore, the
Messenger of Allah states that a person “commanding the good and forbidding an evil is a
charity, and in the buḍʿī [sexual act] of each one of you there is a charity.” 191 Upon hearing that
fulfilling their carnal desires, the companions of the Muhammad questioned him, seemingly not
believing what they had just heard. The Prophet then qualifies his former statement, “Do you not
see that if he were to act upon it [his desire] in an unlawful manner then he would be deserving
of punishment? Likewise, if he were to act upon it in a lawful manner then he will be deserving
of a reward.”192
The previous hadith – Nawawi 25 – in a way redeems sexual activity for the companions
of the Prophet. The Prophet contextualizes sex and teaches that when one does it lawfully it is a
good. That there is a good way to have sex and a wrong way is significant because it supports the
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notion that in the proper context it is inherently relational. 193 On the relationality of sex Bouhdiba
notes, “This is understandable. Orgasm is certainly a pleasure. But a shared one. And it is in the
pleasure derived from another at the same time as oneself that this work of piety resides, a work
analogous to fasting, prayer and chastity. Eros and Agape, then, are both involved in
sexuality.”194 Here, Bouhdiba is correct in that sex can be a marriage of both eros and agape
love. It is curious though that the agape theme should emerge in this discussion of the sexual
relations in Islam. As it relates to the current discussion, the sexual realities of the afterlife are
seemingly man-centered and focus solely on the husband’s satisfaction of the flesh.
Bouhdiba establishes the sexuality/sacred narrative even further by suggesting that the
vision of God is constituted in the “very essence of the delights of the Muslim paradise.” 195 He
quickly distinguishes that the extension of the Beatific Vision into the delights are not
exclusively the vision as that is still separate and distinct; however, the vision is not reducible to
the Beatific Vision alone. He suggests that this co-extensiveness of the sexual and the sacral is
difficult for Christians to understand because from their point of view it is “unthinkable that the
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workings of the flesh, a source of original sin, could find its place in the hereafter.” 196 For Islam,
there is something essential in the Eros, in the fulfillment of the flesh and to some extent,
Bouhdiba is correct in that this is foreign to Christianity but only to the extent that sexual
relations are part of Paradise. Bouhdiba further states that to be in Islamic paradise is “the
fulfillment of self” and this fulfillment can only be realized in “love conceived…as a
transfiguration, a transcendence of self in others. It is no accident that hell is solitude, nonpresence of others, in a word, absence of love. Paradise, on the other hand, is total, full, infinite
love. It is unity in harmony with the world, with oneself and with God.”197 Paradise conceived as
the fulfillment of self in inter-relationality is strikingly similar to the Trinitarian foundation in
Christianity. Bouhdiba touches upon a foundational component of our humanity in that we are
inherently relational. Furthermore, emphasizing the transcendent union found in sexuality is also
significant. Sex is an intimate experience that does unite persons in more than a merely physical
sense. An emotional and psychological union is formed when two human beings copulate.
Perhaps sexuality, and the amount of it in Islamic Paradise, is the one area that conceivably
brings people closest to the sacred. What remains doubtful is that sacred union is actually
achieved in this manner in Paradise.
Perhaps this symbolism – the union of the sacred and sexual – is supported by al-Suyūtī’s
statement, “On their breasts is written the name of their husband, linked with one of the beautiful
names of God.”198 The presence of the divine names on the exposed breasts of these paradisal
maidens coupled with the intimate sexual relations wherein the confluence of eros and agape
love manifests, is purportedly a simultaneous experience with the Divine, a mystical Theo-
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anthropic union. Bouhdiba suggestion that “the sexuality encountered in others is also a
projection in God,”199 is both seemingly innovative and provocative. I do not think he is
suggesting a quite disrespectful imagery of divine-human sex or to say that in having sex with
the houris, the inhabitants of Paradise are also having sex with Allah. He is suggesting, however,
sex is a medium wherein one experiences the Divine while ultimately maintaining, I would
suspect, an agnostic disposition on how that attains.
The possible union of the sensual and the sacred highlights the significant concern raised
against Islamic Paradise, namely, the relationship of Man to the Divine. Allah is fundamentally
transcendent and unknowable, yet, the Qur’ān and traditions continue to purport a mystical
experience with the Divine in Paradise. How is this possible? This question will continue to
develop possible answers in the remaining two sections.
Paradise as Theophany
Paradise as theophany is a concept put forth by the influential mystical thinker and writer
Frithjof Schuon. Paradise as a theophany, a manifestation of the Divine, is similar to the previous
union of the sensual and the sacral in that somehow the pleasures of Paradise are a connection to
Allah but is fundamentally different in terms of the metaphysical reality of Paradise. According
to Schuon, Paradise as the material construction is ontologically different and metaphysically
more than the natural realm in this life. In order to understand Schuon’s claim it is necessary to
contextualize this conversation in relation to the presence of levels of reward in Paradise. The
levels of Paradise and how man relates to them is the impetus for Schuon’s proposition.
As we have already discussed in this chapter, there is an intimate relationship between
this life and next. The Qur’ān and hadith traditions state the rewards and pleasures of Paradise
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are contingent upon the choices one made in this life. It is a common perception that a Muslim is
concerned simply with getting to Paradise. After death and following the general resurrection of
the dead comes judgment. Allah is the supreme judge and he will weigh each person’s deeds on
the divine scales. If the good deeds outweigh the bad ones and then the scales tip in favor of
Paradise.200 But the focus of Muslims should not be to simply get there, to make it to Paradise by
any means necessary. Many will make it to Paradise but barely. Once there, however, their
experience is contingent upon the former life on earth. Haleem emphasizes the importance of this
life and the sealing of deeds at death; he writes, “the Quran emphasizes that nobody will escape
death, the resurrection or judgment, and That there is no way to salvation in the afterlife except
through work in this life… it is the only chance to work for a good life in the next world (35:37).
The urgency is expressed by the frequent use of ‘before’ death for the hour comes.” 201 What one
does in this life matters and carries eternal significance. Life on earth is a journey, a process of
spiritual formation and for the Sufi specifically, this implies achieving a level of gnosis, a level
of knowledge pursued and acquired which then transforms into love.
Surahs 55 and 56 are two chapters where one clearly sees the division of people into
groups based upon the deeds of this life. The chapters present a trichotomy of peoples: those in
the front (or the foremost) and those to the right and left. Those on the left are the ones for whom

But even this scene of judgment and just reward is not exactly the whole picture. If it wasn’t enough to
cause angst over making sure that one’s good deeds outweighed the bad in this life, how much more the angst when
one realizes that the decision to allow entry into Paradise is wholly contingent on Allah’s arbitrary decision. Allah is
merciful, one of the many divine names, and he may choose to allow some into Paradise for whom their scales
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damnation awaits. They are dealt with accordingly and then sent away to their punishment. 202
The two groups which remain are the faithful and the award that awaits them is Paradise. But
Paradise is divided into two Gardens (at least) and the two remaining groups are designated for
one or the other.203 The group in the middle, the foremost, are the highest among the elect of
God. 204 This group will consist of relatively few people as the spiritual process required to
achieve this level is difficult. Sufis believe that they alone will comprise the foremost because it
is only the Sufi doctrine and methods which can guide a Muslim nearer to Allah. 205 For this
group their reward in Paradise is al-Firdaws, the highest level of Paradise and the level closest in
proximity to Allah. The group to the right consists of believers and their reward is Paradise as
well although it is not al-Firdaws. Nonetheless, those on the right will enjoy Paradise and all that
is offered to them.
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In relation to this study, the distinction between the two levels raises some interesting
questions to consider. First, do the inhabitants of the lower level experience Allah in the same
way as those in al-Firdaws? Second, do all Muslims in Paradise experience the unveiling of their
Lord or is it merely those who are a part of the foremost? Third, is the reward of the lower level
relative to the level of spiritual development in al-dunya, that is, if a Muslim believer does not
renounce entirely the physical pleasures of earth, do they gain the physical pleasures of Paradise
but miss the ultimate reward of Paradise in the process and what does that imply about their
character? Fourth, how does proximity to Allah effect the quality of Paradise, will those on the
right still be eternally satisfied?
The existence of levels in Paradise raises interesting questions. Here I will discuss
Frithjof Schuon’s attempt to correct an improper translation of a relevant hadith and what he
proposes as a solution. Schuon writes that there is a hadith which states, “the majority of the
dwellers in Paradise are simpleminded (buhl).” Some commentators on this hadith have
suggested that the simpleminded are those who are “satisfied with the Garden instead of thinking
only of the Gardener – who stop short, in other words, with the created and lose sight of the
Creator.” 206 Schuon disagrees with this reading and believes this interpretation is mistaken. He
suggests that while these men to whom the hadith is referencing are of holy naiveté, they are not
men of little intelligence. 207
Schuon believes that interpretation of this hadith – those who are satisfied with the
Garden instead of the Gardener – is a forced analogy due to a confused teleological relationship
between Allah and Paradise. The proper teleology is this: a gardener is there for the garden and
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not the other way around, that is, the importance of the gardener is connected to and subsisted by
the existence of the garden. It is foolish, Schuon suggests, to purport that the Gardener (Allah)
exists for the garden (Paradise) and that He loses interest apart from it. Rather, a better analogy,
he suggests, would be the absurdity of “honoring the palace instead of the king or the wedding
gown while forgetting the bride.” 208 In either case –the palace or the gown – their existences
derives from the king and bride, but the latter’s importance and interest is not contingent on the
former. But for Schuon, however, these two analogies do not capture the paradisal reality and are
inadequate to convey its nature. He writes, Paradise is “above all a dimension that unites us to
God;” and so instead of being the bride’s gown, Paradise is the very body of the bride, and it is
“therefore what manifests outwardly the mystery of the Personality that is loved.” 209 Paradise,
then, is not a veil that conceals the Divine but an outward manifestation reflecting the Uncreated.
That the created can reveal the Uncreated is a mysterious function but if it did not have that
capacity then, as Schuon notes, “it would be impossible to explain this saying of the Companion
of the Prophet: ‘I never saw anything without seeing God’.”210
Returning to the idea of the Beatific Vision, this eschatological feature suggests that
pleasures or joys in Paradise cannot exist apart from the divine Presence. Preferring a particular
pleasure in paradise to God would, as Schuon notes, “[have] no meaning here; it is merely an
illegitimate transposition of an earthly possibility into the heavenly world.” 211 It is true that
human language is limited in its capacity to reveal eschatological truths. Concerning
eschatology, Hermansen correctly points out, “By their very nature, eschatological doctrines test
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the limits of our rational and customary experience, thereby reminding us of the fragility of our
attachment to conditions that strike us now as unquestionably real.” 212 But it seems here that
Schuon’s rejection is the transference of earthly preferences to paradise as the means of joy
rather than seeing the Divine as its legitimate source of joy. This does not, however, negate the
existence of external and physical pleasures in the afterlife for as Schuon pointed out previously,
the external reality is a reflection of the Hidden. It would seem then that Schuon emphatically
seeks to influence one’s perspective regarding the divine-human relationship of Paradise. A
proper disposition is one that sees the Divine as the source from which all pleasure derives.
That this is Schuon’s goal is made clear when he adds the final and most important
objection to the “fools who people Paradise” interpretation. If the correct interpretation of this
hadith is that the majority of people in Paradise are satisfied with garden while overlooking the
Gardener, it would suggest that the majority of people in Paradise have forgotten God. In Islam,
the remembrance of God is the beginning of the return (ma’ād) and to forget God is to sin, even
the “essence of sin,” as Schuon notes. 213 Paradise cannot contain sin and so Paradise cannot be a
place where even one person, let alone the majority, merits the description of foolish and forgets
the Creator.
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the Qur’ān is full of revelatory and descriptive
language that often depicts a vivid Paradise that has some correspondence to the life humans
experience now. Following Schuon’s attempt to correct one’s perspective of Paradise, it may be
the case that the pendulum swing too far in the other direction. He anticipates this reaction and
seeks to correct that extreme as well:
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Hasty and simplistic disparagements of Paradise obviously serve to stress the
supereminence of the Creator, but the immediate objection to this is that God
requires praise, which is in our interest, but not flattery, which serves no end and
is an insult to Him; in fact the purpose of praise is not to please the tyrant but on
the contrary to actualize our awareness of the divine Source of all goods and
therefore to show forth our human function, which consists in connecting the
cosmic qualities to God so as to see them in God and God in them. 214
A hasty disparagement of Paradise would be to suggest that in light of the beatific vision,
Paradise is of little value. Schuon states that this statement is either a “truism or ‘hypocritical
angelism’.”215 It is a truism if by little value one means it in the sense that the Divine is the only
absolute real. It is an “angelism” if humans ought to disparage the graces which are accordant
with their own nature. The latter disparagement compares the human inhabitants of paradise to
angelic creatures suggesting that human creatures become non-human entities lacking a human
nature and do not possess the same properties of having a will, physical bodies, etc., and thus
certain physical desires relating to physical properties.216 Schuon believes that the graces of
Paradise consistent with our nature include those things which are physical realities and so one
need not be hasty in disparaging certain imperfect views of paradise without other inherently
limited, imperfect views. Allah is the source of all good and to delimit Paradise subsequently
delimits proper human function because it replaces praise with flattery. The cosmic qualities of
Paradise actualize our awareness of Allah as the divine source of all good which properly results
in praise of the Creator. But going even further, Schuon’s thesis is that Paradise is a theophany;
thus, the causal connection between Paradise and Allah is mysteriously ontological. Actualizing
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the awareness of the divine Source is more than a causal connection as he stated earlier; it is to
see the cosmic qualities in God and God in them. Paradise should not be disparaged because, as
Schuon writes, “Paradise is a theophany and, in this respect, cannot be treated as the created
ought to be treated when considered in its non-divinity or separativity.”217
To say that the paradisal realities are more than the veil of the bride but the bride’s body
itself puts theological tension on Tawḥīd, between the uncreated and the created. Paradise as
theophany purports that the created reveals that which is uncreated, that Allah, the utterly unique
and unknowable God, is revealed through that which is knowable. Chittick’s insight is helpful as
he summarizes Ibn ‘Arabī’s thoughts on existence. He writes:
Ibn ‘Arabī places it [the isthmus] at the center of his enormous project to
synthesize all strands of Islamic thought on the basis of the Koran. He points out
that, in actual fact, everything other than God is located in an isthmus between
real being and sheer nothingness. All things are contingent upon the Real and
receive their relative reality from the radiance of his light. All things are in effect
images of God, or “signs,” as the Koran puts it, though nothing is identical with
the signified. Everything other than the Real is God’s “dream,” shimmering in a
tenuous domain that is neither the pure unity of sheer being and absolute
consciousness nor the utter emphasis of pure nothingness.”218
Human existence rests on the isthmus between existence or real being and non-existence. Allah
is the Ultimate Real and as such all that is not-God is contingent and exists only through Allah’s
power (i.e. the radiance of his light). That all creation derives its existence from God whose
existence is necessary is not problematic. A contingent entity, by definition, is not necessary so
for contingent entities to exist, their existence must derive from elsewhere. A problem does seem
to arise however when the ontology of the other than the Real is defined. When Chittick suggests
that everything other than God is God’s dream, is he suggesting that all of creation is a mental
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projection of God? Is creation uniquely distinct and other than the creator or, as a projection, is it
God Himself? It seems that two options are available: either creation is illusory and not real or
all that is other than God is merely an emanation of God himself. There is no true other. 219
Problem of otherness, extension, distinction between Allah and creation are not new
problems for Muslims scholars. In the case of Schuon’s theophany, however, Paradise is
ontologically more than a sign, and is not to be considered as normal matter is considered.
Paradise as the Bride itself is a radical step that is beyond the bounds of orthodox Islam. But, at
the same time, Schuon is working to reconcile the problems arising from tawḥīd and otherness.
He is trying to bridge the impassible, to overcome radical transcendence and unknowability, and
thus experiencing the Divine, while also preserving the fundamental tenet of the faith.
The Beatific Vision
This last section not only brings conclusion to the chapter but to the thematic conclusion
of the chapter as well. All of the aspects of Paradise have been leading up to this last description
of Paradise – the Beatific Vision. The Beatific Vision represents the highest level of pleasure in
Paradise and an overly theocentric emphasis. Surah 10:26 states, “Those who did well will have
the best reward and more besides.” Al-Ghazālī claims that the “more besides” or “even more” is
“the Vision of Divine Countenance, which is the greatest of all delights, which shall cause one to
be oblivious of the pleasures of the people of Heaven.”220 That the Beatific Vision is the highest
good is not debated in Islam. Where we do find disagreement however, is the exact nature of the
vision. Consider these two passages, one from the Qur’ān and one from a hadith: “On that Day
there will be radiant faces, looking towards their Lord,”221 and from the hadith we see
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Muhammad telling his disciples on a clear night that they will “see your Lord as you see this
moon, and you will have no trouble in seeing Him.” 222 Both passages attest to being able to see
Allah but these passages become problematic when the mode of the seeing is established. On the
one hand the Qur’ān and hadith claim that Allah will be seen but on the other hand Allah is
amodal and therefore does not have a body. What then will the believers see on that day?
Furthermore, there are other passages in the Qur’ān which state that a person cannot see Allah. 223
A tension thus arises between what it means to see what cannot be seen.
Historically, this was cause for debate between the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools. The
Muʿtazilites traditionally held to the position that sight (baṣar) must be understood in a corporeal
sense and since God did not have a body, vision of him was impossible. Ashʿarite orthodoxy
affirmed the truth of the vision and proposed that Allah would be seen but held to the traditional
phrase bilā kayf (without the how). They suggested a number of possible options in response to
the Muʿtazilites. First, it was suggested that perhaps the passage regarding Moses was given
contextually to humanity in this life. Perhaps, given man’s current physical condition, he could
not see God, but it could be that in the new paradisal body vision would be granted. 224 Second,
they also denied that there was any logical reason why vision (baṣar) could not perceive an entity
that was neither substance nor accident. 225 A third way was proposed by al-Ghazālī. According
to Timothy Winter, al-Ghazālī worked vigorously to defend the Beatific Vision as a true
description of Paradise. Al-Ghazālī purported that the Beatific Vision was “none other than the
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gnosis (maʿrifa) already given in an inferior and more fleeting fashion to the saints in this
world.”226 Al-Ghazālī is referencing here the Sufi path of gnosis, the internalizing of the religious
life and the contemplation of Allah. The path of gnosis is what leads to the “tasting” or dhawq of
Allah, a religious experience given in an inferior way not but will manifest fully in the Beatific
Vision. In this way, al-Ghazālī holds orthodoxy by preserving the truthfulness of the vision while
at the same time avoiding having to affirm an ocular vision of Allah.
The vision as gnosis thesis reiterates the importance of the al-dunyā/al-ākhira dichotomy
discussed earlier. Muslim anthropology suggests that man is inherently weak and prone to
forgetfulness. In the person, there is a tension between competing forces in the body – the
desiring soul and the rational soul. 227 The desiring soul is designed to be incline to the pleasures
of this life. If one is given over to the desiring soul, he becomes more and more attached to this
world, and less inclined to remember his Lord. The rational soul, on the other hand, is more
inclined to pursue knowledge/gnosis (maʿrifa) and further contemplation of Allah. As one directs
his attention more fully to his Lord, the less his desiring soul clings to this life. Thought of in
another way, the path to gnosis is an emptying of the self, a shedding of earthly desires. The
spiritual life is directed toward filling the mind with knowledge of Allah which in turn leads to
contemplation and love. Sufi doctrine highlights this distinction in man and commends the
contemplative life.
The path to gnosis is a journey that begins in al-dunyā and culminates in al-ākhira when
one attains the Beatific Vision. Perceived in this way – vision as gnosis – the vision (ru’ya) is a
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spiritual delight and it is suggested that it far surpasses the physical pleasures of the Garden. 228
Because this vision is spiritual in nature, in Sufi literature, it’s description also possesses certain
mystical undertones of union and assimilation. Seyyed Nasr, a contemporary Sufi, speaks of the
union of ecstasy where the “Beloved is contemplated in Her infinite beauty, which consumes the
beholder.”229 The Beatific Vision, however, raises all sorts of theological and philosophical
questions; especially if thought of in Ghazālīan/Sufi terms of gnosis, union and assimilation.
First, there is the ever-immanent tension between Tawḥīd and knowability. If God is radically
transcendent and unknowable, then how can one know anything about Allah either experientially
or propositionally? Second, how does reducing the Beatific Vision to gnosis impact the highest
good of Paradise if vision as gnosis cannot reach him? Third, if the vision is attainable in
Paradise what is the extent of the union and/or assimilation? Descriptions of the vision in the
literature, when thought of in these terms, seemingly begins to slowly dissolve the human subject
until naught but Allah remains. These questions and more will be addressed and discussed
throughout the remaining chapters.
Conclusion
This chapter has covered prevalent paradisal themes in Islam. These salient themes were
arranged and discussed in a manner that attempted to express the relationality of humanity to
Paradise as well as humanity to Allah. First, the relationship between this life (al-dunyā) and the
next (al-ākhira) forms an important dialectic in Islamic eschatology. While in al-dunyā, Muslims
must live in light of al-ākhira for what is done here on earth impacts the life to come.
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Furthermore, the pleasures of this life stand in contrast to the coming life. They are but mere
shadows of what Allah has in store for the inhabitants of Paradise.
Second, the theme of sensuality in Paradise considered the relationship of the body to
nature. Paradise is described as an abundance of the sensual where the rewards are constantly
and perpetually generating pleasure for the body. In connection to this theme of sensuality, the
third theme – sexuality and the sacred – it was suggested that within the perpetual acts of
sexuality in Paradise there is a connection to the sacred. Understood in this way, sexuality and
the sacral is possibly a moment/location in which the human comes into contact with the Divine.
The fourth theme, Paradise as theophany, would support the previous proposition as we
saw from Frithjof Schuon and his classification of the physical realm of Paradise of an
ontological class differentiated from the physical in this life. Schuon suggests that Paradise is
more than a sign/signifier relation to Allah and that Paradise is not the veil but the bride itself.
Although outside the bounds of traditional Islamic orthodoxy, Schuon is attempting to reconcile
the two creeds of Tawḥīd and experience of the Divine.
Lastly, all of these themes as they were assembled led to the Beatific Vision of Allah, the
highest and loftiest pleasure in Paradise. Again, the tension between Tawḥīd and experience was
addressed as the passages about seeing God were addressed. Al-Ghazālī offers a possible via
media between two extremes – denying the truth of the vision on the one hand and affirming an
ocular vision of Allah on the other. Both ends of the spectrum are problematic in relation to
revelation. Ghazālī postulates another way when he limits the vision of Allah to gnosis (already
given in this life but fully manifested in the next).
Vision as Knowledge (Gnosis) leads us into the next chapter where we will examine more
closely Ghazālī’s thesis. Furthermore, the next chapter will also look at the various components
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which constitute the culminated vision – knowledge, love and union. The causal relation between
man and the Divine first begins with the Divine. Love, it is said, derives metaphysically from
Allah both in creating and in the self-giving of revelation. Gnosis, as man receives it leads to
love for Allah. As one loves his Lord, in return, his Lord will return that love. Lastly, this
progression of love-gnosis-love culminates in mystical union in the Beatific Vision in the
afterlife.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE ISLAMIC BEATIFIC VISION: GOD’S LOVE FOR MAN AND
MAN’S LOVE FOR GOD
Introduction
The previous chapter concluded with the discussion of the Beatific Vision in Paradise.
The Beatific Vision represents the highest level of both attainment and pleasure in Islamic
Paradise. But, as was also mentioned in the chapter, attaining the Beatific Vision in Paradise
corresponds to a Muslim’s level of spiritual development in this life. Proximity to Allah in this
life correlates to the degree of nearness, and thus pleasure and satisfaction, in the life to come.
Keeping the Beatific Vision in mind, this chapter will discuss the process of spiritual
development in Islam needed to attain the full vision in Paradise. The process will be examined
within the Sufi tradition for they submit that only along the mystical path can one achieve such
illumination. More specifically, the process under examination is that of al-Ghazālī’s design,
what he calls the ‘science of the afterlife.’ There are two central themes emphasized in the
process or path – knowledge (or gnosis) and love. Along the path, knowledge of Allah comes
first which is then followed by love for Allah. As one grows in knowledge of Allah so too does
love for Him grow. As one grows in love for Allah, s/he will pursue more knowledge and thus
one follows a path towards greater illumination and greater love. The reciprocating
knowledge/love cycle brings one nearer and nearer to Allah until that person loves nothing save
Allah alone. It is in this moment, when love for Allah (and His Prophet) is above all else, that
Allah then loves his servant. In order to understand how this relation is achieved, we will discuss
the content and nature of the revelatory knowledge as well as the kind and quality of
Divine/human love.230
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The phrase “God’s love for man” may initially seem a contrary conception of Allah
common to the Western reader. Seyyed Hossein Nasr believes that this idea of Allah as only a
God of Justice – but not of Mercy, Compassion, and Love – has been “propagated by certain
Western scholars and Christian apologists,” and that it is “totally false.” 231 Perhaps there is some
truth in Nasr’s claim of propagation but at the same time it is not as if these assertions were made
in a vacuum, absent from any Islamic doctrines and teachings. I would submit that the notion of
Allah as loving is not a prevailing theme in many Sunni Muslim societies. 232 This does not mean
however, that Nasr’s claim is to be ignored or rejected. Many Muslims thinkers and writers,
especially in the classical period of Islam, emphasized Allah’s love, compassion and mercy. We
turn now to one such person of this period, Al-Ghazālī, the first Islamic reformer, and his quest
to revive the ever-important religious and spiritual pursuit of the afterlife.
Al-Ghazālī: Islam’s First Reformer
Having a love for Allah that is above all other loves is the telos of all human creatures.
Subsequently, love for Allah also leads to a love for His Prophet but the degree of love for the
latter must not supersede the former. Loving the things of this world, the temporal, finite
pleasures more than the Divine creates a division wherein one neglects his/her ultimate purpose
in life. Furthermore, love for earthly things more than Allah will cause a person to miss out on
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the blissful life to come as s/he will not attain the Beatific Vision in Paradise wherein eternal
felicity resides and may even lead to damnation in hellfire. Love for Allah is the utmost concern
for the Muslim believer.
Possessing a love for Allah above all else is preceded by knowledge of Him. A person
must know his Lord before one can love and so there is a need for divine revelation and
disclosure prior to love. In Islam, revelation is given in a number of forms. Classical Islam
teaches that all of creation is a revelation of Allah, testifying of His many wonderful attributes.
The vast expanse of the cosmos, this world of ours, the human body, evoke a posture of
remembrance and reflection. 233 These modes of revelation manifest in a general sense, but they
are not sufficient in producing the type of knowledge needed to elicit a full and abounding love
for Allah. It is the Qur’ān alone, the special revelation of Allah, wherein one learns the most
fundamental truth of tawḥīd. But such knowledge, however, exists in gradation in the religious
subject and, as we will see, the level of spiritual development corresponds to one’s ability to
internalize tawḥīd.
As was mentioned earlier in the study, Al-Ghazālī is a very influential Islamic thinker,
writer, theologian, philosopher and Sufi.234 The influence and gravitas with which he wrote are
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so widely felt in the Muslim world that he is often given the moniker, “The Proof of Islam.” It is
at the convergence of knowledge, love and the afterlife where his thoughts and insight are
paramount for this study. Frustrated with the religious form of Islam in his day, al-Ghazālī set
out to reform what he saw as a perversion of the faith from how it was originally practiced in the
days of the Prophet. The Islamic society of his day, it seemed, had become engulfed in the
formalities of jurisprudence and kalām. These sub-disciplines were having a terraforming impact
on the religious sciences – both in thought and perspective. He sensed that the emphasis on the
afterlife and, more importantly, the attaining of the Beatific Vision had been altogether cast to
the side, yet for him, and for Islam rightly practiced, it constituted the utmost importance in
religious life.
In order to grasp al-Ghazālī’s contribution to Islamic thought as well as understand his
patented science of the afterlife, it is beneficial to briefly summarize and examine two of his
works. First, we will look at his autobiography which tells of his intellectual and existential
journey through epistemological skepticism and religious crisis. Second, the opening pages of
the Book of Knowledge – Book 1 of the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn)
highlight the need for revival in Islam and thus orients the reader towards what he sought to
resolve. Al-Ghazālī’s journey is chronicled in his autobiography entitled The Deliverer from
Error (al-Munqidh min al- ḍalāl)235 completed in the early months of Fall 500/1106. 236 The
timing of the Deliverer is significant due to the cause for writing, a factor which cannot be
overlooked. Alexander Treiger notes that al-Ghazālī’s autobiography is written in response to a
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significant controversy – the Nīshāpūr controversy237 – that arose following the publication of
the Revival (Iḥyāʾ) and so the Deliverer should be read as an apologetic treatise.238 Al-Ghazālī’s
pointedness in the Revival did not gain him favor with the religious elite of his day, and the
Deliverer, in part, is answering certain charges against his methodology in the Revival. Thus,
certain passages in the Deliverer, especially those in relation to philosophy, must be read
carefully and in light of the entire corpus of al-Ghazālī’s works. 239
With that in mind, in the Deliverer we are privy to al-Ghazālī’s journey and how he came
to resolve his bouts with epistemological skepticism and religious crisis. For al-Ghazālī,
epistemological doubt was the first obstacle in need of navigation. He went through a period of
skepticism while on a quest for certainty and thirsted for the ability to “grasp the real meaning of
things” and not to believe something to be true merely because of religious tradition. 240 Al-
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and not ignore the rest of his corpus of literature – especially his inclusion of philosophical ideas elsewhere in
various works (especially the Revival).Treiger defends the thesis (supported by Richard M. Frank) that al-Ghazālī is
in debt to Avicenna (Ibn Sina) in all his writings (his emphasis). He further states that scholars have identified
“considerable problems with al-Ghazālī’s presentation of his engagement with philosophy…” which leads him to
suggest that we take al-Ghazālī’s apologetic comments against philosophy in the Deliverer “with a grain of salt.”
Alexander Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī’s theory of mystical cognition and its
Avicennian foundation, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 3 (especially pts. 1-3).

Kenneth Garden notes that among al-Ghazālī’s objectives in writing the Deliverer were to “exaggerate
the totality of his break with his pre-488/1095 life and thought, downplay his extensive debt to philosophy, and
proclaim his unparalleled religious authority.” Garden, First Islamic Reviver, 170.
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On these pursuits al-Ghazālī writes: “In the bloom of my youth and the prime of my life, from the time I
reached puberty before I was twenty until now, when I am over fifty, I have constantly been diving daringly into the
depths of this profound sea and wading into its deep water like a bold man, not like a cautious coward. I would
penetrate far into every murky mystery, pounce upon every problem, and dash into every mazy difficulty. I would
scrutinize the creed of every sect and seek to lay bare the secrets of each faction’s teaching with the aim of
discriminating between the proponent of truth and the advocate of error, and between the faithful follower of
tradition and the heterodox innovator. I would never take leave…of a philosopher without seeking to become
acquainted with the essence of his philosophy, or of a mutakallim without endeavoring to discover the aim of his
discussion and polemic, or of a sufi without eagerly trying to obtain knowledge of the secret of his serenity, or of a
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Ghazālī searched for an epistemological grounding in sense data and rational data. In a scene
similar to one that would transpire a few hundred years later with Descartes, sense data and
rational data are conversant interlocutors on al-Ghazālī’s skeptical shoulders. Sense data came
under scrutiny first and after thorough reflection, al-Ghazālī determined epistemological
grounding could not be found in sense data because his soul would not allow him to submit that
he was safely from error whilst relying on it. The strongest of senses, the eyes organs, are often
deceived by what is seen (i.e. the movement of shadows, the size of stars, etc.) and the
knowledge provided through sense-data and judged by the “sense-judge” needs refutation from
another judge – the “reason-judge.”241 Reliance on sense-data for grounding was thus untenable
and so he then postulated that perhaps one could rely on rational data and primary truths. 242 But
as he did, sense-data spoke up and questioned the judgment of the rational-judge. Just as the
rational judge had come along and corrected the perception of the sense-judge and exposed the
lie, how does the rational judge know that the primary truths, as they are perceived, are true?
Could there not be another judge beyond perception that could render the untrue verdict for the
rational judge? To make the point, al-Ghazālī considers dream states and how in the waking, one
realizes that what was perceived reality was merely a dream, that the dreamer did not know s/he

devout worshiper without looking into the source and substance of his piety, or of an irreligious nihilist without
attempting to find out his background and motivation in order to become aware of the reasons for his bold
profession of nihilism and irreligion.” Al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalal), trans. by R. J.
McCarthy, (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2004), 54.
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Ibid., 56.

Al-Ghazālī has certain primary truths in mind: “‘Ten is more than three’, and ‘One and the same thing
cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied,’ and ‘One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal,
existent and nonexistent, necessary and impossible.’” Ibid., 56.
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was dreaming until awoken. It could be the case that our conscious reality is merely a dream that
we could awaken from at any moment (or at death). 243
This realization gripped al-Ghazālī and by his own testimony he remained extremely
skeptical for two months. It is important to note that al-Ghazālī’s “malady,” as he calls it, did not
impact his adherence to religious doctrine and his skepticism did not carry over into his religious
beliefs. After a while, he testifies that Allah “cured him of that sickness” and that, “…My soul
regained its health and equilibrium and once again I accepted the self-evident data of reason and
relied on them with safety and certainty. But that was not achieved by constructing a proof or
putting together an argument. On the contrary, it was the effect of a light which God Most High
cast into my breast. And that light is the key to most knowledge.” 244 The last two sentences are
of paramount import for understanding al-Ghazālī’s epistemology and subsequently his
methodology of the religious sciences as they introduce the phenomenology of inspiration.
According to al-Ghazālī, most knowledge or the “unveiling of truth” does not depend on
“precisely formulated proofs” but from the light which is cast from Allah and anyone who
believes otherwise has “straightened the broad mercy of God.” 245 It is Allah who illumines the
heart with axiomatic knowledge (or first principles) and divine inspiration. But in his quest, the
question remained of who were the purveyors of the full truth within Islam and how does one
prepare the heart for reception? Al-Ghazālī was inclined to believe the categories of those who
were seeking truth was limited to four: the Mutakallimūm, Bāṭinites, Philosophers, and the

Here, al-Ghazālī cites a tradition of the Prophet saying: “Men are asleep: then after they die they
awake.” Ibid., 57.
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Sufis.246 He committed to immersing himself in the first three and found both positive and
negative features within each group.
The fourth category of truth seekers he investigated were the Sufis. Of the Sufis, AlGhazālī writes that he knew their particular Way was “consummated [realized] only by
knowledge and by activity [by the union of theory and practice].” 247 He further elucidates that
the aim of their knowledge is removed obstacles in the soul, ridding it of bad habits and qualities,
so that a pure and polished heart remained, a heart that is “empty of all save God and adorned
with the constant remembrance of God.” 248 At this point in the narrative, al-Ghazālī notes that
from his journey into the sciences, through their methods and practice, on the quest for the two
kinds of knowledges – revealed and rational – he had already acquired a certainty about three
things: God Most High, in the prophetic mediation of revelation, and the Last Day. 249 The
certainty in these fundamental tenets was not caused by any one specific proof but by a number
of experiences and circumstances. He found, however, more was needed in order to attain the
beatific vision in the afterlife. Sufism, he realized, was more than just theory and words, it
demanded piety and the partaking of experiential states. In order to achieve eternal bliss, he must
move beyond theory and knowledge and seek to internalize these truths of which he had become
certain. A personal religious battle was emerging within al-Ghazālī for he was realizing what it
would take in order to cleanse his heart of worldly attachments. 250 His teaching post in Baghdad,

246

Ibid., 58.

247

Ibid., 77.

248

Ibid., 77.

249

Ibid., 78.

He writes, “It had already become clear to me that my only hope of attaining beatitude in the afterlife
lay in piety and restraining my soul from passion. The beginning of all that, I knew, was to sever my heart’s
attachment to the world by withdrawing from this abode of delusion and turning to the mansion of immortality and
devoting myself with total ardor to God Most High.” Ibid., 78.
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one of the most prestigious appointments one could attain, was muddying his heart and building
up the earthly abode of delusion. He faced a choice, to move beyond theory and into practice, to
embark on the religious experiential journey that is the Sufi Way. R. J. McCarthy suggests that
this is a very significant moment in the Ghazālī story, as it represents the beginning of the
religious crisis al-Ghazālī faced following his epistemological crisis. 251 Al-Ghazālī made the
decision to apply himself to the Way and left his teaching post in Baghdad. He set out for
Damascus and for the next ten years he committed to solitude, remembrance of God, and
cleansing of the heart from anything but God Most High. During these ten years, al-Ghazālī
became and, from that point on, was a Sufi.252
For the purposes of this study, a specific question emerges here concerning the
development of al-Ghazālī’s methodology for knowing during this time. It is clear that he
considers the Way of the Sufis to be superior for attaining the beatific vision but is it exclusively
the supreme way to know God? The answer to that question is debated and will be developed
further in following sections but for now, we can consider al-Ghazālī’s own conclusions
following this ten-year journey. He writes:
I knew with certainty that the Sufis are those who uniquely follow the way to God
Most High, their mode of life is the best of all, their way the most direct of ways,
and their ethic the purest. Indeed, were one to combine the insight of the
intellectuals, the wisdom of the wise, and the lore of the scholars versed in the
mysteries of revelation in order to change a single item of sufi conduct and ethic
and to replace it with something else better, no way to do so would be found! For
all their motions and quiescences, exterior and interior, are learned from the light

McCarthy writes: “Al-Ghazālī always had an unshakable belief in the “three fundaments” – even, it
would seem, during his earlier crisis of skepticism, which was not properly a religious, but rather a psychological
and epistemological crisis. This may also help to explain what follows. For here we begin the important account of
the great crisis of al-Ghazālī. This is a religious crisis, a crisis of the spirit, not of the intellect alone: to be or not to
be a true and wholly committed follower of the way logically consequent on a profound and living faith in the “three
fundamentals.” McCarthy is the translator of this version of the Deliverer. Ibid., 115 n.168 (footnote appears on pg.
78).
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of the niche of prophecy. And beyond the light of prophecy there is no light on
earth from which illumination can be obtained. 253
Whatever conclusions are to be made regarding al-Ghazālī’s methodology, it must include, at
least in part, the paradigm of Sufism.
The second part of our initial inquiry looks at the opening section of the Book of
Knowledge, Book 1 of the Revival. Al-Ghazālī wrote the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ
ʿulūm al-dīn) for the expressed purpose of reorienting the Muslim community into mindful
pursuit of the afterlife. 254 In essence, al-Ghazālī developed a new religious discipline: the science
of the afterlife. He believed this discipline to be unknown to his contemporaries but also believed
this science was not new in the sense that it had been known to the first generations of Muslims
following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. 255
In the opening passage of Book 1 of the Iḥyāʾ: The Book of Knowledge (Kitāb al-ʿilm),
we are given the objective of this massive tome. 256 Al-Ghazālī begins the Iḥyāʾ with the
conventional religious introductions and invocations although the structure of his introduction
does not fully adhere to mandated conventions of religious writing. The haste with which he
writes the first three steps of the introduction is a rhetorical device suggesting to the reader that
his message is so important he has not time for formalities. 257 The fourth entry of the
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The science of the afterlife has two branches: the science of the unveiling (ʿilm al-mukāshafa) and the
science of practice (ʿilm al-muʿāmala).
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Treiger, Inspired Knowledge, 4.
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The objective is the same as has just been previously stated a few paragraphs prior. Here, however, we
get a glimpse of al-Ghazālī’s specific thoughts regarding the religious climate of his day. Also, another note to
mention regarding the form of al-Ghazālī’s intro to the Iḥyāʾ, Garden states that the introduction, along with
detailing the objectives, also gives insight into why al-Ghazālī’s critics respond to him as they do. Garden, “AlGhazālī,” 17.
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On the religious formalities and the cause for controversy see Garden, Ibid., 18-20. Garden notes that
this break from convention is actually a rhetorical device employed by al-Ghazālī to depict a message given with
haste: “By rushing through the traditional pious invocations, linking these directly to his mission statement, and
writing in such a florid style, the author conveys a sense of the urgency of his task. This passage is designed to give
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introduction begins the cause for writing. A brief analysis of this passage will be helpful for
understanding not only the purposes of the Iḥyāʾ, but also, I would submit, his life’s work as a
whole. The fourth entry begins as follows:
I hasten to enlighten you who are self-righteous and reject belief, and who
go too far in your reproach and disapproval.
I am no longer obliged to remain silent because the responsibility to speak
and to warn you has been imposed on me by your persistent blindness to the true
state of the divine reality, and your insistence on fostering evil, stirring up
opposition against anyone who, in order to conform to the dictates of knowledge,
deviates from custom and the established practice of men. In doing this he fulfils
God’s prescriptions to purity the self and reform the heart, and thus redeems a life
that has been dissipated in despair of remedy and avoids the company of those
who the Law Giver [Muhammad] described as “The person most severely
chastised on the day of judgment will be the learned man whom God did not
afford benefit from his knowledge.” 258
Al-Ghazālī begins his charge, making his distaste known for those who are self-righteous in the
faith. He feels compelled to write against these people for a number of reasons: first, their
religious thought and practice has become blind to the original intentions of the faith. Second,
they are not only leading others astray but actively persecuting (and obstructing) those who resist
these constructs and pursue the “true dictates of knowledge” thus fulfilling God’s prescriptions
to purify the heart. In this passage, one can begin to see the opponents al-Ghazālī is challenging
– the religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) and their acquisition of knowledge (ʿilm), which, according the
implications of the cited hadith, will be of no benefit to them in the afterlife. One of the keys to

the impression of near recklessness, as though the author were driven by a mission so imperative that he cannot be
bothered to observe convention and wait until after the formalities to launch his attack.” Ibid., 19-20.
Al-Ghazali, The Book of Knowledge (Kitāb al-ʿilm), Book I of The Revival of the Religious Sciences
(Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn), trans. by Kenneth Honerkamp, (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2015), xl. The section division of
this passage is influenced by Kenneth Garden who interacts with this passage in the source listed below. Also, it is
important to note that the hadith reference at the end of the passage is also cause for controversy in the Iḥyāʾ.
Ghazālī uses many hadith throughout The Revival that are of low grade in terms of authenticity and transmission.
Garden notes this and also points out that this hadith in particular received the grade of ḍaʿīf “which is to say,
possibly spurious.” Garden, “Al-Ghazālī,” 22.
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understanding al-Ghazālī’s aim in the Iḥyāʾ is his conception of ʿilm which can be translated
either as “knowledge” or “science.” We have already seen that the charge to all Muslims is to
know himself and to seek knowledge (ʿilm) of his Lord. The questions before us in this section of
the study and for al-Ghazali in the Iḥyāʾ is “what constitutes ʿilm?”259
In the next section, Al-Ghazālī continues his explication of the cause for the Iḥyāʾ. One
can sense his belief in the imminence of the concern as well as the incensed disposition towards
the religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ) as leaves no uncertainty as to their identity. He writes:
By my life! There is no reason for your persistent disapproval except the
malady which has become an epidemic among the multitudes. The malady [of
ignorance] is not discerning the importance of the matter, the gravity of the
problem, and the seriousness of the crisis. The next life is approaching, the
present world is vanishing, death is imminent, the journey is far, provisions for
the journey are scant, the dangers are great, and the road is blocked. The
perceptive know that only knowledge and works devoted to God avail.
With neither guide nor companion, the journey on the road to the next life,
with its many pitfalls, is difficult and tiring. The guides to the way are the learned
who are the heirs of the prophets, but our age is void of them, and only the
superficial remain, and Satan has mastery over most of them. All of them were so
engrossed in their worldly fortunes that they came to see good as evil and evil as
good, so that the science of religion disappeared, and the light of guidance was
extinguished all over the world. They made people imagine that there is no
knowledge except the formal legal rulings of a government by which judges settle
disputes when foolish people quarrel; or the ability to debate, which is displayed
by the vainglorious in order to confuse and refute; or the elaborate and flowery
language by which the preacher seeks to lure the common people. Apart from
these three [types of knowledge] they could not find other ways to profit and
[acquire] the riches of the world. 260
It is interesting to note that alongside al-Ghazālī’s castigation of the religious leaders he also sees
them as part of the sickness or “malady.” They are both the cause of the epidemic and the
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Iḥyā, “the contestation of what constitutes ʿilm.” Ibid., 22.
260

Al-Ghazālī, Book of Knowledge, xl-xli.

108
victims along with the remaining multitudes.261 The malady is “forgetfulness” but not necessarily
the forgetfulness associated with the call to remember their Lord, rather, it is the ignorance of the
immanence of the life to come (i.e. not being mindful of ma‘ād or the “going back”). Along with
the immanence of death and the return, what heightens the concern for al-Ghazālī is the
challenge of the path one must take in order to return. Again, we see the significance of
knowledge in this process as he notes that only the kind of knowledge he has in mind and works
attributed to Allah will avail or attain felicity.
Certain guides are needed to lead people along the path that is both far and dangerous but
al-Ghazālī notes that the world is void of them and with the loss of them so too did the science of
religion disappear, and the light of guidance extinguish. 262 Of course religious guides still
remained within Islam (that is who al-Ghazālī is writing to), but he believes they are all
superficial and, even more extreme, that Satan has a hold on them. The identity of the corrupt
guides comes into view as al-Ghazālī notes that the guides have led the people astray by their
“legal rulings” (fiqh) and “debating...and elaborate/flowery language” (kalām) by leading the
multitudes to believe their methodologies are, respectively, the only source for religious
knowledge. The jurist and the theologians are who al-Ghazālī has in mind and in order to revive
the religious sciences, “this means,” Garden writes, “wrestling ʿilm from the hands of those
ʿulamāʾ who have blotted out its true spirit.” 263 One can see why Ghazālī faced controversy in
his time. His clearly manifested charges against the religious leaders of his day was perhaps the
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most significant cause for controversy in his time for in doing so he was essentially challenging
their faith, wealth, power and influence throughout the Muslim world.
In the closing section of his opening statement al-Ghazālī writes:
The knowledge of the next life according to which our predecessors
walked and which God, in His book, called discernment, wisdom, knowledge,
illumination, light, right guidance, and rectitude, has been quite forgotten. This is
a calamity in religion and a grave crisis, [so] I considered it an important duty for
me to compose this book in order to revive the religious sciences, to reveal the
ways of the early imams, and to clarify the branches of knowledge the prophets
and predecessors regarded as useful. 264
Al-Ghazālī believes that he has been chosen to revive the all-important religious sciences for the
way of reform has been shown to him. He does not want to do away with the religious
methodologies of jurisprudence and kalām-oriented theology; rather, to reorient them and, as
Garden writes, “subordinate them to what al-Ghazālī calls the “other-worldly science” (ʿilm alākhira).”265 The distinction made here by al-Ghazālī – the “other-worldly” vs “worldly” science
– likely stems from the same distinction made in Surah 30:6a-7, “…but most people do not
know; they only know the outer surface of this present life and are heedless of the life to come.”
Awareness of the life to come is paramount, not only for al-Ghazālī but as evidenced throughout
the many passages in the Qur’ān warning people to heed the coming judgment. But as al-Ghazālī
rightly advocates, heeding the coming judgment is only half of the picture, it is not enough to
merely make it to Paradise. A Muslim should strive for felicity in Paradise which is achieved
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Garden, “Al-Ghazālī,” 6-7. He goes on to write, “What al-Ghazali means by the otherworldly science
seems on the main to be Sufism, be he never says so directly, and in those passages in which he briefly discusses the
esoteric and theoretical aspects of this science, he does so in ways that could be taken to be philosophical.” Here, we
are privy to a point of debate in Ghazālīan study concerning the role of Sufism and Philosophy in his thought. The
intricacies of the debate are beyond the scope of the paper but what is significant is the role of Sufism and
philosophy in the quest for felicity. Current scholarship – Kenneth Garden, Alexander Treiger, Frank Griffel,
Binyamin Abrahamov – suggest a more prominent role of philosophy in al-Ghazālī’s methodology than has
traditionally been assumed in Western scholarship. The current theses suggest a synthesis of Sufism and Philosophy,
each dependent on the other for the attaining of the knowledge leading to felicity.
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through the attaining of the Beatific Vision, achieved only after one pursues knowledge of the
divine in this life.
The Revival: Preparing the Heart for Inspiration
The previous section served to contextualize al-Ghazālī’s thought and prepare the reader
for his main body of work – the Revival of the Religious Sciences. The Revival is a revival of the
science of the afterlife, the locus classicus in Islam for attaining practical religious knowledge
pertaining to the perusal of felicity. For al-Ghazālī, it is imperative that all Muslims pursue
knowledge of the afterlife, and more specifically knowledge of God. 266
The science of the afterlife is divided into two categories: the science of proper conduct
and the science of spiritual unveiling. The former is the means to achieve the latter, that is, the
former constitutes the path leading to the unveiling. The Revival is an instruction manual, a
science for how to attain knowledge through the unveiling which in turn leads to felicity in the
life to come. The role of knowledge in the Revival cannot be understated and the pursuit of
knowledge is the most excellent of quests but at the same time, it must not be disconnected from
action. Knowledge and action share a dialectical bond in the Revival. On the one hand, right
action is needed to purify the heart in order to make it receptive of inspirational knowledge
(ilham), i.e. unveiling, but, on the other, knowledge of proper action (i.e. ethics) is needed to
know how to complete the actions of proper conduct. Thus, knowledge is foundational to
achieving eternal bliss and the pursuit of knowledge the most excellent of virtues. 267 According

Al-Ghazālī writes, “and you should find it [knowledge] as a means to the abode of the hereafter and its
delights as well as a path to proximity with God, for there is no means of approaching Him but through it.” AlGhazālī, Book of Knowledge, 25.
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On the foundation of knowledge al-Ghazālī writes, “The most exalted rank with regard to humanity is
eternal bliss [in the hereafter], and the most excellent of things is that which serves as a means of attaining it. One
will never attain it without knowledge and action. One will only attain the incumbent actions through the knowledge
of how to complete them. The foundation of bliss in this world and the next is therefore knowledge; it is thus the
most excellent deed of all.” Ibid., 25.
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to al-Ghazālī, unveiling is the aim of every saint and of the sincere, and it is toward this aim he
wished to make accessible, but it is also that case that he does not permit the knowledge of the
unveiling to be recorded in writing. 268 The key to understanding al-Ghazālī’s role in this study
lies in unlocking the science of the unveiling. Thus, the following questions will be addressed in
this section: How is unveiling achieved in this life? Which methodology does he employ –
Sufism or Philosophy – to achieve said phenomenon? What content is revealed in the phenomena
of unveiling?
In order to answer these questions, we must examine the elements of al-Ghazālī’s noetic
structure. While each element deserves its own section, due to space limitations, they will be
interspersed into a tandem conversation regarding the methodology of the science of the afterlife.
The first and fundamental element on his noetics – the heart (qalb) – is the locus of the sciences
and where both the noetic and methodological discussion begins. Al-Ghazālī believed that the
most glorious thing about man, separating him from all other creatures, was his capacity and
aptitude to know God. The heart is the element in man which prepares him for knowledge and
allows him to receive it for it is the heart, as al-Ghazālī states, “that knows God, and works for
God, and strives towards God.” 269 This conception of heart (qalb) does not refer to the physical
heart and actually stands in contrast to the physical organ in that it is non-physical and immortal,
the part of man which endures through death. 270 The heart of man is also the seat of desires and
that which inclines him to either obedience towards God or disobedience. The outward actions of
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either good or evil, obedience or disobedience and the physical parts which carry them out are
the either the heart’s light or its darkness.271 It is imperative then that a person search and know
his heart for the heart is also the place wherein one knows himself, and if one knows himself
then he knows his Lord.272 Likewise, if one does not know his heart and thus himself, he does
not know his Lord.
For al-Ghazālī, the heart, which he calls the “subtle tenuous substance,” is the real
essence of man. 273 The heart is the part of man that perceives, knows, and experiences and in this
sense, it is synonymous with the part of man the philosophical tradition calls the rational soul or
intellect. Such equivalence may cause one to wonder why al-Ghazālī opts for a different element
to reflect the human intellect rather than traditional philosophical noetics. Treiger suggests that it
was not al-Ghazālī’s intent to overturn philosophical tradition or to make a more “emotional”
noetic element; instead, it was an attempt, to “defuse the concept’s philosophical connotations so
as to make it more palatable to the broader circles of religious scholars.” 274 Here, the choice to
use “heart” demonstrates al-Ghazālī’s sometimes covert methodology in the Revival and a
glimpse (among many) of his philosophical commitments.
Lastly, there is, as Treiger suggests, perhaps another crucial reason al-Ghazālī employs
the heart as his noetic foundation. He writes, “Because of its religious connotations, the heart,
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Knowing oneself and this formulation of the saying “know yourself and thus know your Lord” was a
popular Muslim proverb and was written by many different authors of various stripes. Al-Ghazālī is referencing that
proverb here and as Skellie (the translator of Marvels) notes (fn.6), al-Ghazālī sometimes spoke of it as a hadith.
Ibid., 2. It is, however, unlikely that this was a genuine hadith attributable to the Prophet but this sort of occurrence
is not something new for one common criticisms of his works was his hadith scholarship and the frequent use of less
than credible hadith.
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Treiger, Inspired Knowledge, 18. Also, it is interesting to note that al-Ghazālī’s noetic structure suggests
Avicennian influence (thus philosophical) and that he seems to be following Avicenna’s example. Treiger
demonstrates that in Avicenna’s last work, Epistle on the Rational Soul, he calls the rational soul – among other
names – “the real heart.”
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more so than the intellect or the rational soul, is an appropriate meeting point of the two
dimensions of spiritual life: the ascetic praxis and the mystical theoria.”275 As we have seen and
will continue to develop further, al-Ghazālī’s science of the afterlife is a combination of the
sciences of proper conduct and unveiling – praxis and theoria.276 These two sciences converge in
the heart and this convergence is demonstrated by a powerful analogy of the heart as a mirror, an
analogy crucial for understanding al-Ghazālī’s science of the afterlife.
In the Revival, the science of proper conduct is divided into outward and inward
knowledge. Outward knowledge is connected to the senses and is subdivided into acts of worship
and religious custom (Books 1 and 2 of the Revival); whereas, inward knowledge is connected to
the states of the heart and characteristics of the soul and is subdivided into blameworthy and
praiseworthy states (Books 3 and 4 of the Revival).277 The heart, being the locus of inward
knowledge, is where praxis (i.e., ethics) is developed. However, according to al-Ghazālī, the
heart is also a battleground wherein various internal armies vie for control. 278 Al-Ghazālī lists
three internal armies that are present in the heart – the armies of anger, appetence and
knowledge.279 These armies have an array of purposes – both internal and external – serving the
human need to live in this life as well as prepare for the life to come. The first two armies –
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appetence and anger – belong to the class of armies that “incites and instigates” in order to, as alGhazālī states, “obtain that which is profitable and suitable (i.e., appetence); or to ward off that
which is harmful and destructive (i.e., anger).” 280 The third army, called knowledge or intellect,
is part of the third class which perceives and gathers information as “spies.” 281 Above all, it is
imperative that the heart gain the assistance of this army for it is “the party of God.” 282 The other
two armies – appetence and anger – are two armies easily given over to Satan and those forces
will war against the heart if not brought under subjection. This is the plight of many people
according to al-Ghazālī for their intellection has been forced to devise “stratagems to satisfy the
appetence,” whereas it should be the other way around, appetence serving the intellect. 283
At this point, the introduction of the third army highlights another element of al-Ghazālī’s
noetic structure –intelligence/intellect (ʿaql). According to Al-Ghazālī, the intellect (ʿaql) is “the
source of knowledge, its point of origin and its foundation; knowledge springs forth from it like
fruit from a tree, light from the sun, and vision from the eye.” 284 In light of al-Ghazālī’s use of
the term, Treiger suggests the primary interpretation of ʿaql be ‘intelligence’ instead of ‘intellect’
as the former denotes the primary rendering of the term as a quality of the heart rather than the
heart itself. In this sense, ʿaql, as a quality of the heart, is as Treiger describes, a configuration
“…in virtue of which the heart becomes receptive of intelligible forms.” 285 ʿAql (‘intelligence’)
as a quality or attribute is consistent with al-Ghazālī’s own explanation:
It [ʿaql] is the attribute that differentiates human beings from all other animals
and affords them the ability to apprehend the speculative sciences and to organize
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the subtle rational disciplines. Al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī intended this as his
definition of ‘the intellect’. He said, ‘It is an innate inclination whereby the
speculative sciences are grasped and understood. It is like a light cast into the
heart that prepares it thereby to comprehend existent entities’…It is like the innate
quality present in a mirror that differentiates it from other corporeal bodies and
gives it the ability to reflect images and colors in a manner unique to each, namely
its polish or sheen.286
Al-Ghazālī’s words call us back to the mirror analogy referenced earlier. Al-Ghazālī likens the
heart to a mirror and in this analogy, if the heart is a mirror, then intelligence is likened to the
mirror’s polish, or in this case its ability to reflect the knowledge revealed to it.
Furthermore, mirrors are prone and susceptible to becoming dirty, and when that does
happen, it is no longer able to properly reflect the image across from it. A mirror in this condition
will not functioning properly until it is cleaned and the tarnished removed. In this Ghazālīan
analogy, the human heart is also susceptible to impurities, the tarnishing of the polished mirror,
or the subjection of the third army to the others which vie for the heart’s focus and attention. Just
as a physical mirror ceases to function properly if it is marred and unpolished, so too does the
heart of man cease to function as it should if it is dark and murky. The darkened, murky heart is
the heart of the wicked person because a darkened heart cannot remember his Lord and on the
Day of judgment that person will be cut off from the Lord (cf. Q 83:12-17). The righteous are
those whose hearts are polished and are ready to receive and reflect the true nature of things, i.e.
divine inspiration (ilham).287
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The Way Forward: Mystical Sufism or Theoretical Philosophy?
Recognizing the reality of the negative tendencies in the heart, the Revival is al-Ghazālī’s
attempt to revive the Muslim community away from such harmful propensities. He desired for
his work to be disseminated to the Muslim community at large. With such a goal in mind, he
presented certain sciences one way and re-package others in another in order to appeal to the
masses. One example of his rhetorical methods can be seen in the four-fold division of the
Revival. The division of sections mirrored the four-fold division of the science of jurisprudence
(fiqh). Al-Ghazālī did this because many students of his time were interested in jurisprudence
which, as he observed, had become popular among those who did not fear God. Through forming
the Revival in such a fashion similar to the books on jurisprudence, he hoped this would be a
“clever way to win hearts over gradually.” 288 It is this sort of re-packaging – form of
methodology, terminology, etc. – that makes him difficult to label. Nonetheless, as this section
continues to work through al-Ghazālī’s science of the hereafter, one of the questions that will be
answered concerns the identification of his methodology within the larger Islamic traditions.
In order to address the identity of his methodology, it is important to first briefly establish
the contexts of both of the sciences al-Ghazālī’s is often identified – Sufism and Philosophy.289
In his day, Sufism was a practical discipline more than a theoretical one. It was a spiritual
exercise wherein one molded the self into an ideal form. Kenneth Garden notes that Sufis saw
the ideal as a “Godly self,” an ideal derived from a hadith often quoted by them: “Acquire the
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virtues of God.”290 The path to the ideal formed many stations along the way. Garden further
notes that the most basic of these stations amounted to “scrupulously obeying God’s
commandments,” and the furthest “to the self’s obliteration in an overwhelming awareness of the
Divine that breaks down the distinction between knower and known.” 291 This latter stage was an
immersion in God, a loss of self, a type of knowledge of God (maʿrifa), but it was not the
concern of the Sufis to systematize or theorize these experiences.
Islamic philosophy was a robust science in al-Ghazālī’s day. Being influenced by
Aristotelian, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic philosophy, it had become uniquely Islamic. For the
Islamic Philosophers, philosophy was not strictly an intellectual exercise. Islamic philosophy
was very much concern with the practicality of their teaching, and like the Sufis, aimed to
transform the self in order to attain salvation in the afterlife. 292 The most well-known and
influential Islamic philosopher at that time was Ibn Sīnā (or the Latinized Avicenna). Avicenna
believed that knowledge of God, the knowledge necessary for salvation, proceeds only from the
middle terms of syllogisms. The capacity to gain knowledge of the intelligibles is a mental act
“whereby,” as Dimitri Gutas summarizes, “the human intellect comes into contact with the active
intellect and receives…‘divine effluence.’”293
Sufism and Islamic philosophy shared commonalities in the time of al-Ghazālī. Both
believed that they were the purveyors of truth and both were practical disciplines seeking to
perfect the human soul with the goal of a higher knowledge of God. 294 However, the ends, and
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the methods of achieving those ends, differed. Sufis believed that knowledge of God came
suddenly and was the result of spiritual exercise; whereas the philosopher believed this
knowledge was achieved through rational inquiry. It is interesting to note that before al-Ghazālī,
the goal of attaining felicity in Sufism was not prevalent. It existed in some Sufis writings but
none that al-Ghazālī mentions having read. Felicity in the afterlife was, however, the goal of the
philosophers but it would seem that their philosophical influences provided a dualistic view of
the afterlife and thus knowledge and contemplation were the highest goal to attain.295
Having this context in the foreground, let us return to al-Ghazālī’s analogy of the heart.
Al-Ghazālī has demonstrated the need to polish the heart, to remove all of the tarnish, the
temporal and finite things which hinder it from being proper configured to receive knowledge. In
the previous discussion concerning al-Ghazālī’s quest through intellectual and religious
skepticism, it was shown that he considered philosophy and Sufism to be among the four
disciplines seeking truth. Al-Ghazālī finds the Sufi path of spiritual purification containing the
necessary methods of cleansing the heart from all impurity, or, as he states, “to lop off the
obstacles present in the soul and to rid oneself its reprehensible habits and vicious qualities.”296
This pure, polished and empty heart is ready for the rush of divine wind to remove the veil and
by Allah’s grace, provide the subject with the light of the divine knowledge of God. 297 Before alGhazālī, Sufis were thus inclined towards the knowledge gained through immediate inspiration
in contrast to that gained by instruction. They did not pursue the study of knowledge nor did they
concern themselves with discussions about doctrines or proofs. The way to knowledge is through
ritual and devotion.
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For al-Ghazālī, the Sufi practice of purifying the heart was necessary for unveiling but at
the same time their practices subjected them to many difficulties and perils. First, the heart is by
nature easily given over to destructive elements. Al-Ghazālī quotes the Prophet here saying that
“the heart of the believer is more unsteady than a cooking pot as it boils.” 298 Experience alone
cannot sustain the highest state of knowledge because of the confusions found in the heart. All it
takes is for one impure thought to enter the heart and it will be rendered unpolished. Second, the
practice of asceticism, the stripping away of all earthly appetites and desires, has a harmful effect
on the physical body and weakens one’s constitution. If inspiration occurs in this state, one can
easily become confused, the mind being blurred by lack of nutrition. Third, because the Sufis do
not pursue learned knowledge (i.e., the sciences and the discussion of doctrine or proofs) and
philosophy, when they do receive a vision they can succumb to confusions and be trapped in that
vision for up to twenty years! Lastly, because of the lack of learning the mystical states of
unveiling can lead the Sufi to make prophetic statements (i.e. ecstatic utterances) that are
heretical pronouncements of the relation between the knower and the Known. 299 The two most
notable of these utterances were made by al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) and al-Bisṭāmī (d. 261/874).
Following their supposed inspiration and perceived union with God the former declared “I am
the Truth” and the latter proclaimed “Glory be to Me!”300 Both men were put to death for these
sayings which were seemingly innocent proclamations of union and worship, albeit, heretical
claims.
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Continuing with this analysis of the Sufi way, al-Ghazālī believes that these problems
could be avoided if the Sufis also followed a path of learning. He does not wish to correct their
intentions of polishing the heart or their pursuit of mystical knowledge, both are necessary aims.
Al-Ghazālī does however suggest that the path of learning (i.e. theoretical knowledge) be
incorporated into their practice. On the critique of confusion mentioned earlier, he writes that “if
he [the Sufi] had mastered knowledge beforehand, the point of confusion in his vision would
have been opened to him at once. To busy one’s self in the path of learning is a surer and easier
means of attaining the aim.”301 Furthermore, al-Ghazālī expounds on this thought and describes
the expectations of the Sufis in their quest for knowledge. It is worth quoting him at length as
this sequence is crucial to understanding his methodology:
They [Sufis] claim that it is as though a man left off the study of jurisprudence
(fiqh), asserting, ‘the Prophet did not study it and he became one who understood
the divine law by means of prophetic and general inspiration without any
repetition or application, and perhaps discipline of the soul and steadfastness will
bring me finally to that goal.’ Whoever thinks this, wrongs himself and wastes his
life. Nay, rather, he is like one who gives up the way of gain through farming,
hoping to chance upon some treasure. The latter is indeed possible, but extremely
unlikely. So too [in the matter of gaining knowledge]. They say, ‘It is first of all
necessary to attain to that which the learned have achieved and to understand
what they said. Then after that there is no harm in expectantly waiting for that
which has not been disclosed to the other learned men, and it may be that this will
be disclosed afterwards through strenuous effort.’ 302
Notice the two approaches to divine knowledge highlighted here. The first group supposes the
model of the Prophet claiming that he received full understanding of the divine law without
having to develop in the way of jurisprudence. But al-Ghazālī notes that this rarely happens, that
God’s grace is not commonly bestowed in this manner. The latter option is the one al-Ghazālī
supports, advocating for it in the chapter from which the quote came. Elsewhere, in the Book of
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Knowledge, al-Ghazālī advocates the pursuit of learning through deduction, inference and study.
He cites a story told by Al-Makkī of whom al-Junayd of Baghdad was his teacher: “Then when I
departed I heard him saying, ‘May God make you a partisan of hadith who is a Sufi, not a Sufi
who is a partisan of hadith.’ He pointed out that one who acquires hadith and knowledge then
takes the Sufi path will succeed; while one who takes the Sufi path before acquiring knowledge
is gambling with his soul.”303 Here we again see the preferred approach of al-Ghazālī in the
pursuit of divine inspiration – acquire knowledge through learning before pursuing general
inspiration.
In the conclusion to this section on al-Ghazālī’s methodology for acquiring divine
inspiration, I am highlighting a number of dialectical relations at play in his work: the
saints/prophets and the learned men, Sufism and Philosophy, inspiration and inference, and the
few and the many. The first three groups all stand in conceptual relation to one another and
represent the crux of both tension and confusion in al-Ghazālī’s methodology. Perhaps the main
challenge in understanding his methodology is in trying to identify it with what has come before.
Some scholars purport that al-Ghazālī was a Sufi given his propensity towards their ethical
practices and pursuit of mystical experiences of divine inspiration. Other scholars purport that his
system was entirely philosophical and not to be confused with Sufism. 304 But al-Ghazālī’s
methodology cannot be confined to what had come before or to any one particular system. AlGhazālī was creating a new way forward, a reformation of sorts, and so the best way to define his
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methods is through synthesis and new creation. 305 The methodology of the religious sciences is
not purely Sufic or philosophical; rather, philosophy aids the Sufi goal of attaining mystical
knowledge. I would submit that al-Ghazālī still maintains that higher knowledge (i.e., divine
inspiration, ilham) is ultimately achieved through Sufi practice but that it must be supplemented
by philosophical learning or what he calls theoretical knowledge. Polishing one’s heart is of
utmost concern and allows a more beautiful, albeit mystical, revelation to manifest. 306
Al-Ghazālī’s revival of the science of the afterlife forever reshaped the Islamic landscape,
especially in regard to the relation between Sufism and Philosophy. Although his methodology is
not purely Sufic or Philosophical, his inclusion of both led to a narrowing of the gulf in the
spectrum between the two in later thought. Before the time of al-Ghazālī, Sufism was more
practical discipline than theoretical; however, after his time, Sufism became increasingly
theoretical as practitioners attempted to give rational explanations of their mystical experiences.
Garden suggests that the rich cosmologies that were developed based upon mystical experiences
from theoreticians such as al-Arabi, may have been made possible by al-Ghazālī’s innovative
methodology.307
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Lastly, there is the dialectic of the few and the many as it relates to the level of human
spiritual development. Every Muslim adherent finds him- or herself on a path of spiritual
development in this life. Each person is called to remembrance (dhikr) of Allah and some
achieve this calling far better than others. The end goal of this remembrance results in divine
inspiration (ilham), the goal of the process we have been looking at in this chapter so far. For the
prophet or saint of Islam, this process happens immediately. The winds of divine grace, in an
instant, rush in and reveal divine knowledge to the heart. But it is important to note that
inspiration is not reserved to the prophets and saints alone; rather, in al-Ghazālī’s methodology,
all have the potential to attain to the same spiritual level (i.e., the experience of inspiration) of the
prophets. This process happens immediately for the saints and prophets but is achieved through
the spiritual process of the purification of the heart, the methodology al-Ghazālī develops in the
Revival. This does not mean that every Muslim can become a prophet but that each Muslim can
reach the state of prophecy wherein the veil of the heart is removed and inspiration floods in.
Lazarus-Yafeh notes that this aspect of al-Ghazālī’s theory of prophecy ran counter to orthodox
Islam and was perhaps one of his “most dangerous doctrines.”308 Al-Ghazālī believed that
achieving the highest stage was the last stage of religious development on earth but that few
would end up reaching it.
The Nature of Theological Love in Islam
This next section turns to the topic of love in Islam looking both at the relationship
between God and man as well as the kind and quality of love exhibited by both parties. We begin
first with man’s love God.
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Man’s Love for God
Knowledge and love form a reciprocal relationship which moves spirally upwards in
spiritual progress.309 Knowledge logically precedes love for how can a person love that which is
not known?310 Now that the process of divine inspiration has been discussed, the study now
focuses on the other half of the religious equation, that is, love for God. Al-Ghazālī thoroughly
develops the concept of man’s love for God, most directly in Book 36 of the Iḥyāʾ entitled Love,
Longing, Intimacy and Contentment.311
As with all sections and topics of the Revival, Al-Ghazālī begins his discourse by first
turning to proof-texts found in the Qur’ān and sacred traditions relating to the topic of love for
God. Al-Ghazālī notes that within the Muslim community, love of God and His Messenger is an
obligation and serves a condition of faith (īmān).312 In the hadith of Sahih Muslim, it is stated:
“No person believes, till I am dearer to him than the members of his household, his wealth and
the whole of mankind.”313 On the existence of love for God, he first cites “He loves them and
they love Him” (Q 5:54). In a succinct and relatively terse manner, al-Ghazālī declares that love
for God must be possible because the Qur’ān affirms its existence. On its existence and
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possibility al-Ghazālī has little to say beyond this affirmation. He does, however, have much to
say regarding the nature of said love.
Al-Ghazālī’s conception of man’s love for God is described as having a longing for Him
as the ultimate object worthy of such affection, the Beloved whom is the aim of all earthly
pursuit. This longing stems from the reality that human creatures lack perfection and are thus in
search of that which will fulfill what is lacking in their person. God, the ultimate Good, is the
only being who does not lack in any way and so this sense of love cannot be applied to Him. He
is, however, the object of this kind of love as love for God in this manner is the pursuit of filling
what is lacking in our own humanity, and when that which is yearned for is grasped, man
delights in it.314 This pursuit of filling is also described as a growth of the soul and is the process
of becoming fully human, achieving the telos of human existence. According to Chittick, “They
[Al-Ghazālī and others] often call it ‘assuming the character traits of God’ (al-takhalluq bi aklāq
Allāh).”315 In this manner, love for Allah entails the putting on of God’s attributes, and thus
closeness to God, as al-Ghazālī states, “lies in attribute rather than in physical location.” 316
Longing for Allah in a way which manifests itself through a process of spiritual
development is seemingly synonymous with the multi-leveled concept of jihad or struggle. Jihad
is undoubtedly a loaded concept, especially in the West, but we need to make the distinction
between the forms of struggle – inward and outward. 317 When considered inwardly, jihad
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denotes the process and need for man to overcome his feeble-mindedness and spiritual weakness.
Ozak likens this weakness to coming into this world as a blind man who is born into darkness. 318
The Qur’ān suggests that whoever is blind in this world will be blind in the life to come (cf. Q
17:72). Overcoming the spiritual blindness is thus of paramount importance in achieving the life
to come and so jihad against the flesh and longing for that which is lacking in the flesh are
pursued in tandem accord.319
In this sense, love, defined as longing for that which is Good, is consistent with the
notion of love as eros in Plato’s Symposium.320 At the dinner party, the main setting of the
Symposium, Socrates recounts his conversation with Diotima, the wise sage, and how, in
Socrates’s estimation, she provided him with a correct understanding of love. Throughout the
course of the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon, erōs love emerges as a spirit or daimon
that guides the subject in the pursuit of the Good (or Beautiful). Now, on the pursuit of the Good,
one does not have the capacity to immediately perceive the Beautiful. Socrates states that erōs
typically manifests first in a desire for physical beauty. This is the first rung in the progression of
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what has been labeled Diotima’s metaphorical “Ladder of Love.” 321 From the love of physical
beauty, mankind can climb the ladder and ascend the vertical progression of desire leading
ultimately to the highest rung, the love (erōs) of the Beautiful.322 Erōs is thus a sort of driving
force that compels the subject towards the perfection which it lacks.
If love is the perpetual desire for the good, this provides a causal explanation for human
action. Irving suggests that Plato believes every action, every desire, everything which man
strives for is done in pursuit of acquiring the Good or goodness. This being true, it would entail
that all activity, understood as a desire for the good, is equivalent to saying that erōs is what
drives human action. 323 Socrates would suggest something similar but as Sheffield suggest, he
does not claim and would not go as far to say that all human desire is erōs; the qualification of
this perspective that desire is erōs insofar as it is directed towards the good, but this does not
include all grounding of desires. 324 Identifying erōs as the impetus for some, if not all, human
actions implies that whatever human beings pursue, it is due to the perception that the object of
their pursuit is good. But we know that perception is not always reality and some objects which
are perceived to be good are not so. I believe this was the source of both al-Ghazālī’s frustration
and motivation. The majority of Muslims in his day were pursuing an end that was not aimed at
the Good, not directed towards Allah.
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Longing for Allah is the quintessential component of Islamic religious life. In fact,
al-Ghazālī purports that longing is necessary for the gnostic pursuing the afterlife. There are
numerous ways in which this longing can be satisfied and satiated. Al-Ghazālī identifies two
ways specifically in which longing manifests in human beings and where satisfaction is found in
God the Beloved – ocular and conceptual longing. The former entails a longing to see the
Beloved. This longing is not fulfilled in this life; rather, fulfillment in this manner is found in the
life to come. The highest attainment of Paradise is the Beatific Vision of Allah. In this event the
ocular longing for God is fulfilled. 325 Now, this could not be the only type of fulfillment because
if one’s longing was satiated in a specific encounter at a specific instance in the afterlife,
satisfaction would reach a limit. Thus, while the ocular longing is fulfilled in a magnificent way
in the afterlife is cannot be the extent of that which is longed after.
Along with an ocular longing for Allah, al-Ghazālī also identifies a conceptual longing
for Him. This type of longing has no end, whether in this life of the next. If it did have an end,
that would entail a full disclosing of Allah to man meaning that man had the ability to fully
comprehend that which is fundamentally Other, radically transcendent and unknowable. In this
form of longing, Allah is both being known and yet is concealed. This tension is consistent with
the idea of longing as the notion of longing entails some form of concealment for if that which is
longed after is manifested in a real and complete way, longing logically ceases. Elaborating on
this point, al-Ghazālī writes, “it should be explained that longing is inconceivable except for
something that is perceptible in one aspect while remaining imperceptible in another.”326 In
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Paradise, man will eternally long to continue to contemplate the Beloved. Contemplation as
pleasure and satisfaction is part of what al-Ghazālī calls the “twin graces” of Paradise, the other
being divine disclosure. 327
Disclosure and contemplation as the means of pleasure and satisfaction in Paradise of
course presupposes that disclosure is a possibility. Al-Ghazālī was aware of this and responds by
stating:
Of course, this presupposes that disclosure of that which cannot be disclosed in
this world will actually be possible [in that world]. Were it not given unstintingly,
bliss would reach a limit and not be augmented; as it is, that bliss continues
everlastingly. God’s statement, Their light will shine in front of them and on their
right, and they will say: ‘Lord, perfect our light for us and forgive us’ [Q 66:8] …
supports this sense: bliss is the perfection of light notwithstanding any [prior]
light gained in this world. 328
Al-Ghazālī is correct in his analysis of the relation between bliss and that which is unstintingly
given. It would seem that satiation and limitation could be reached in the afterlife if these two
things are true: the afterlife is eternal and infinite in duration and the source of said satisfaction
and bliss were of finite capacity and resource. Thus, it would further seem that the source of
human satisfaction in Paradise need to be of unlimited capacity and resource. But that is only one
part of the consideration. The other considers that which is to be known through disclosure.
Unending bliss is contingent upon the source’s (or in this case Source’s) ability not only to
disclose unstintingly and be infinite in nature, but to be able to disclose in the first place. Is it the
case that discloser of Allah is possible in the next world? Any measure of divine disclosure must
initiate from the divine subject and subsequently directed to the other. Al-Ghazālī purports that
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this disclosure is possible and cites a passage from the Qur’an as support. 329 In this passage, the
believing Muslim petitions Allah to perfect their light where light, in this context, refers to divine
disclosure. Allah’s light is given to them and provides a fundamental element of eternal bliss.
Al-Ghazālī’s conception of man’s love for God is consistent with the eros motif seen in
Plato but the analysis of al-Ghazālī’s conception cannot overlook the potential mystical influence
of Neo-Platonic thought. In Plotinus’s philosophical system, the eros motif is the “core,” and the
most important end for the human creatures is, as Abrahamov points out, “the return of the soul
to God [or the One].”330 The return of the soul is the third of three stages of the way of man’s
return to God. For Plotinus those three stages consist of “an ethical stage, then one of knowledge
and love, leading to the mystical union of the soul with God.” 331 The mention of acquiring
knowledge and love leading to a mystical union echoes of al-Ghazālī’s methodology in the
Revival. Furthermore, Plotinus suggests that a newly awakened soul is too feeble to bear and
perceive the Good and must be trained and shaped. He likens this development to a sculpture
perfecting a statue through cutting, shaping, and of all things, smoothing (polishing?), so that one
may “glow of beauty” and “see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.” 332
Once the soul sheds all the hinders it from joining to the One, it is at last joined to the One in an
scene of ecstasy and bliss. 333 Al-Ghazālī’s formulation of human love is consistent with the eros
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motif of Plato and the more mystical emphasis of Plotinus. Abrahamov suggests there is enough
similarity to suggest the possibility that the Greek philosophical tradition “plays an important
role in the formulation of Muslim mystical thought on sacred love” while also cautioning to not
make too certain the causal connection. 334 It does seem safe to say, however, that al-Ghazālī was
influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition but at the same time his version of the eros motif
is distinct for he remains faithful to Islam by retaining and incorporating Islamic ideas of this
world and the world to come. 335
God’s Love for Man
In relation to al-Ghazālī’s chapters on man’s love for God, he has relatively little to say
about Allah’s love for man. This is not due to lack of significance; rather, it is simply because
there is not much to say in terms of description. 336 As he is wont to do, al-Ghazālī continues his
consistent method of appealing first to the Qur’ān and then the sacred traditions. 337 Al-Ghazālī
calls the passages of the Qur’ān which speak of God’s love for man “proof-texts” and since they
attest to God’s love for man we can know that it exists, “it is no mere metaphor.” 338 Even though
the Qur’ān and traditions speak of God’s love for man as declarative statements with little
theological content, a theology of Allah’s love for man did develop within Islam. To receive
Allah’s love is the telos of every Muslim believer because it entails that one has striven and has
successfully emulated the divine characteristics in his/her own person.
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Common to his methodology for explaining various in-depth points and distinctions
relating to knowledge and love, al-Ghazālī provides a helpful analogy for understanding Allah’s
love for mankind. In this analogy, he tells the story of a king and his servant. In this story there is
a king who grants a servant access to his court, to be in the king’s presence. The servant has
many laudable traits and because of this the kings allows the servant to be present in his court at
any time the servant wishes. Al-Ghazālī suggests that the reason for the king’s actions might
have been so that he could consult with the servant for advice or to refresh himself by looking at
him, etc. Whatever the reason was, al-Ghazālī states “It is safe to say that the king loved him;
this means he inclined to him since his friend had within him some affinity corresponding to
himself.”339 As the story progresses, the king allows the servant to enter his presence but, in a
shift of causality, al-Ghazālī then explains, it was not because the king needed the servant or
sought his aid; rather, it was because the servant had developed a “pleasing manner and laudable
traits” that he was allowed to draw near and not because of any need the king possessed. 340 When
the veil was lifted and the servant allowed to approach the king, it can be said that the king loved
the servant and that he (the servant) benefitted greatly by being in the king’s presence.
The analogy demonstrates two way in which the king loved the servant. In the first way,
the king was inclined towards his servant and saw in him the potential of benefitting in some
way from their relationship. The king inclined towards him because there was something that the
king needed, some way in which the servant could help the king. Thus, we can say that the king
lacked something in his own person and assumed it could be found in the servant. In this sense,
the king loved the servant where love is regarded as a desire for that which is lacking in one’s
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own person. It is also consistent with al-Ghazālī’s definition of human love.341 The second kind
of love in this analogy is love as benefaction. By the king allowing the servant to draw near, that
act denotes a love entailing benefaction on behalf of the king toward the servant. Al-Ghazālī
explains that this parable of the king and servant only holds true in relation to Allah and Man if
understood in the second sense, that is, the king allowing the servant to draw near but having no
need of his assistance. In the loving demonstration of drawing near, one must not assume any
movement on the part of Allah towards man. Allah does not incline towards man out of any need
or want and there is no alteration or distinction in Him when man is allowed to draw near. Man is
granted nearness to Allah contingently, upon his first drawing near to Allah and removing from
his person those lower, beastly, and carnal tendencies which mark mankind’s disposition. Only
after a man develops his character favorably, that is, emulate the divine traits, is he allowed to
draw near to Allah. Allah’s love for mankind can be thought of directionally but only in the
sense of man’s movement towards Him and not the other way around. Furthermore, Allah’s love
for man lies in His lifting the veil which in doing so causes man to draw even nearer to Him and
experience the divine reality on a much deeper level. In this sense, Allah’s love can be thought of
as benefaction similar to the kind of love that was first demonstrated in creation. Out of His
mercy and grace, Allah provides man with the capacities necessary to achieve his established
telos – proximity to Allah. As a point of clarity, Al-Ghazālī cogently summarizes the distinction
of loves between and from both God and man in the following statement:
So then, God’s love for man lies in His drawing him near, and out of
himself, by warding off distractions and sins and in purifying his inmost nature
from the spots of this world and in lifting the veil from his heart until he eyes Him
as though he saw Him with his very heart.
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Man’s love for God lies in his inclination to seize this absent perfection
which he lacks. He yearns for what he lacks; whenever he grasps some part of it,
he delights therein. Love in this sense is unthinkable for God. 342
In short, love in Islam between Allah and man can be simplistically described as the process of
drawing near (man) and allowing man to draw near (Allah).
In this process of love given and received, a sequential pattern emerges. Love
metaphysically begins with Allah. He is the causal first mover and displays benefaction towards
man by bestowing upon him special physical and cognitive capacities. Also, it would seem that
the self-disclosure of Allah through special revelation is a further act of benefaction. If man is to
draw near to Allah through emulating the divine traits, he must be granted epistemic access to
them. Next in the sequence, man has a moral responsibility to love Allah, this being done
through the spiritual processes discussed throughout this chapter. Once man becomes favorable
in the sight of Allah, He then grants special access to the divine through divine disclosure
(ilham). This second phase of God’s love is seemingly similar to the first in that the subject is
shown benefaction from Allah in that he has the capacity to and may partake in the divine
pleasure of Allah bestowed on those who first incline to Him. The difference, however, between
the two instances of benefaction is that the first is given freely and without contingency whereas
the second act of benefaction is conditioned up man’s prior action, that is, contingently directed
towards those who first love Him.
Abrahamov puts forward an interesting designation for this love as benefaction. He
observes that when discussing man’s love for God in Islam, one realizes that Allah is the
ultimate cause of man’s love for God in that Allah has given man the capacity to do so. This
ability has been given because Allah is merciful and graceful in provision. Abrahamov states that
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this kind of love from Allah is “a notion reminiscent of the agape motif.”343 This designation is
significant for a number of reasons. First, he casually makes this suggestion at the conclusion of
one of the sub-sections without developing the notion any further, leaving the reader to decide
what is meant by the statement. Second, it would seem that if this is truly a reminiscent notion, it
would be worthy of further explanation due to its categorical distinction from eros and its
common designation of the love of the gods. Third, it is uncertain which context of agape
Abrahamov has in mind here. His analysis of al-Ghazālī’s conception of eros was in relation to
the Platonic and Neo-Platonic contexts and so perhaps he has in mind an agape love relative to a
Greek conception. If this is so, agape in the Greek context is relatively shallow in meaning and
there is scant material in the extant literature to provide a robust understanding of the term and to
strongly distinguish it from the other usages of love – eros and phileō.344 There is however, some
nuance in the usage of eros and agape worth noting in this context. According to Quell and
Stauffer, agape love must often be translated “‘to show love’; it is a giving, active love on the
other’s behalf,” whereas, eros “seeks in others the fulfillment of its own life’s hunger.” 345 These
two definitions are consistent with al-Ghazālī’s distinction between man’s love for God as
longing and God’s love for man as benefaction; however, the use of agape to describe
benefaction could possibly be misunderstood if the reader thinks there is any more nuance in the
term than this simple definition. That the reader would have a more nuanced understanding is
because the notion of agape love took on a more robust definition and significance when it was
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adopted by New Testament authors to describe the love that the Triune God has for mankind. If
Abrahamov has in mind the usage of agape in pre-Biblical Greek, this would be consistent a
consistent usage of agape in relation to Allah’s benefaction. However, he must not imply any
more significance to agape than this basic definition. Anything beyond this understanding, any
inclusion of New Testament nuance is unwarranted. That this is so will be demonstrated in the
following section concerning the object of Allah’s love.
The Object of God’s Love
We have seen that Allah’s love for man is described as kind of benefaction, given to
mankind when He allows nearness and proximity. But there is still an important component of
God’s love yet to be discuss, that is, the object of His love. In al-Ghazālī’s analogy of the king
and servant, the servant is shown a kind of love in the form of benefaction, but the analogy fails
to demonstrate the true object of the king’s, in this case Allah’s, love. Any consideration of
Allah’s love must be understood in concert with the doctrine of tawḥīd, the most fundamental
Islamic statement concerning God’ ontology. Tawḥīd, when applied to Allah’s nature, denotes
unicity within Himself and dissimilarity towards the other, that is, there is no distinction within
Allah’s essence and He radically transcendent and wholly other-than creation.
In order to understand the significance of tawḥīd in relation to love, especially its object,
let us approach the subject indirectly and begin from the human perspective of spiritual
progression as it relates to mankind’s internalization of tawḥīd. Al-Ghazālī likens the doctrine of
tawḥīd or unity as a jewel that is enclosed by layers of husks. Each layer forms a gradation of
tawḥīd and spiritual progress is measured in terms of one’s ability to uncover the layers of
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tawḥīd until the last stage, the jewel, is illuminated and internalized. 346 The first husk of tawḥīd,
the outer layer, is to pronounce with your mouth the first pillar of Islam, “There is no god but
God (lā ilāha illa-Llāh).” Proclaiming that Allah is One stands over and against any conception
of a trinitarian deity; however, this pronouncement is the outer layer because, as al-Ghazālī
points out, these words can be mere lip service or even be uttered by a hypocrite. 347 The second
husk moves inward and considers the internal state of the person. Here, the pronouncement of
tawḥīd is in direct correspondence to the belief in divine unity. In this state, al-Ghazālī writes,
“there is not within the heart the least contradiction or denial of understanding this attestation; on
the contrary, the exterior of the heart envelops its conviction and affirms its veracity.” 348 The
third level is the jewel of tawḥīd and the heart of the matter – both in location within the heart
and the nature of reality. For al-Ghazālī, the third level is reached when a person realizes that
everything arises from Allah and from Him alone, that he is the only Real and Absolute. 349 This
realization arises in the polished heart and marks the final stages of spiritual progression – a
union of love and knowledge.350 Moore labels this process a “transformation” wherein there is a
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shift in focus from “individual consciousness to the greater ‘cosmic’ consciousness,” or in the
case of certain Sufi practices, “to be annihilated from our effective ego-self and allow God, Who
Alone exists, to be experientially realized in His singular existence.” 351 That a person should
pursue such a level of internalization is imperative not only because it is merely the highest level
of spiritual attainment, but also because it is the most fundamental truth of reality, revealing the
ontological nature of the Real and the non-real.352
The jewel of tawḥīd, that there is none but Allah, that He alone is the truly Real, directs
the object of Allah’s love. From the perspective of man, Allah alone is the Real and everything
arises from Him, or, as Ormsby writes, “the more plainly he [man] sees that behind all his
actions, it is God, and God alone who acts.”353 From the perspective of Allah, however, this
means that He has no view of anything else other than Himself. Al-Ghazālī states this point more
strongly, writing, “God has no view of anything other than Himself as being other than
Himself.”354 It seems as if al-Ghazālī is here making the claim that Allah does not see anything
other than Himself because there is no other being than Himself. He goes on to write,
He [Allah] only sees His own essence and His own acts exclusively since nothing
exists except His essence and his acts. For this reason, the master Abū Sa'īd alMīhanī said, when God's statement ‘He loves them and they love Him’ was
recited to him, ‘In truth He loves them for He loves only Himself,’ meaning that
God is all and that there is nothing in existence other than God. For he who loves
himself, his own actions and his own creations, does not pass beyond his own
essence in his love nor the consequences issuing from his essence, inasmuch as
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they stand in a nexus with his essence. It is in this way therefore that He loves
only Himself.355
Statements such as this have led to the suggestion that the doctrine of tawḥīd taken to its logical
conclusion results in a form of pantheism in which all that exists is merely an extension of Allah
although Skellie believes that al-Ghazālī protects against this heresy which emerges within
extreme forms of Sufism. 356 Ontological considerations notwithstanding, Allah having nothing in
view other than His self and His acts, one must consistently say that the only object of God’s
love is Himself alone. Furthermore, it would seem then that if everything derives from Allah –
love included – then the love which human creatures have for God is really God loving Himself.
Joseph Lumbard suggests this, stating it accordingly, “every love, every inclination and every
delight is for God and from God. The five stages of man’s love for God are thus five ways in
which God loves Himself through the love of His servants for Him.” 357 The notion of divine selflove, however, does not come from the Qur’ān directly and according to J. N. Bell is a later
development within classical Islam through the influenced of Neoplatonic thought. 358 Although
not deriving specifically from the Qur’ān, the notion of self-love is entirely consistent with
tawḥīdic Allah. We know that love existed prior to creation because it is one of the 99 names of
Allah (al-Wadud) and thus we can deduce that Allah demonstrated self-love sans creation as
there was naught but Him in existence. This also follows because there is no differentiation
within His divine essence and there can be no change relating to creation – love, if it existed
prior to creation must have been self-love. While discussing Allah’s self-love, Bell highlights the
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words of the Sufi poet al-Daylamī (d. 11th Century) in which he makes an outright, unequivocal
pronouncement on the matter:
God has never ceased to be described with love (mahabba), which is an attribute
subsisting in him. In his pre-eternity he considered himself for himself and in
himself (or "by himself": bi-nafsihi) and he was conscious of (wajid) himself for
himself and in himself. Thus he loved himself for himself and in himself, and
there were there lover, beloved, and love, one thing without division, for he is
pure unity ('ayn al-ahadiya), and in unity two things cannot coexist. 359
In this quote one cannot help but notice the three-fold distinction of lover, beloved and love and
be reminded of the same Augustinian formulation regarding the Trinity. It is important to
distinguish though that when applied to Allah, He is all three – lover, beloved, and love – at
once. Allah is the lover, the beloved, and love all in one, demonstrating a hyper-reflexive, selfreciprocating, inward-focused love. Bell further notes that for al-Daylami, this same original love
is what appears, albeit indirectly, in the world of contingency. 360 This view is consistent with alGhazālī’s conception of Allah’s self-love as well as how His love manifests towards creation.
Bell’s use of indirectly to describe Allah’s love is significant and only begins to capture the nonreciprocating love of Allah for man. Allah does not desire anything other than Himself and sees
none other than His essence, will and acts. In this way, the object of Allah’s love is the Self; He
only sees Himself and not the other. Insofar as a human creature loves those same attributes and
acts, and when Allah sees enough of Himself in a human person, then he or she is allowed to
draw near so that Allah can love and admire Himself as he sees His attributes and acts reflected
in that person. The telos, then, of every Muslim believer is to become a mirror in which Allah
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sees His reflection and is subsequently allowed to come closer so that Allah may continuously
love and admire Himself in that mirror.361
Allah’s love for man must first be understood within the context of the object of His love
– the Divine self – and only then can one begin to understand the nature of His love for mankind.
Love as benefaction is a bit misleading because one can wrongly assume that this benefaction is
a primary concern for Allah. Allah’s love for man is causally indirect, disinterested, radically
removed, a bi-product and after thought deriving from loving the Self as ultimate. Allah’s love
for man may be some form of benefaction but in the same breath, it must also be said that human
creatures are in no way the object of His love. In fact, it seems metaphysically consistent to say
that they cannot be the object of His love for how could love for the other arise in such radical
unicity? There can be no movement, no descent down towards the other-than God.362
Following this conclusion, that Allah’s love for man is disconnected, disinterested love,
one question that naturally arises is how does this impact the pleasure of Paradise? What then
can be expected in terms of knowledge and love as it relates to the Divine-human relationship in

This is consistent with Moore’s analysis. He writes, “What a mystery, but not a mystery! Why have we
been created in a manifest universe if not by Him Who created us to become vehicles to reflect Him back to
Himself? He says in a hadith Qudsi, ‘I created the creation in order to be known.’ We are not one with Allah, but we
are not separate from Him either. ‘The whole universe cannot contain Me, but the heart of the believer can contain
Me.’…What separates us from Him is His utter transcendence of this entire known and unknown cosmos.” Italics
added for emphasis. Moore, “Dhikr,” 65-6. It should be noted that this hadith qudsi, while being cited in Sufi texts
often, does not appear in any of the canonical hadith traditions. Lumbard, “From Ḥubb to ʿIshq,” 350 fn. 18.
361
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At this juncture, Nygren’s descriptions of Plotinus’ conception of God is interesting, he writes: “It is
fundamental to Plotinus’ thought of God that the Divine is self-sufficient and never issues forth from its sublime
repose. Any suggestion of a spontaneous coming down is out of the question here. In harmony with this – lastly –
there is the fact that the Descent, in so far as it is a reality, means not an act of Divine condescension, but the Fall of
the soul into sin and guilt. Anyone who descends to a lower level always does so involuntarily, according to
Plotinus; and that is a proof of weakness and of an inability to maintain the higher position. It is consequently
unthinkable that the Divine Being should ever really descend.” Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1953), 197. In this quote Nygren does not make the connection to Islam that is being suggested
but it is interesting to note the other al-Ghazālīan similarities to Neo-Platonism and wonder if perhaps he was
influenced by Plotinus’ conception of descent and ascent as well as the notion of love as longing.
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the Beatific Vision? Ormsby’s summation of the relation between love and knowledge in alGhazālī’s thought is beneficial, he writes:
Nevertheless, the love of God, as presented here, is a love the ultimate purpose of
which is an ever-deepening knowledge of the divine; and in fact, for all Ghazali’s
recourse to the well-established terms and figures of amatory discourse, these
betoken knowledge of God as much as love of Him. When he speaks of
“intimacy” with God, this denotes not “union” but something more akin to an
unending exploration of the mystery of God, an infinite foray into the
unknowable. The reciprocity lies in the search itself, in the divine summons to the
search. If there is “jubilance and gladness” in this intimacy, that is not only
because of “nearness to God”, but because that intimacy involves an incessant
unveiling, a progression of epiphanies, rather than some final absorption into the
godhead. If knowledge and love seem virtually indistinguishable at this ultimate
stage, that is perhaps because they are mutually transfiguring. Love, in the end, is
a matter of passionate cognition.363
The Beatific Vision, as Ormsby states, is a fusion of knowledge and love, a final culmination of
the quest through the science of the afterlife which was al-Ghazālī’s motivation and intention.
For those who are drawn near in Paradise, love from God will be demonstrated through the
giving of ‘incessant unveiling,’ a never-ending self-revelation. But notice that the reciprocity
between God and man is indirect, and one-sided. Yes, there is a divine summons to partake in
this unending foray into the unknowable, but it is still indirect benefaction on Allah’s part, it
must be. Intimacy and love in this context, it would seem, is grounded in attaining propositional
knowledge and the ever-recursive sublimity resulting from such revelation. To suggest any
further degree of intimacy would infringe on the doctrine of tawḥīd, yet one does sense that for
al-Ghazālī, there is an experiential intimacy that comes from such interaction that transcends
knowledge and sublimity but it is at this point one must refrain from inquiry and default to the
famous Ashʿarī principle of bi-lā kayf “without asking how.”364
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the nature of love in Islam as it pertains to God’s love for man
and man’s love for God. Within this framework, the two main themes of knowledge and love
emerge. The telos of humanity being nearness in proximity to Allah in the afterlife, knowledge
of God and the subsequent love for Him are paramount for attaining such ends. Knowledge and
love were discussed within the framework of al-Ghazālī’s thought and more specifically within
his massive tome Revival of the Religious Sciences. Al-Ghazālī set out to reform the Islam of his
day as its leaders, both spiritual and civil, had become too focused on and concerned with this
life and had neglected the life to come. In the Revival, we saw al-Ghazālī’s development of how
one can attain divine inspiration (ilham) the level of spiritual development in this life which
leads to the Beatific Vision in the life to come. There is a current debate concerning al-Ghazālī’s
methodology and the systems he employs within his body of work. Al-Ghazālī can be difficult to
label due to his common practice of using terminology of certain groups in his own way. The
modern consensus is that al-Ghazālī’s methodology was not wholly Sufi or not entirely
philosophical but a combination of the two, a new synthesis of thought. Sufism serves as ethical
and practical framework for polishing the heart whereas philosophy serves to prepare the heart
contextually for inspiration and to guide and correct the heart when it receives, digests, and
interprets said revelation.
Love is also another integral theme in this chapter. It was shown that in Islam, man’s love
for God is primarily that of longing for that which the human person lacks (i.e. the perfection
that is Allah). Love as longing is consistent with the Platonic and Neo-Platonic conception of
love as eros, an influence al-Ghazālī likely received following his interaction with Muslim
philosophical in that time. Also consistent with Neo-Platonic thought is the notion of self-love as
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it pertains to the kind of love God has. As a perfect being who lacks in nothing, love, if it exists
within the divine, is directed inward to the Self, as the highest object deserving of love. This kind
of love is reflexive, ever-turning in upon itself in a radical reciprocity. Within this context,
Allah’s love for man emerges as a type of benefaction in that man is allowed to draw near in
close proximity and enjoy (benefit from) the bliss of contemplating the eternally emanating God.
But Allah’s love in the context of relationality remains directed inward to the Self and love for
man is derivative and secondary, a bi-product of Allah’s Self-love that enjoys seeing His
attributes reflected in mankind.
In the next chapter the study turns to the Christian tradition and will discuss the same
paradigm – the nature of God’s love for man and correspondingly Man’s love for God. Within
this context, the same themes of knowledge and love will be interacted with as they are
inevitably inter-linked. Furthermore, we will see how knowledge and love relate to the human
experience of the afterlife and if there is a qualitative distinction within Christian conceptions of
Heaven.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE CHRISTIAN BEATIFIC VISION: GOD’S LOVE FOR MAN AND
MAN’S LOVE FOR GOD
Introduction
In this chapter, we now shift to a Christian context and consideration of the themes being
examined in this study – the beatific vision, knowledge of God, God’s love for man and man’s
love for God. Like Islam, Christianity affirms that God is the highest/ultimate Good and is the
chief end of man. As was mentioned in the opening chapter, space does not allow for an overly
thorough treatment of the nature of the Christian doctrine of heaven. Christian conceptions of
heaven occupy a broad spectrum of thought – both biblical and imaginative, egocentric and
theocentric, etc. In the opening section of the chapter, the discussion of heaven will focus on
fundamental features of heaven particularly pertaining to the nature of this study. Nevertheless,
the central focus of the chapter will be a theocentric view of heaven consistent with the
corresponding theocentric Islamic view – the beatific vision of God. Following the discussion of
heaven, the chapter will then examine the nature of God’s love sans creation, as it eternally
existed in the triune relation of the three persons in the Godhead. Here, the question of how love
is to be understood in terms of passages in Scripture which state that “God is Love” is
examined.365 Is love part of God’s divine essence, and, if it is, do human beings have epistemic
and experiential access to that aspect of God? Furthermore, the chapter will then follow a similar
format as the previous chapter in which the themes of God’s love for man, knowledge of God,
and subsequently man’s love for God are considered.
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1 John 4:8.
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Heaven: A Theocentric View
There are many various conceptions within the Christian tradition regarding what heaven
will be like. As such, the doctrine of heaven has not been, in any way, a monolithic doctrine
within Christianity. A historical study of the doctrine of heaven reveals many different
conceptions of the life to come, each influenced by theological and cultural trends of the day.
Plato and Aristotle, early church persecution, Benedictine monasticism, Medieval Scholasticism,
the Reformation, Victorian era Romanticism, the Enlightenment and Religious skepticism, as
well as art, poetry, literature, agrarian and urbanized communities have all made their mark on
the doctrine of heaven. 366 In this way, the historical study of heaven is also a history of Christian
thought from the inception of the church to modern day. Out of this history emerge two
prevailing themes of which all views ascribe – theocentrism or anthropocentrism. The former, a
theocentric view of heaven, places God at the center of the heavenly experience. Here, the
beatific vision of God, or often known as the beatific knowledge of God, is the highest form of
human happiness and bliss. This view is often, but not necessarily, linked with some form of
Platonic or Aristotelian philosophical presuppositions. While the philosophical influence does
not need to be rejected a priori and is beneficial in many areas, at the same time, there seems to
be theological compromises in others for the sake of the philosophical position. The thought of
Thomas Aquinas is one such system which falls within this classification – of both theological
and philosophical compromise – and is worth examining in the pages to follow. 367 The second

For a very detailed and thorough history of heaven see Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang’s
Heaven: A History. For a concise summation of the book’s central themes, see the last chapter “Paradise Found:
Themes and Variations.” pp. 353-358.
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Aquinas does fall in line with the Aristotelian tradition but it should also be noted that Aquinas’s
influence is based largely through the Augustinian medium. Both Augustine and Aquinas incorporate Aristotelian
philosophy into their theological systems with the former theologian/philosopher having a large influence on the
latter. The Augustinian influence on Aquinas has been well-documented and there is no doubt that the Aristotelian
influence on Aquinas is dependent upon Augustine’s thought; however, the reason for focusing largely on Aquinas
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part of this section will consider the felt effects of Modernist and Enlightenment thinking on the
doctrine of heaven and how this influence created the need for a Christian reformation of heaven
in recent years. Lastly, I will submit that recent discussions of heaven which focus on the
centrality of the resurrection and the restoration of all things, is the healthiest way forward for
Christians contemplating heaven.
The Medieval Renaissance
In Heaven: A History, McDannell and Lang note there were three new cultural shifts in
the Medieval period that gave shape to the concept of heaven: the city, the intellect, and love. 368
The increase of urbanization during this period gave rise to the emphasis of heaven as a great
city, the new Jerusalem, a move that shifted away from the more agrarian conceptions of heaven.
The theme of heavenly love in this period is linked to the increase in the male-female
relationships of courtly love. Tales of knights in pursuit of lovely ladies inspired a more
passionate conception of marriage as opposed to the more contractual nature of many courtly
marriages. Furthermore, the scholastic depictions of heaven, which will be considered in a
moment, were often seen as cold and devoid of passion. And while the contemplative conception
of heaven might have been acceptable to the scholastics, the poets and mystics rejected it
because they emphasized a more relational union with the Divine. 369 The intellectual shift in the

rather than Augustine is due to the proximity of Aquinas to Al-Ghazālī. Alongside the proximity of time, there is a
connection of thought between the two views. As will be seen in the pages to follow, both Aquinas and al-Ghazālī
emphasize contemplation as the highest form of happiness in the life to come.
368
369

McDannell and Lang, Heaven: A History, 69.

It should be noted that the love theme during the Medieval period can be separated into theocentric and
anthropocentric categories. Those who emphasized courtly love could not conceive of a heaven in which there was
not love between the beloved and themselves. This sort of social imaginary was seemingly significant for eternal
happiness. The poets and mystics, while finding the rigidity of the scholastics to be unsatisfactory, maintained a
more theocentric view of dynamic love between God and man. This view of consummate love was in no way erotic
but did emphasize the longing of the soul for the divine and the anticipation of union in the life to come. For more
on this see Ibid., 94-107.
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Medieval period was influenced by the rediscovery of the classic Greek philosophers, namely
Plato and Aristotle, through interaction with Muslim philosophers and theologians (e.g.
Avicenna). Chief among the Medieval Scholastics was the theologian and philosopher Thomas
Aquinas. We now consider his views on the afterlife.
The two main theological and philosophical influences on Aquinas’ thought were
Aristotle and Augustine, the former being his philosophical authority and the latter his
theological authority. 370 Aquinas was indebted to both of these thinkers and often cites them as
authoritative support in his systematic treatises. Of particular importance in this study is
Aristotle’s specific influence on Aquinas’s conceptions of heaven and what constitutes the
ultimate good for humanity. Aristotle once wrote, “…every action and choice, is thought to aim
at some good; and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all
things aim.”371 Aristotle thought men and women pursue certain actions because they believe
that those actions are aimed at a certain good. Now, if this is true, it is of course important to
discover what the good is to which all must aim. Aristotle suggested that happiness is such a
good and that the way to achieve said happiness was from the contemplative life. 372 This
philosophical framework of things having particular ends to which they aim and that end for
human beings being the pursuit of happiness was accepted by both Augustine and subsequently
Aquinas.373 Specifically regarding the Christian application of this framework, the contemplative
life was rooted in contemplation of the divine. Consistent among the scholastic writers was belief
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Happiness, for Aristotle, is the end which is achieved as a human pursues the good. Human good is the
activity of the soul exhibiting virtue, whether it be intellectual or moral. Ibid., 12-13 (I.7-8).

On the relation of Aquinas to both Aristotle and Augustine, McDannell and Lang write, “While
philosophy, for Aquinas, mean Aristotle, his main theological authority was Augustine.” McDannell and Lang,
Heaven: A History, 88.
373
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that contemplation of the divine was the goal of man while on earth and that it would be the
eternal occupation of the beloved in heaven. 374 Aquinas argued that contemplation is the highest
activity of intellection, and it is that mental capacity which separates man from the animals and
plants.375 Furthermore, everything finds an ultimate end in God and so for human beings, who
possess higher-level mental capacities, their end is intimately connected to the intellect. Thus,
man’s ultimate telos, according to Aquinas, is the contemplative life in relation to divine
knowledge. This activity is the chief end of man and also wherein eternal bliss is derived.
Neither the carnal pleasure of life, nor any other external thing, can be what satisfy human
creatures, because they all would detract from the last end of everything which is God. 376
For Aquinas, heaven is the culmination of human perfection and happiness. The reason
for this is due to the encounter the beloved will have with the Divine once in paradise – the
beatific vision of God. It is in this specific culmination where his contribution to the doctrine of
heaven is most significant for this study. In order to achieve ultimate happiness through
contemplation, Aquinas posits that a few things must happen first. The reason that human
creatures cannot achieve perfect happiness in this life is because they see through a glass dimly,
that is, their perception and knowledge of God is incomplete. 377 Once in heaven, the soul is freed
from the imperfections of the body and can thus be rightly oriented towards God. 378 But the soul
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This point is most significant in terms of Aristotelian influence as well as a major point of departure
from Aquinas in the view of heaven presented later. This point is also quite technical and might detract from the
scope so it will be discussed here. The heavenly realm for Aquinas is very static and there is little emphasis given to
the physical realities of heaven. Aquinas writes that the active life will cease in the future life of the blessed and will
consist solely of contemplation of God. This might lead one to suggest, what role then does human bodies have in
the life to come? It would seem that the resurrection doctrine, the teaching that Jesus raised bodily from the dead,
would have bodily implications for Christians as well in the life to come. Aquinas does see the importance of the
body but not for purposes of enjoying physical, bodily pleasures. The reason for the importance of the body has to
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does not exist separate from the body, rather, the body is resurrected, glorified, and reunited with
the soul in order to form the unified human substance. Second, and consistent with the
Aristotelian concept of God, Aquinas was committed to the principles of perfection including
aspects such as impassibility, timeless, static, etc.; God is outside time and thus does not
experience change. Furthermore, because God is immaterial, he is not seen in the traditional
sense of seeing. The vision of God is not vision in seeing rather it is vision as perception. The
beatific vision is equivalent to having knowledge of God which, according to Aquinas, is
possessing knowledge of his essence, the very substance of God. 379 Third, Aquinas also states
that no human intellect can, by its own natural power, perceive God’s essence. The moment in
heaven when revelation is given, when the beloved no longer sees (perceives) through a glass
dimly, is an act of God’s grace. In this moment, the beloved receives a “divine ray of light.”380

do with his anthropological commitments to Aristotle and the view called hylomorphism. Hylomorphism is the
anthropological view that suggests human beings are both body and soul and, more specifically, the soul is what
gives form to the body. Unlike other forms of dualism which parse out body and soul in human creatures and
suggest that the soul is eternal and can exist separate from the body, hylomorphism suggests a more unified human
substance. To give an example, Aquinas writes, “Abraham’s soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a
part of him…there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e., the body and soul.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica,
trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Cincinnati, OH: Benziger Brothers (RCL Benziger), 1947),
https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/ (Accessed December 2, 2018), Supplement.Q75.Reply to Objection 2. A
person is not reducible to a soul in hylomorphism but is part of a whole which must necessarily include the body, a
human person is essentially both soul and body. Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, vol. 10, trans. by Beth
Mortensen, ed. by Peter Kwasniewski and Jeremy Holmes, (Parma 1858 Edition), IV.D44.Q1.A1, Response to
Quaestiuncula 1, https://aquinas.cc/31/32/~275 (Accessed December 3, 2018). See also, Summa Theologica,
Supplement.Q93. A1. The implications then for heaven is this: the beloved in paradise will not be a disembodied
soul because that soul would be incomplete and lacking. The soul needs the body just as the body needs the soul, the
two form a sort of internal symbiotic relation. Moreover, Aquinas suggests that without the body, the soul would be
imperfect because it is only part of a whole and although the soul does not need the body for contemplation, the
glorified body is more conducive to the intellectual operation because, “insofar as through being united to a glorified
body the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation.” Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, Supplement. Q93.A1.
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It seems that Aquinas equates the divine essence to a divine intellect and it further seems that he does
this not from a strong scriptural inference but philosophical commitments. His argument can be summarized
according: 1. God cannot be seen in his essence in the traditional sense of seeing, however, human creatures have
the natural desire to arrive at understanding of the divine substance. 2. There cannot be a natural desire which does
not have a corresponding mechanism to meet said desire, 3. “We must,” Aquinas writes, “conclude that it is possible
for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect, both by separate intellectual substances and by our
souls.” Summa Contra Gentiles, III.51
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All of God’s knowledge is at once possessed by the beloved and for an eternity will contemplate
God’s knowledge in a state of bliss. Aquinas describes this moment as an outpouring of divine
goodness and an act of grace whereby God elevates the beloved.
Aquinas’s view of heaven can be appreciated for a number of reasons. First, his
commitment to a hylomorphic anthropology is consistent with an embodied view of the beloved
in the afterlife. Second, his view is inherently theocentric and rightly recognizes God as the
summum bonum. Third, Aquinas seeks to preserve the doctrine of God’s transcendence yet, at
the same time, demonstrates that there is a degree to which God is knowable. At the same time,
Aquinas’s view is problematic on a number of fronts. The first problem is in relation to the last
point of agreement. Aquinas’s view helps the believer to see that his only end is in God “yet”, as
Peter Vardy has noted, “a God identified with the supreme Platonic values.” 381 Vardy takes issue
with this conception of God and suggests that the timelessness of God can be challenged. The
doctrine of the incarnation and resurrection suggests that the second person of the Trinity
persisted in the incarnation following the resurrection implying that Jesus is still in bodily form,
located in space and, it would seem, experiencing time. 382 Vardy also notes that the idea of
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This is not the only way to work through the problem with Aquinas’s view. Admittingly and for reasons
one can applaud, Aquinas was trying to preserve the notion of perfection as it relates to God but there are ways one
can synthesize both the idea of perfection and a dynamic personal interaction. Consider the words of W. Norris
Clarke, a Thomist, who considers a creative way forward: “I would answer—in my project, “creative retrieval of St.
Thomas”—that our metaphysics of God must certainly allow us to say that in some real and genuine way God is
affected positively by what we do, that He receives love from us and experiences joy precisely because of our
responses: in a word, that His consciousness is contingently and qualitatively different because of what we do. All
this difference remains, however, on the level of God's relational consciousness and therefore does not involve
change, increase or decrease, in the Infinite Plenitude of God's intrinsic inner being and perfection—what St.
Thomas would call the “absolute” (non-relative) aspect of His perfection. God does not become a more or less
perfect being because of the love we return to Him and the joy He experiences thereat (or its absence).

The mutual giving and receiving that is part of God's relational consciousness as knowing and loving what
is other than Himself is merely the appropriate expression or living out of the intrinsic perfection proper to a
perfectly loving personal being, the expression of the kind of being He already is. To receive love as a person, as we
better understand the unique logic of interpersonal relations today, is not at all an imperfection, but precisely a
dimension of the perfection of personal being as lovingly responsive. What remains fixed as the constant point of
reference in our concept of God is Infinite Perfection.” W. Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God: A
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humans possessing a body and remaining timeless are seemingly a contradiction. A fundamental
aspect of being human is to experience time, to change and progress. The timeless beatific vision
does not do justice to the idea of individual persons surviving death. Nor does it do justice to the
doctrine of the bodily resurrection of the second person of the trinity. Jesus rose from the grave
with a physical, albeit glorified, body. Another of Vardy’s main issues is with the impersonal
nature of the beloved towards one another. “Heaven,” Vardy writes, “appears to be a community
with an active social life focused on Christ and on continual praise of God.” 383 To this I would
add that the social life of heaven is not only focused on Christ, but it entails relationality with
Christ. It is not altogether obvious, nor necessary, that contemplation of the divine is both the
chief and the source of eternal bliss in Heaven. It would be agreeable to suggest that bliss partly
entails contemplation and reflection but at the same time, Scripture suggests that we are known
by God and the relationship between Christ and the Church is that of a marriage. In a marriage
relationship, both parties know and are known by the other. Aquinas suggests however that the
beloved of heaven experience felicity when they come to know God as he knows himself, but
this felicity delimits the relationality between God and the beloved. 384
Aquinas’s conception of heaven is influenced by a philosophical understanding of God
that is unnecessarily static and abstract. I do not wish to discount the focus on God for the source
of eternal bliss, however, I do wish to challenge Aquinas’s conception of the beatific vision. I
agree with Peter Vardy when he states, “The possibility is open to us of a life lived in fellowship

New Thomistic Perspective, 2nd Revised Edition, New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 136-37.
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“For God Himself understands His own substance through His own essence; and this is His
felicity…And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy to eat and drink at God’s table,
seeing Him in the way that He sees Himself.” Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.51.
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with God in a heavenly society where the Christian idea of agape or mutual love prevails.” 385
Because of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus, the beatific vision should not be seen as a
final “static purpose but a dynamic joy” which is imparted to the individuals who have been
transformed by love because of God’s grace. 386
Heaven Reimagined
Vardy’s analysis segues favorably into this final section on heaven. This is due to his
emphases on love, fellowship, society, and an overall dynamism characterizing the eternal
activity of heaven. Before building upon Vardy’s depiction, it is important to first provide a brief
context of the doctrine of heaven in the 21 st century. Following the emergence of Modernist and
Enlightenment thinking, the doctrine of heaven, among other Christian doctrines, came under
significant criticism and attack. For the past two-hundred years, a robust understanding of
heaven has been waning in the many Christian traditions to the point where believe in heaven
itself is in steady decline. 387 Even if the doctrine of heaven is strongly retained in some Christian
traditions, such as Fundamentalism, McDannell and Lang argue, “eternal life has become an
unknown place or a state of vague identity.” 388
Jerry Walls identifies a number of significant negative influences which he suggests have
influenced the doctrinal decline of heaven in Christianity. First, the internal coherency of heaven
has been challenged regarding certain philosophical considerations. Eternity and living forever
are ideas which challenge the human mind especially in the areas of personal identity and eternal
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joy.389 Second, Walls notes that broad cultural and intellectual trends have had a significant
impact on the supernatural framework altogether, heaven included. The philosopher Charles
Taylor has suggested that we live in what he calls the “Secular Age.” 390 By “secular” Taylor
does not mean that the Western Culture is thoroughly areligious – far from it. What he means by
the term is that there is no longer one belief structure that is granted a higher plausibility over
another, all are open to criticism and debate. Within this context, there is space for a frame that is
thoroughly secularized, a “closed world system” that is characterized by what Taylor calls the
“Immanent Frame,” that is, a frame which constitutes a “natural order, to be contrasted to a
supernatural one, an immanent world, over against a possible transcendent one.” 391 An aspect of
this frame which is truly unique to the post-modern era is that these closed world systems are
self-contained in terms of meaning and morality. Throughout the Enlightenment era, in the midst
of a very liberal theology, heaven was still a concept that provided moral reasoning and meaning.
Immanuel Kant purported that heaven was a necessary concept for the postulate of practical
reason, even though morality was grounded in a non-religious duty. But today, within these
supposed self-contained models, heaven is not necessary for meaning and morality. Moreover,
along with the emergence of these models came the notion that heaven and the notion of an
eternal life was evil because it kept people focused on the life to come and not on their
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immediate futures. This is why Karl Marx called religion the “opium of the people.” 392 So, on
the one hand, the doctrine of heaven is waning because of the rise in acceptance of naturalistic
presuppositions, on the other, it is even deemed evil by some because it provides a false sense of
hope and meaning in this life.
Christian culture in the West is not immune to the Immanent Frame and a thorough-going
secularism has fostered space for a thoroughly secularized theology. Even those whom have
resisted a liberal theology have still been impacted by the Immanent Frame and, consequently, a
critical component of heaven is in need of restoration – a renewed emphasis on Christian hope.
In Heaven, Walls does well to demonstrate the reasonableness of heaven and its value for
addressing extremely difficult philosophical issues, especially in relation to the meaning of life.
In concert with Walls’ work, N.T. Wright, through contextual biblical exegesis and
biblical theology, and has reclaimed another aspect in need of renewal – biblical imagery. One
common conception of heaven in popular Christian circles is the notion of heaven being some
place far away where people go when they die; a place out there, an ethereal reality of harps and
clouds with the earth being jettisoned and left behind. But is that an accurate interpretation of the
Scriptural depictions of heaven? N. T. Wright argues that this is not a biblical imagery of heaven
as it tends to minimize two key components tied to heaven in Scripture and early Christian
theology: resurrection and restoration of nature. 393
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In Surprised by Hope, N. T. Wright has done well in reclaiming what I would submit is a
sound and thoroughly biblical vision of heaven. His project focuses largely on the life of Christ
and the significance of the incarnation, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus. 394 The life of
Christ was a demonstration, a foretaste of the what the kingdom of God will one day be like.
This preview reached its climax when God raised Jesus, the Son, from the dead and showed
God’s power over death and the grave. The resurrection became the focal point of Christian hope
of life and the Apostle Paul teaches that without the truth of a literal, bodily resurrection of Jesus,
Christianity fails, and its message preached in vain. 395 Central to the message of Christ’s ministry
and subsequent death and resurrection is the message of hope and restoration. This is what it
looks like when Jesus comes into his kingdom. This coming restoration is foreshadowed in the
OT in scenes of coming judgment. Wright suggests this is where some of the modern
eschatological confusion emerges. The modern conception of judgment tends to be negative but
for the Jews reading Psalms 96 and 98 as well as Isaiah 11 and 65-66, the coming judgment of
God was a cause to celebrate. 396 In the OT, to have judgment was a good thing because justice
will be ensured. Judgment done according to righteousness. God will sort it out. Furthermore,
following the judgment of the Lord, renewal and restoration were promised to follow. The
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promise of cosmic renewal has no greater scene than in the culmination of the new heaven and
new earth in Revelation 21-22 where the writer depicts the New Jerusalem coming down out of
heaven to be united with the earth. This passage reveals two important themes of heaven. First,
in the end, heaven and earth are meant to come together and this physical reality will be the
eternal dwelling place for the beloved. Second, heaven is proximity to God. Through Scripture
we see glimpses of heaven wherein man enjoys a certain measure of proximity to God. In the OT
the Temple was the place where God and people met. In the NT, it is in Jesus and the Holy Spirt
where this happens. In the final scene of Revelation, heaven has come to earth and the temple,
which was once the symbolic and literal dwelling place of God among his people, will be no
more for in this new city “its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb.” 397 To this we
can add, where God is there too will be love for God is love and so it is true, as C. S. Lewis says,
“For where agape is, there is, in some degree, heaven.” 398 The blessed reality of heaven will be
the union of the beloved to Love itself, this will be, as John Wesley writes, what “crowns all” for
“there will be a deep, and intimate, an uninterrupted union with God; and constant communion
with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, through the Spirit; a continual enjoyment of the ThreeOne God, and of all creatures in him!” 399
Amidst all of the various biblical interpretations, cultural trends and theological
traditions, a biblical view of heaven entails what N. T. Wright calls “eschatological duality.” He
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writes, “What matters is eschatological duality (the present age and the age to come), not
ontological dualism (an evil ‘earth’ and a good ‘heaven’).” 400 As Christians contemplate heaven,
they ought to look to Christ for direction. His birth, life, death and resurrection all tell the story
of love, redemption, new life and restoration. These components of Jesus’ life form not only a
foreshadow of what is to come but establishes a hope that is relevant for believers in this present
life. What Christ demonstrated to the world was the love God has for it and not only that but his
active working to restore the broken relationship, a paradise lost, which will one day culminate
in the final age to come.

The Mystery of God
An orthodox Christian theology of God begins with two basic questions: “what is God
like?” and “who is God?” These two questions, while related, are distinct as Bray suggests – the
former is an inquiry into the essence or being of God and the latter concentrates on his personal
nature.401 An orthodox Christian theology also rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that
God has spoken to man and through man in history (special revelation); and two, that God is, at
least in some capacity, knowable. 402 In Christianity, the revealed Scriptures are the authoritative
source of knowledge about God. What the Scriptures reveal about God allows for humanity to
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theologize and make inferences about what God is like and who he is. The first consideration,
what God is like in his essence or being, has led to much debate throughout the centuries
concerning what can actually be known about God. One challenge facing this aspect of theology
is the proposition that God is utterly other and unique, incomprehensible. God’s being is so other
than our own, it is purported, that is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive it through creaturely
language and finite minds. Feinberg points out this challenge noting that is it difficult to discuss
because it is “difficult to find biblical language that talks about the ‘divine essence’ (perhaps the
closest is Paul’s claim about the ‘form of God’ in Phil. 2:6, though Paul’s intent is not to teach
the Trinity).”403 Essence and nature language is inherently a philosophical category and while
they are important for understanding a thing and what it is like, the Bible does not exactly speak
in that categorical way. Historically, this led many theologians towards a mystical approach to
God, a means of approaching God through non-rational means (i.e. an existential encounter) and
speaking of God in ‘negative,’ apophatic terminology. 404 But not all theological endeavors were
of the mystical tradition. The Reformers were very reluctant to say anything about God’s essence
but did not go so far as to endorse a ‘negative’ theology in its entirety. Calvin, as Bray points out,
affirmed negative theology in relation to the Divine essence but not as it relates to what could be
known through God’s personhood and personal relationship. 405 The second fundamental
question, who is God?, should be, according to Calvin, the focus of the Christian endeavor. He
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writes, “Those, therefore, who, in considering this question, propose to inquire what the essence
of God is, only delude us with frigid speculations – it being much more our interest to know
what kind of being God is and what things are agreeable to his nature.”406 Certainly, to know
what is agreeable to God is of utmost importance, but at the same time it seems that to speak of
God’s nature is to say something about his essence, that is, what is essential to God’s being.
Part of the challenge in this discussion is a categorical one. It is difficult to discern what
is meant when one uses terms such as essence, nature, being and attribute and whether or not
they are separate or synonymous. I would submit that it is philosophically consistent to use
essence and nature synonymously so that when one speaks of the nature of God, they are
referring to his essence. 407 Furthermore, we must be careful to not dissect the nature of God into
two parts, separating the being of God and his essence (ουσια( from his personhood (ὑποστασις).
It is problematic to speak of God in his singular essence first and then get around to discussing
the tri-unity of persons. The tri-unity of persons in the Godhead is central to our conception and
consideration of the Christian God. On the centrality of trinitarian doctrine, Wolfhart Pannenberg
writes,
It is not a doctrine of only secondary importance in addition to some other basic
concept of the one God: If the issue is considered in terms like that, the case for
trinitarian theology is lost. It can be defended only on the condition that there is
no other appropriate conception of God of Christian faith than the Trinity. In that
case we cannot have first a doctrine on the one God and afterwards, in terms of
some additional supernatural mystery, the trinitarian doctrine…Everything that is
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said in Christian theology on the one God has to be predicated, then, on the three
persons of the Trinity in their communion. 408
If a thing’s essence is that which without it, it would cease to be that thing and since personhood
is of primary important to the concept of the Christian God, do we not then understand
something of the divine essence, however minimal it may be? It would seem that God’s
revelation of himself has demonstrated something essential to his being. This is not to say that
the nature of the tri-unity of persons in a singular substance has been comprehended fully, there
is no denying that God transcends human comprehension, but it does seem we can begin to
understand the essence of God, however hidden and mysterious.
When talking about God, theologians throughout Christian history have walked a fine
line avoiding the extremes of agnosticism and anthropomorphism, transcendence and
immanence, revelation and hiddenness, knowledge and mystery, trying to rest in the dialectical
tension. Certainly, on the one hand, Christians want to maintain that God categorically
transcends the creation and therefore religious language. 409 And yet, on the other hand, they also
affirm that God has revealed himself through the Scriptures and ultimately in the person of Jesus
Christ. Furthermore, knowledge is so central to the discussion about love because one cannot
love that which they have no knowledge about. To provide clarification on this tension the last
dialectical set – knowledge and mystery – is worth examining in a little more detail.
In Boyer and Hall’s, The Mystery of God, the authors discuss the idea of theological
mystery, a motif that is sprinkled throughout the Scriptures. In the beginning of their analysis,
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they highlight the dialectic of knowledge and mystery in terms of light, and more specifically,
the sun. They employ a popular C. S. Lewis quote which states, “We believe that the sun is in the
sky at midday in summer not because we can clearly see the sun (in fact, we cannot) but because
we can see everything else.” 410 The authors here suggest that “Lewis’ point was clear: there may
be certain things that are themselves too great to understand but that nevertheless enable us to
understand lesser things with remarkable clarity.” 411 Like the sun in the midday sky, which is not
visible to the naked eye yet illumines everything else, so too does God illumine reality while also
not being known through normal means of knowing. The Scriptures state that God, the Creator,
“lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6:16); this same God announces, “No one may see me
and live” (Exod. 33:20). Through this construction, Boyer and Hall note that this is the God
whom “philosophers, theologians, and ordinary Christians have recognized as
‘incomprehensible,’ ‘inscrutable,’ ‘hidden,’ ‘past finding out.’” 412 God is a mystery and yet
human beings are called to seek and know him. How can this be, how can this divine invitation
be meaningful if the mystery cannot be overcome? The answer lies in the meaning of theological
mystery. For most, the first definition of mystery which comes to mind entails some notion of a
puzzle or problem that is in need of solving. That meaning does not suffice in relation to God, he
is not some puzzle that can be solved. “The mystery of God is not,” as Boyer and Hall state, “a
question to which we must find an answer; it is itself the answer.” 413 The Apostle Paul states that
the mystery revealed to him was made known through revelation (Eph. 3:3). This kind of
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mystery is one that remains so – still mysterious – even after it is revealed and unlike
investigative mystery which is eliminated once enough knowledge is obtained, this “revelational
mystery” is “in some sense established, not eliminated or solved, by its revelation.” 414 When God
revealed certain things which had heretofore been unknown, they are revealed as mystery so that
the knower has knowledge of the mystery but is still left in awe and wonder, the mystery still
remaining.
Revelational mystery, as the authors call it, can be divided into three sub-categories:
extensive, facultative and dimensional.415 For the purposes of this study, I wish to discuss only
the last type of revelational mystery – dimensional mystery. The authors define dimensional
mystery as “characterized by an unclassifiable superabundance that transcends but does not
invalidate rational exploration.”416 In order to help with understanding on this type, the authors
present the analogy of the Flatlanders and shapes. Imagine if you will that there are people who
are called Flatlanders who only perceive reality in two-dimensions – length and width but no
depth. Further imagine the consideration of a circle in this two-dimensional reality. The
Flatlanders are able to rationally perceive the circle without a problem. Now, what would happen
if the Flatlanders were asked to consider rectangular extension from the circle so that the shape
under investigation were now a cylinder. They would not be able to understand the notion of
cylinder-ness because this shape adds another dimension to the consideration, a dimension that is
outside of their capacity to understand and perceive. Notice that this mystery has nothing to do
with the cylinder itself, the concept of cylinder is not irrational, but it is beyond the rational
capacities and reality of the Flatlanders. Transpose this analogy to the dimensional mysteries of
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God as reveal to finite creatures. The authors state, “The problem we will face as we address the
reality of God is not that reason does not apply but that we do not know how to apply it. The
things of God are not internally self-contradictory, but what we say about God would be selfcontradictory if we were speaking of the ordinary things of this world.” 417 Knowing God does
not dispense with reason, knowledge of God is not less rational, it is above human reason.
In light of dimension mystery, the challenge then for Christian theology is the avoidance
of agnosticism. How is this to be avoided if knowledge of God is beyond human dimensions?
The authors admit that it is difficult to conceive of revelation as both knowledge and mystery, to
use one’s reason but at the same time realize God is beyond reason. This is not an impossible
task however, and the authors suggest that resolution begins not just with the right sources of
information but also “being the right kind of knower.” 418 Left to our own finite selves,
knowledge of God would remain in another dimension, and so Christian theology begins with
God and in order to know what kind of knower we humans are, we must first turn to what God is
like.
Knowledge of God begins with God, with the kind of being he is and the intentions he
has for creation, namely, human beings. The Scriptures reveal a God who is inherently and
fundamentally personal, a God who is not merely some abstract “thing” or “it,” but a personal
“Thou,” and, more specifically, a tri-unity of persons.419 Being personal is not something that
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God has by means of a quality or relation to something external, it is what God essentially is. 420
We can say that God is the premier persons and all personhood derives from him. God’s
personal-ness is self-contained and self-sustaining within the three persons of the trinity and
from eternity past, these three have enjoyed unending communion, a rich reciprocity of giving
and receiving, of loving and being loved. 421
As it relates to human creatures, not only was the creation created by a personal God, but
this personal God creates other individual persons external to himself, human creatures that were
endowed with the imago Dei.422 Going back to the emphasis on being a certain kind of knower,
we see from Scripture that God’s creation of human beings was special and unique. No other
creature in creation had been given the image of God. Having knowledge of God was linked to
God’s intentions and the kind of creatures he not only intended to create, but whom he intended
to be in relationship with. Thus, we can say that God created human beings with the capacity to
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meaningfully engage with the various degrees of revelational mystery. Only because of the work
of the Creator can human beings engage with such mystery. Moreover, in this divine work is
manifested the agapē love of the Creator towards his creation. A love that is rooted in doing and
action and not because of any need or want external to God, “but,” as Lewis states “of plain
bounty.”423 But, and perhaps more importantly, human beings can only be personal because the
Creator himself is personal, the premier persons, and not only that, those persons share in a
unbounded, perichoretic love from all of eternity.
In the backdrop of the theme of mystery and knowledge, the next section examines the
notion of God’s love for man. This section expounds of God’s love toward human beings and
discusses the tremendous undertaking he undertook in order to love such finite creatures.
Experiencing and sharing God’s love is a form of knowing God and so knowing what God’s love
is like is beneficial for any meaningful relationship between humans and the divine.
God’s Love For Man
God’s love for mankind is a central pillar in Christianity and, as Feinberg rightly suggest,
“one of the grandest themes in all of Scripture.” 424 Perhaps the most famous verse of the Bible –
John 3:16 – begins with the powerful phrase “For God loved the world in this manner, that he
gave his only begotten Son.” God’s love for the world was conveyed to the world through the
giving of the beloved Son, the Son who would become a ransom for many and through whom the
world would be saved. 425 For confessing Christians, it is humbling to consider the manner in
which the Triune God loves mankind – a thought that inspires wonder and mystery. When
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considering the love God has for mankind, one thought that should not be so quickly passed over
concerns the lengths God went to love human beings. Few people consider the theological and
philosophical difficulties inherent in a reality in which the infinite comes into contact with the
finite in a loving, relational way. The qualitative difference between the Creator and the created
is so vast and incommensurable, it would be quite remiss of human creatures to not take
seriously the lengths the Triune God took not only to revealed himself but to achieve the
particular end which manifested in the Incarnation, Death and subsequent Resurrection of Jesus.
The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard took this relationship between the Creator and
creature seriously. He contemplated and discussed the lengths to which God, whom, according to
the Kierkegaardian designation is infinitely qualitatively different than the creature, went to not
only love humanity but be victorious in love, overcoming the unfathomable chasm that existed
between them.
Two fundamental assumptions direct Kierkegaard’s reflections of God’s love for man:
first, God’s love is his motivation as well as his end, and two, love is genuinely expressed and
experienced only among equals. The first assumption touches upon of an important theological
and philosophical consideration: “what is the motivation for God’s action?” In relation to
creation, God is the primary cause, the Unmoved Mover as Aristotle calls him. But unlike the
Aristotelian designation of God, which was merely a necessary condition for reality to obtain, the
Christian God, alongside being the Creator is also loving and relational towards creatures.
Neither choice nor necessity dictates a certain measure of distance for he is not far removed and
detached from creation. However, God’s disposition towards creation seemingly creates this
tension of causality which can be summarized in this way: If God is perfect, that means he is
self-contained, in need of nothing, nothing can be added to his essence or taken away; therefore,
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he does not act according to some external need as if he was lacking in any way or had a desire
necessitating a certain occasion. What then causes God to move? To act? To appear?
Kierkegaard recognizes this tension and asks the same question,
…nor can he [God] be so determined by any occasion that there is as much
significance in the occasion as in the resolve. What then could move him to make
his appearance? He must indeed move himself…But if he moves himself it
follows that he is not moved by some need, as if he could not endure the strain of
silence but had to break out in speech. But if he moves himself, and is not moved
by need, what else can move him but love? 426
Why does Kierkegaard assume that nothing but love be that which moves God to act, he answers
“for love does not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but within.” 427 God is love and is
moved by love and this motivation comes from within God himself. Agapē love is love grounded
in action, in doing. God acts because he is love. Thus, God was not forced to love mankind, he
freely loves through an act of the will. Because God is love and had such determinations towards
his creation, he would, in the fullness of time, make himself known. Kierkegaard states it this
way, “Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this way, but just as his love
is the basis, so also must love be the goal, for it would be a contradiction for the god to have a
basis of movement and a goal that do not correspond to this.” 428 The question of how God
achieves such an end is revealed in the problem which underscores Kierkegaard’s other
assumption.
Kierkegaard’s second assumption is fascinating when considering the love between God
and man. He reminds the reader that God loves the learner and it is his aim to “win him.” 429
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Kierkegaard suggests that this kind of love, that one that win’s over the individual, must be one
that is shared among equals. He writes,
…for only in love is the different made equal, and only in equality or in
unity is there understanding. Without perfect understanding, the teacher is not the
god, unless the basic reason is to be sought in the learner, who rejected what was
made possible for him.
Yet this love is basically unhappy, for they are very unequal, and what
seems so easy – namely, that the god must be able to make himself understood –
is not so easy if he is not to destroy that which is different. 430
Here, Kierkegaard’s point is that God’s love for man, the kind which seeks reciprocated love, is
frustrated by the inability of God and man to understand one another – the emphasis being on the
side of the beloved’s incapacity to understand God the lover. In order to win mankind over, the
gap of difference must be overcome. So how does God avoid this frustrated love? How is the
equality of lovers resolved or must God’s end be frustrated for eternity? He says that, in this
frustration, the grief on God’s part is infinitely more profound and something only the superior
being in the relationship will fully understand. There is not a creaturely analogy which can
adequately grasp the extent of the misunderstanding. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard is resolved to at
least try and explain this frustration knowing that human conceptions cannot capture the fullmeasure of qualitative difference between God and man.
Aware of the limitations, Kierkegaard asks the reader to consider the analogy of the king
and the maiden. Imagine that there was a king who loved a lowly maiden. Their status was such
there existed an asymmetrical relationship for he was the lordly king and she a humble maiden.
Not being hindered by this, the king simply declares her his equal, raises her up, and they are
wed. As time goes on, however, the king begins to have an anxious thought but one that he keeps
to himself lest by speaking it to others it begins to germinate. The king thinks to himself, “what if
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the maiden becomes displeased with her status,” not because she is not grateful for what the king
has done; rather, because the king has made her into something she is not. She will always be the
humble maiden and he the lordly king. The thought might even cross her mind, as Kierkegaard
writes, “she would have been happier had she remained in her obscurity, loved by an equal,
content in her humble cottage.”431 In this moment, the king’s love would become frustrated, and
not because he had done something wrong, that his love was not of a self-less kind; rather, it is
the weakness of the beloved’s perception of the relationship that is the cause of great frustration.
Notice that the problem is not that they are not equals in a positional sense, the king has
made the maiden his queen and she is. The problem lay in understanding, of the maiden’s
attempt to return to a lesser love. This is the learner’s error according to Kierkegaard. God’s love
for man is like the love the king had for the maiden and in the same the way the king’s love
could conceivably become frustrated so too the love God has for man will experience an
“unfathomable grief” out of frustrated love. 432 God’s grief arises out of frustration for at least
two reasons. First, it is frustrated because his ends are not being realized. Second, the love of
God only seeks that which is best for the other, but the learner wants to return to the lesser, to the
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squalor of his lowly position. Perhaps the grief is like that of a parent’s love for a child that
allows them to make their own choices knowing that they are choosing the lesser but allowing
them to do so anyway. The parent knows what is best but does not force the child’s hand, all the
while knowing that even if the child leaves, the love for them will remain. In the same way
God’s love does not cease, “for the divine love,” as Kierkegaard writes, “is that unfathomable
love which cannot rest content with that which the object of love might foolishly consider
himself blissfully happy to have.” 433
But would not God expect this of his creation? Yes, the Triune God, would certainly have
known that this love would have become frustrated, that humanity’s volition was weak and that
love could easily become frustrated as the creation frivolously sought that which would only
temporally satisfy. On this anticipation, the words of C. S. Lewis are helpful:
It would seem that Our Lord finds our desires not too strong, but too weak. We
are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when
infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud
pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday
at the sea. We are far too easily pleased. 434
Humanity is far too easily pleased with the lesser, but God does rest content. He is not content to
leave humanity in the mud and so now we must ask how God avoids the frustrated love? How is
the asymmetry between the Lover and the beloved overcome and true love realized? Kierkegaard
considers two options: first, the union might be brought about by the elevation of the
learner/beloved or, two, by the decent of the Lover.
The first option – the elevation of the learner/beloved – is like the king’s decree to make
the maiden his equal. God could have elevated the humanity’s status by divine fiat, a royal
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decree. God could, at once, overcome the weaknesses of human creatures and perfect their
character but such a decree, Kierkegaard suggests, would come at a price. 435 In this moment of
transformation, the sin and separation are overcome but so too is the will of the human
individual. In this moment, God makes the decision for human creatures and in order to
guarantee that love is not frustrated the will of humanity is bolstered and stands resolute but at
the same time, the memory of a past life is altered and wiped clean. The person has no memory
of how they arrived in the condition they are in, they do know however that they are in a place of
goodness, happiness and bliss. The learner/beloved would no longer desire to return to the lesser,
back to the making mud pies in the mud. But, the choice to be there was not their own. Now, this
is not to say that God does not exercise his authority and will in the lives of human creatures at
decisive moments in history, he does, but it does not seem to be the way he normally operates,
and it definitely does not seem to be the case in relation to love. With love being the prime
motivation for God’s ends, it would seem consistent to submit that the free choice between the
Lover and the beloved is of prime importance. Thus, the elevation of the learner in this manner is
not acceptable, not because the learner objects but the Lover knows his beloved did not choose to
be there on his/her own accord.
Another scenario within the first option of elevation is God could reveal himself to
mankind in a display of majesty, power and glory. 436 Perhaps the scene would be similar to that
of the return of Christ on the white horse in Revelation or the scene depicted around God’s
throne where the angels continuously worship. 437 In this manifestation, there will but one option
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for all living creatures, to bow and confess in worship that Jesus is Lord. 438 At once, the learner
would lose himself in adoration and he/she becomes enraptured in the glory of the divine.
Kierkegaard suggests that this could have satisfied the maiden but at the same time it would not,
he writes, “satisfy the king, for he did not want his own glorification but the girl’s.” 439 Two
things are of important note here. First, it is only a mere suggestion that this manifestation could
have satisfied the maiden and in this hypothetical scenario the learner as well. Kierkegaard
suggests it might have satisfied the maiden, but I suggest that it would not. It would not because
of the particular telos of mankind. Being made in the image of God, human beings are persons
endowed with a likeness to the premier persons of the Triune Godhead. As persons, human
beings are inherently relational yet are unique individual selves and it seems that in this kind of
manifestation the individual self is lost in a quasi-divine absorption. Second, and following from
the first, the relation between the tri-unity of Persons and human persons is frustrated. There is
no doubt that mankind would, in this instance, worship God but would this end fully align with
God’s purposes? According to Kierkegaard, it would not. The first option – the elevation of the
learner – may in fact please the individual but it would be shrouded in deceit, it simply will not
do for, as Kierkegaard states, “In taking this path, then , love does not become happy – well,
perhaps the learner’s and the maiden’s love would seem to be happy, but not the teacher’s and
the king’s, whom no delusion could satisfy.” 440 The tension is thus revealed, how does God
annihilate the unlikeness that exists between them and yet not annihilate individual persons in the
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process? The unlikeness must be overcome because, “not to disclose itself is the death of love,”
and yet how will God accomplish that for, “to disclose itself is the death of the beloved!” 441
God was not satisfied with the kind of relationship which either was shrouded in deceit or
abolished the individual selves whom he loved. The Scriptures are replete with relational
commands – both to challenge and invite – directed to the learner to taste, see, know, respond,
choose and love God. But these commands are fraught with frustration due to the kind of thing
human creatures are: sinful, frail, weak, finite, contingent, etc. Given the infinite qualitative
distance that exists between God and man, that would seem enough to highlight the lengths God
undertook in order to achieve that particular end of love. But humanity, in the most extreme form
of arrogance, added another layer of complexity to this task. Not only is there a difference
qualitative difference between God and man, the Creator and creation, human creatures rejected
their Creator and, in His place, set themselves as gods. The Bible says mankind professed to be
wise in their rejection of God but in reality they were demonstrating their foolishness. 442 Thus,
not only was there a divide in quality of essence, there too was divide of character and purity.
Standing in the ultimate form of ignorance and self-aggrandizement, the creation had become an
enemy of and to the Creator. 443 This added dimension only heightens the qualitative degree of
God’s great love for humanity. Human beings cannot ever fully understand the degree to which
God’s love has overcome but nevertheless, when we begin to try and comprehend we are filled
with the words from John’s epistle, “behold what great love the Father has for us…” 444
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Because God is motivated by love, if the frustration in the Lover remains following the
elevation of the learner/beloved, then perhaps it can be absolved through descent. Kierkegaard
considers the notion that in order for love to be actualized and the asymmetry overcome, the
lover must alter himself for the sake of the beloved, to meet the beloved wherever he or she may
be. In the case of the infinite and the finite, the higher becomes the lower, taking on their
humanity, becoming the lowest among them – the servant, the one who serves others. The
Gospel of John states that the Word became flesh and dwelt among humanity. 445 This incarnation
of the second person of the Triune Godhead, the putting on flesh and becoming the servant was
no mere Docetist shell. The servant form was not, as Kierkegaard noted, “an outer garment, like
the king’s beggar-cloak, which therefore flutters loosely about him and betrays the king…It is
his true form and figure. For this is the unfathomable nature of love, that it desires equality with
the beloved, not in jest merely, but in earnest and truth.” 446 It was in the gesture of love, the
incarnation of God, that divine love was put on the center-stage of human history. But the full
extent of God’s love for mankind was not fully revealed until Jesus took up his literal cross and
died the death which was the beloved’s fate, an act for which there can be no greater
manifestation.
The Lover went all the way to Calvary’s cross on behalf of the beloved. The human life
of the Lover, Jesus the Christ, was a revelation of the Father, of what God is like in His essence.
It was in this form, that of the true God becoming man, wherein the asymmetry was overcome.
In light of this beautiful revelation, one could rightly ask, “did God intend it to be this way from
the beginning?” The simple answer is, yes. Scripture states that the Lamb of God was slain
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before the foundations of the world. 447 This passage, among many others, suggests that it was
part of God’s plan for the Son to die as the Father’s chosen Lamb. Perhaps, it could even be
suggested further that this was the only way for love to be realized. Kierkegaard implies as much
in his concluding thoughts:
For love, any other revelation would be a deception, because either it would first
have had to accomplish a change in the learner (love, however, does not change
the beloved but changes itself) and conceal from him that this was needed, or in
superficiality it would have had to remain ignorant that the whole understanding
between them was a delusion (this is the untruth of paganism). For the god’s love,
any other revelation would be a deception. 448
What was or was not necessary is not the point here; rather, it is that this is what God did to
demonstrate his love towards mankind and overcome the asymmetry that existed between God
and man. Looking back at the cross, at God’s love on full display, the beloved is left in awe, in a
humble adoration of the Lover, of what has been done on his/her behalf.
The learner owes everything to the teacher, that there is no thing about the learner that
earns merit or has the ability to overcome the misunderstanding. 449 Through the descent of the
Lover, the learner and maiden are thus elevated in Christ but in this event their place and position
are not lost on them. There is a scene in the book of Revelation where the crowns of glory are
given to the sons and daughters of God. They are heirs according to the promise, they are raised
up by the Teacher who is also the King. But love is reciprocal, it is self-giving, always focused
on the other and in this Regal scene, those honored and brought high, take off their royal crowns
and lay them at the feet of the true King. This is not synonymous with the humble maiden
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realizing her humble place and desiring to return to that lesser love. This laying down of crowns
at the feet of Jesus results from the realization that the King became the Servant, that for the sake
of love fulfilled, the lover lowered himself to the status of the beloved. There is understanding, a
beautiful understanding and yet there is the inability to comprehend the lengths the Lover went
to win the beloved; yet, the beloved know that glory, honor, and worship are due to the Lover
alone.
This intention of God, to be engaged in love between equals, provides us an apologetic
response to the so-called hiddenness of God problem and the common retort made by skeptics
that if God exists, why does he not simply reveal himself right here and now? This retort may
seem a glib jest and will likely gain some rhetorical favor for the skeptic, but at the same time it
can be a simple and honest question: Why does God not acquiesce to these revelatory demands?
Would it not be simple for the Godhead to be revealed in all power and glory and at once make
its existence known to the skeptic and believer alike? The answer is both dialectical and
paradoxical. In a dialectical sense the answer is both yes and no. Yes, it would be easy for God to
make people know that He exists, but that kind of knowledge is not what God is after nor would
it do humanity any good. Scripture states that even the demons know and believe that God exists
and shudder at that reality. 450 The knowledge of God which demons possess is of no use for the
human’s soul, it is not a knowledge grounded in love, submission and worship. So, no, it is not
simple, especially having seen the challenges between the king and the maiden – how great then
between God and man. But do not be mistaken, the non-simplicity of the matter was not because
God lacked the ability or the resolve; rather, it was the weakness and limitations of the persons
whom God loved.
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Paradoxically, the manner in which God displayed his love is both simple, and yet for
some profound and offensive, to grasp. This is what Jesus means when he teaches you must
become like the children in order to enter the kingdom of God. 451 Children realize their need for
help that is external to them. In their youthful disposition, perhaps they see with clearer eyes both
their need and the beauty of this story. Furthermore, it is simple to those who have responded to
the invitation of love, who have tasted and seen that the Lord is Good. 452 For those who have yet
to experience the goodness of God’s love, it seems lowly, offensive, a “stone of stumbling and a
rock of offense.”453 C. S. Lewis’s distinction between looking at versus looking along something
is quite helpful here. 454 Lewis describes a moment when he was in a very dark toolshed and a
saw a single beam of light shining through a crack at the top of the door. As he looked at the
light he could see the beam distinctly and it illuminated the shed faintly. But as he aligned his
eye with the beam of light Lewis writes that the inside of the shed vanished and “I saw no
toolshed, and (above all) no beam. Instead I saw…green leaves moving on the branches of a tree
outside and beyond that, 90 odd million miles away, the sun.” 455 There is an experiential
difference between looking at and looking along something. After having offered a few more
examples of the differences between at and along, Lewis then asks the qualitative question of
which is more valid or true than the other. Or, which of the two distinctions tells you most about
the thing? This question, Lewis suggests, is taken for granted and over the past fifty years it has
largely been assumed that in matters of religion, a true account must come from the outside, that
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is, those looking at – the anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists. 456 Lewis pushes back
against this default assumption pointing out there are things we can look at but simply not know
what it is like until we look along. Being outside of something can offer a clearer picture but it
does not detract from the significance and validity of seeing along the beam, being on the inside.
Those having looked along the beam of God’s sacrificial love know through experience the
depths of this great love.
Conventional wisdom scoffs at the idea of God on the cross. Friedrich Nietzsche affirms
as much when he writes,
Obtuse to all Christian terminology, modern people can no longer relate to the
hideous superlative found by an ancient taste in the paradoxical formula ‘god on
the cross.’ Nowhere to date has there been such a bold inversion or anything quite
as horrible, questioning, and questionable as this formula. It promised a
revaluation of all the values of antiquity. 457
Nietzsche’s words highlight a profound truth of the crucifixion of Jesus, that it transcends human
wisdom, logic and morality. No time before or no time following has such a conception entered
the hearts and minds of men. But that is what God does, He takes the foolish things of the world
and shames the wise. 458 Nietzsche’s words are prophetic as they, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, illuminate the “bold inversion” of Christ on the cross and the reality that this
event creates a confrontation with every single human being. Nietzsche was correct, Christ on
the cross calls for a revaluation of all values, it calls for one to make a choice, to either die to self
and take up one’s own cross or to reject this call to love and submission. So, why does God not
write your name in the sky and meet your demands for knowledge and epistemic access, because
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He has already revealed himself. Where you may ask? Kierkegaard has the answer, “Look, there
he stands – the god! Where? There. Can you not see him? He is the God; and yet he has no place
where he can lay his head.” 459 Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, is the revelation of God and
the kind of knowledge that God desires man to have is captured in the words of Jesus to his
disciples when he asks “and who do you say that I am?” 460 Here, Jesus demonstrates that he is
concerned not only that the disciples have an opinion of who he is but that they have knowledge
of his identity. God was revealed in Christ so that man could have the relationship God intended
to have with those creatures made in His image.
The relational purposes of God are intended for heaven as well. God’s intentional love
for man extends into this current life but it also will continue on into the afterlife for an eternity.
Kierkegaard’s analogy helps one to contemplate the lengths God went to achieve his purposes.
The current experience of God’s love is a profound reality. The God who descended out of love
to overcome finite humanity invites those very same creatures to be in personal relation with him
for an eternity. If the love is God is such a good experience now, consider how much more joy
there will be when humanity sees their Lord face-to-face. Heaven is the ultimate culmination of
God’s love for man; where the author of love and life and light calls the redeemed his own and
as the Scriptures state, “so shall we be with the Lord forever.”461
Man’s Love for God
Man’s reciprocating love for God is the last section to be considered in this chapter.
Integral to the possibility of love between two persons is first the possibility of knowledge of the
other who is to be known. Without the potential for knowledge and its corresponding actuality,
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there can be no love. In this way, knowledge and love are intertwined. As the previous section
noted, the incarnation, life, death and subsequent resurrection of Jesus Christ provides both
knowledge of God and a demonstration of the kind of love God has for human beings. 462 In
Christ, not only does God cross the infinite qualitative difference in terms of knowledge about
himself, he also does so in the realm of love. The incarnation is at once both a revelation of
knowledge and a revelation of love in space and time, the descent of God bridging the divide
which would have not been possible for man to ascent to or overcome. 463 With the way made
available, the resulting work of Christ comes with an invitation and a command, the call to come
and die to self through loving God and loving others. This command is rooted in both the kind of
personal being we were created as and what we were created to do. It is not a cold-hearted
command given by a disingenuous over-lord, but it is stern and unyielding. Much like Lewis’s
Aslan, the metaphorical Christ-figure, who is a great lion that cannot be tamed and isn’t safe but
is also good and the king, so too, is Jesus Christ the same person loving person who will also
return to judge the earth with a sharp sword. 464 He is the Savior-King, the lover and the judge.
Furthermore, the nature of this command is that its burden is easy and the yoke light. 465 It is easy
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and light for a number of reasons but perhaps the most striking of them all is connected to the
very life of Christ himself. Humans being are not asked to do something that God himself has not
already done in the second person of the Trinity. Jesus is the archetypal human being, a perfect
example of what it is to fulfill the greatest commandments – to love God and love others. 466 His
life and death demonstrate that qualitative nature of God’s agapē love. Not only is this the way
in which God has loved us, it is also the motivation the compels us to love one another in the
same manner.
The Scriptural mandate to love God and love others is of premier importance in the life of
a Christian. The pair stands resolute as the two greatest commandments to follow, the latter
being second in importance only due to the nature and necessity of the former. But Loving God
and loving others are also mediums of knowing God, a way of understanding the dimensional
mystery. In the first epistle of John, the author states, “Everyone who loves has been born of God
and knows God.”467 Whoever has agapē love for his neighbor has both been born of God and
knows God. A person who loves in this sense knows God because God is love and in that act one
knows what God is like. Why is this the case though, why is it that those who love others with
agapē love have been both born of God and know God? Regarding the latter part, knowledge of
God, the answer is found in the following verse when the author says, “because God is love.”
The phrase God is love (ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν) is perhaps one of the most profound statements in
all of Scripture concerning God, not merely because of the directness of the copulative formula
but also because it reveals to us a glimpse of the divine essence. This statement goes beyond
describing what God is like in the sense that God is comparable to love; rather, from it we are to
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understand, through the copulative, that God is love in the equative sense. John goes on to show
how the love of God was made manifest to the world through a double unfolding. He first notes
that the love of God was demonstrated in the sending of his only Son (τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν
μονογενῆ) into the world in order that we might have life. Secondly, John further develops the
Son’s commissioning noting that God’s love was demonstrated not only in the purpose of
bringing life but in being the propitiation for sin. In fact, it is in this act of propitiation through
which we can have the kind of life which demonstrates God’s love. Nestled in-between the two
examples, in perhaps a chiastic fashion, the apostle reminds us of a fundamental aspect of God’s
agapē love, it is always prior to and independent of any act of benevolence on the behalf of
mankind.468 God loves not because we loved God but because he first loved us, a statement John
reiterates a few verses later: “We love because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19).
As it pertains to human creatures and the knowledge of God, it is interesting to note that
in this passage knowledge of God is obtained through agapē love. This means that knowledge of
God is gained, not through the transmission of a propositional statement about God, but rather in
the act of love, in doing. 469 The following verse does convey such a propositional statement,
perhaps one of the most important ever revealed of God, but here in verse seven the author
appears to be adding another layer of knowledge that goes beyond what one thinks about God.
Of course, what one thinks and believes about God is important and fundamental to right living,
but here the author seems to say there is another degree of knowledge that is gained only through
action, through love that is defined by doing. In the act of agapē, one gains knowledge of what
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God is like because God is agapē. When a Christian loves another person selfishly and
unconditionally and acts rightly towards the other’s good, treating them as a proper end, he/she
gains a sense of what God is like. He/she gains knowledge that was not hitherto known by
propositional statements. This kind of knowledge is gained only through experience and is thus a
subjective truth. It is subjective truth but not in the sense of a relativistic postmodern
subjectivity, that kind of purporting relegates truth to judgment of the individual. In the Christian
sense, the kind of subjectivity in mind here is realized only when the human person, the subject,
comes into direct contact with objective truth, with the true Real.
There are some truths that can only be experienced in this way and they tend to be the
most significant truths of human experience. Consider this example of knowledge gained
through experience. Imagine there are two people, a guy and a girl, who have been brought
together by two families in an arranged marriage. Both of them have never seen or met one
another and they are about to meet for the first time before deciding to officially marry. Up to
this point the girl’s family had told the prospective groom and his family about her, descriptions
of what she is like, her personality, likes and dislikes, quality of character, strengths and
weaknesses and even favorite foods (they were very thorough). Likewise, the guy’s family
relayed the same kind of information to the prospective bride, being very thorough and covering
similar material and topics as they had received. Both the prospective bride and groom feel they
know a lot about their future mate but in what sense do they know the other? Up to this point
they only possess propositional knowledge of the other marked by statements such as “he is
kind,” “she enjoys jokes,” “she is sentimental,” “he is generally pessimistic,” etc. But how well
can they really be said to know one another even though they have been told so much about the
other? There is still another kind of knowledge to be gained, it is called, knowledge through
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acquaintance. There is an immediacy to this kind of knowledge that begins in the initial
subjective encounter. Even in the moment of the first meeting, the first hello, the first smile,
there is something new, a subjective knowledge gained through a direct encounter with the
person, in this case the future spouse, that was not possibly acquired through propositions. In this
moment there is a new degree of knowledge gained, a new level of relationality that can only
come through such an interaction of which propositional truths cannot compare.
Human love for God is rooted in agapē, in action. But at the same time, Christian love for
God has also been thought of in terms of erōs love, of desire for the ultimate Good. This leads us
to the discussion concerning the relationship between agapē and erōs as it pertains to man’s love
for God. There is a rich history of theological development of agapē and erōs but there are two
figures – Augustine and Luther – who are perhaps most prominent in this discussion and yet
stand in stark contrast towards one another’s thought.
Beginning with the ancient Greek philosophers, one question which they earnestly sought
an answer entailed the movement or what A.E. Taylor calls “the first step” towards conversion of
the soul from the world to God. 470 The answer began with contemplation and a knowledge of the
self which “is also the knowledge of our own ignorance of true good.” 471 Human beings are
lacking and in want for they do not possess the Good, the reflective life is the beginning process
of discovering or in some instances returning back to the Good. 472 From these reflections
emerged the idea or erōs love and the notion of the soul searching or longing for that which it
lacks. Underlying the Greek idea of erōs is an embedded dualism in which the soul longs to
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separate from the physical world (including the body) which is transient and temporal, to escape
from Plato’s cave and enter the “sunshine of the intelligible world” to that which is permanent
and eternal.473 Lindberg purports that this goal is more clearly expressed in the writings of
Plotinus who reflects Plato and Aristotle and heavily influenced Augustine. 474
Augustine was indeed influenced by Greek philosophy, especially the idea of erōs love.
Because of this influence, perhaps the most significant feature of Augustine’s theology of human
love is that all love is acquisitive love or erōs. That all men seek the Good is a universal
presupposition for human being. But more than just seeking the Good, Augustine adds to this
saying that all men love. 475 Love is the most elementary function in man. But Augustine begins
to diverge from Greek influence at precisely the moment of discerning the proper object of one’s
love. Concerning the starting point of introspection in Greek philosophy, A. E. Taylor rightly
quips, “How do we pass from the discovery that we are in this miserable and shameful ignorance
of the one thing it is incumbent on us to know to apprehension of the scale of true good? How do
we get even so far beyond our initial complete ignorance as to be able to say that a good soul is
immeasurably better than a good body, and a good body than abundance of possessions?” 476 If
man’s love is to be rightly ordered how does he find where to begin? Towards what Good does
he aim? Augustine would affirm Taylor’s point here, and this is manifested in his distinction
between Caritas and Cupiditas. For Augustine, acquisitive love is neither good nor bad, to desire
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is to be human, it is the way God has created us.477 The distinction between these two forms of
love, then, is not in acquisition (kind) but in the object of the acquisition. In this sequence, there
are only two possibilities, either love ascends or it descends. 478 Caritas is that love which is
ascends because it is rightly order on God whereas Cupiditas is that which descends because it is
focused on this world, on the temporal. This is the fundamental problem for human creatures and
the fatal flaw of all Greek philosophy. Augustine does not believe that man can ascend the ladder
of righteous on his own accord. Yes, man seeks the Good so that his soul may find its proper
end, but sin causes the fallen creature to always pursue the wrong end, to worship the wrong
thing as god. The fallen creature’s conception of what is, in actuality, the Good perpetually
remains turned or curved downward towards the finite and contingent realms. 479 Man will always
seek the Good but what is conceived of as the Good will never be that chief end for which he
was created. Eros, the soul’s search for that which befits it, must be supplemented from without.
Augustine purports this is where the agapē love of God is needed. Only through an act of grace
whereby the divine descends to the creature and empowers him/her through the work of the
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Spirit can one be directed towards the proper telos.480 Only once the Spirit illumines the heart
may man’s ultimate aims be properly aimed towards God and it is this illumination which
empowers the ascent.
Augustine believes that erōs and agapē are synthesized in the life of the believer. What
he finds true and profitable in Neo-Platonism must be supplemented by the Christian conception
of agapē. The issue that remains however is this, does Augustine properly synthesize erōs and
agapē? Moreover, are the two types of love even synthesizable or are they, at their core,
mutually exclusive; the former being fundamentally egocentric and the latter theocentric? Martin
Luther vehemently rejected this synthesis and attempted to dismantle the relationship between
the two. For him there were at least two glaring issues with the synthesis. The first is the
implications related to merit, salvation and the will. If it is the case that the Spirit must act first,
independent of the person’s will, in order for man to assume the proper telos in erōs, what sort of
causality is taking place and what are the implications of that act. When the Spirit acts and
imbues supernatural ability to man does then man’s will take over as he begins the ascent – to
love with agapē toward God and neighbor – or is it the case the Spirit continues to act and direct
the will in agapē action? The former brought a measure of pause for Luther due to the seeming
implication that man had the capacity to earn merit in his own salvation and subsequently
sanctification. This was inherently problematic for it suggested that man had a mechanism within
his own nature which could work towards salvation. In this sense, agapē love was the act of
properly calibrating the mechanism which, when pointed in the right direction, could follow the
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desire of the soul in proper pursuit of God. It would seem this reduces the Spirit to a divine spark
needed, merely the cause, albeit a necessary one, to put the sojourner on the right course.
Second, Luther consider erōs to be inherently antithetical to Christian love because it was
fundamentally egocentric. In the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518 we see Luther’s separation and
rejection of the erōs paradigm even though he does not mention it by name; he writes, “The love
of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. The love of man comes into being
through that which is pleasing to it.” 481 Like Augustine’s curvatus (or curve downward), Luther
also believes that man has a natural bent. While Augustine’s curve emphasizes the object of
one’s love, Luther’s is transfixed on the lover, on erōs itself. Luther believes that man’s
corruption is inherent to the very kind of erōs love that is symptomatic of the sinful creature.
This love is turned inward and is at its core selfish and self-seeking and antithetical to agapē. But
in eradicating the synthesis perhaps Luther goes too far to the other end of the spectrum. Wishing
to remove any form of human involvement, the other option placed causality of all
manifestations of agapē, beyond simple calibration, in the work of the Spirit. But this move also
seems problematic due to the nature of love and relationality. The assumption here being that
love, if it is to be called genuine agapē love, must be freely given and freely received. In this
formula however, love is freely received by the human being but not freely given for it is the
work of the Spirit and not man in the love of both God and others. Who is doing the loving and
who is loving who? If love is genuine then it needs to truly involve the will of another. In this
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formula it seems as if the human being is merely a conduit for the Spirit to act, the personal
agency of the human overridden.
In light of this discussion there are a few assertions that I wish to call into question. First,
are erōs and agapē inherently antithetical to one another? It doesn’t seem that the answer is
necessarily affirmative at least not in the sense that there is a logical contradiction. Irving Singer
agrees and states, “There is no contradiction in thinking that man’s love is the created effect of
God’s love, which both compliments and causes it, leading it to spiritual union after all other
inclinations have been renounced.” 482 One argument for the rejection of the synthesis was it
made God, as the summum bonum, into merely a means whereby one could achieve their selfish
end of happiness. But I think Augustine is aware of this and safeguards this assertion by
introducing the idea of enjoyment or frui towards and object within the framework of caritas.483
On the relation to objects (or persons), Augustine makes the distinction between enjoyment (frui)
and use (uti). The former is the end whereas the latter is the means to achieve that end.
Concerning enjoyment, he writes, “for to enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own
sake.”484 Augustine asserts that the Trinity alone is the true object of enjoyment and, not a means
to achieve another end, but to be enjoyed for its own sake.
Second, over the course of criticism has agapē become too vacuous? Nygren, who is
himself Lutheran, defines agapē as “spontaneous and unmotivated,” “indifferent to value,”
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“creative” and “the initiator of fellowship with God.”485 Because of its origin from God, it is
understandable why one would conceptualize agapē as unmotivated so as to protect the
immutability of God. But when applied to God’s love for man, does it become too vacuous?
Consider Nygren’s statement on agapē:
Love towards God does not seek to gain anything. It most certainly does not seek
to gain anything other than God. But neither does it seek to gain even God
Himself or His love. The very thought of gaining God’s love, is fundamentally
alien to it. It is the free – and in that sense spontaneous – surrender of the heart to
God. When God gives His love freely and for nothing, there remains nothing for
man to gain by loving God. His love for God loses the character of a deserving
achievement and becomes pure and unfeigned. 486
His application here is quite brazen and honestly describes a love that is seemingly less-than
personal, lacking any measure of affection or desire. I propose that if you try and reduce agapē
to pure choice of another over oneself then you are no longer talking about love but a
supererogatory act that is seemingly arbitrary and vacuous. Yes, there are very few explanations
that can be given for God’s initial act of creation but they are all rooted in his nature. What is
also part of his nature is personhood, and as we have seen the personhood of God does not need
to be thought of in a static, immutable sense but in a dynamic way, of a mutual love between
persons that both gives and receives freely but also enjoys the other. 487
Third, what of the erōs paradigm altogether? For Augustine, erōs was clearly a paradigm
he thought compatible with Scripture, but it is interesting to note that that Greek word is not used
in the Bible. I believe Augustine is correct in the opening pages of his Confessions, that we are
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made for God and we are restless till we find rest in Him. This notion is similar to the popular C.
S. Lewis quotes which states, “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can
satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.” 488 But perhaps
Augustine would have fared far better if he had simply left the erōs paradigm behind when
conceptualizing man’s love for God. The Bible does not seem to complicate the paradigm of
love. In the Scriptures we see both an invitation and command. The invitation is to come and
enjoy God, just as the Psalmist states, “I sought the LORD, and he answered me…Oh, taste and
see that the LORD is good!” 489 Elsewhere the command, “Love the Lord your God with all your
heart, soul, mind and strength.”490 Here the command to love includes the whole person, the
heart (affection/desire) as well as will and mind. But more importantly the love between God and
man is a love between persons, a love with personal affections. The goodness God sees in us
only come from Him, from the Christ-life that has transformed human persons into the persons
they were meant to be. In closing these words of Lewis are fitting: “He [man] does not think God
will love us because we are good, but that God will make us good because He loves us; just as
the roof of a greenhouse does not attract the sun because it is bright, but becomes bright because
the sun shines on it.”491
Conclusion
Much ground has been covered in this chapter but throughout each topic – heaven,
knowledge of God, God’s love for man, man’s love for God – there have been underlying themes
of love and relationality, knowability and mystery. In the section on heaven we saw that a

488

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 114.

489

Ps. 34:4a, 8.

490

Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37; Luke 10:27.

491

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 59.

193
Biblical depiction of heaven is one where heaven and earth come together, where God is seated
on the throne and human beings enjoy him and his creation. On the section concerning the
mystery of God, a taxonomy of mystery was provided detailing that revelational mystery rests in
the tension of both revealing and hiddenness. Such is the nature of God, he is both
communicable yet beyond being communicated. Any knowledge that we do have of God is due
to the kind of being he created us to be, namely personal creatures that share in some compacity,
through the imago Dei, with the divine Tri-unity of persons. In the section on God’s love for
man, Kierkegaard’s work concerning equative love was unpacked, an imaginative yet
illuminative excursion into the lengths God went to realize his end of love and relationship
between the infinite and the finite. It was suggested that a revelation through condescension, in
the Incarnation of the Christ, was the necessary means for a love that would not ultimately be
frustrated through inequality. Lastly, and in light of the lengths God went to procure such a
relationship, man’s love for God was considered. Augustine stands as a pivotal figure in the
doctrine of Christian love. His synthesis of erōs and agapē into what he called caritas has been a
Catholic staple ever since. It was not until the Reformation when Luther challenged this
synthesis and tried to dismantle any association of agapē to erōs. But like all pendulum swings,
perhaps Luther goes too far in trying to protect agapē. It was suggested that Augustine’s notion
of longing and desire in human beings for God is accurate but that distancing oneself from the
Greek notion of erōs might be beneficial as well. In the end we returned to the concept of
personhood and suggested that a robust picture of Biblical love is one that includes the whole
person which would entail both will and affection. Yes, God’s agapē love is the starting point of
all things Christian, but perhaps there is more to Biblical love than mere unmotivated action. In
my mind’s eye, I imagine the persons of the Trinity enjoying each other from all eternity. The act
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of creation, then, is the instantiation of a loving invitation to join in and partake of the divine
love, enjoyment, and unity which forms the fundamental foundation of all reality.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The study began with a quote from the British philosopher Bernard Williams raising the
question of the goodness of eternity. The afterlife, as Williams suggests, must be a place which
renders boredom unthinkable. Eternity brings out all possibilities and by extrapolating out into
eternal duration, it would seem if one could become bored in the afterlife he/she inevitably
would. It would not matter when it happened either for there would still remain an eternal
existence following the event. At that moment of singularity, when a specific pleasure brought
on the first intimations of boredom, however minute, the quality of the afterlife would have
crossed over a point of no return. These thoughts have caused theologians and philosophers to
wrestle with the concept of eternal existence and question whether or not it is something to be
desired. Both Islamic and Christian orthodoxy affirm that human creatures are intended to live
forever in a realm of unending pleasure and bliss. Moreover, these respective versions of the
afterlife – Paradise and Heaven – have been designed by the Deity to meet the needs of the finite
human creatures who inhabit these realms. Thus, the comparative study ensued, seeking to
discover if one theological system provides a better account of the afterlife over the other. Is it
the experience of God as Tawḥīd or Trinity that better meets the demand of eternity?
Three essential themes emerged in the study – knowledge, love and the afterlife. The
afterlife, it was assumed, had to contain some measure of proximity to the Divine if it was to
meet the demands of eternity (QGP). Following that assumption, the other two themes –
knowledge and love – became of paramount import. Love between persons seems to be a
fundamental good within human existence and thus would be necessary for human flourishing.
But before love can be had, there must first be knowledge for that which is not known cannot be
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loved. This seems true also if man is to love God and God is in some way to love man. Thus,
these themes became the main points of comparison between Christianity and Islam.
Within the Islamic tradition, al-Ghazālī was chosen as the specific dialogue partner for a
number of key reasons. First, al-Ghazālī has been called “the Proof of Islam” and it seemed that
if one were to question the truthfulness of Islam, then he/she would need to interact with such a
distinguished figure. Second, al-Ghazālī was very concerned with the religious practices of his
time and felt that the Islam community at large had abandoned their pursuit of the afterlife. In
response, he wrote the Revival of the Religious Sciences, a series of 40 books which had the
purpose of reorienting the Muslim believer towards attaining Paradise. Third, al-Ghazālī also
emphasized that Allah is the ultimate good and it is the Beatific Vision (i.e. the closest proximity
to Allah in Paradise) which is the highest state of bliss. His conviction is shared as it seems that
if the QGP is met in the afterlife it will be linked to human experience of and proximity to the
divine for Allah represents the ultimate good.
The second chapter was dedicated to creating a particular depiction of Islamic Paradise.
Due to the nature of tawḥīd, connection to Allah is limited and any access to him in Paradise is
indirect. Because of this, it has been purported that the sensual pleasures and general bliss of
Paradise are instances in which Allah is experienced albeit indirectly. Some mystical Islamic
thinkers have suggested that Paradise itself is a theophany of Allah which radically transforms
the way Paradise is imagined. At the very least, the blessings of Paradise are said to be a direct
result of Allah’s good intentions. The more one experiences this bestowal of bliss, the more one
is compelled to give praise to Allah. But these same pleasures, as some have suggested, are
locations wherein a deeper metaphysical experience is had. Allah’s presence being mystically
mediated through these blessings and rewards. Lastly, the highest level of reward was discussed.
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The Qur’ān teaches there are gradations to Paradise and the highest level of reward resides in
Firdaws where the faithful few experience the Beatific Vision of Allah. It is this final reality
which al-Ghazālī sought to attain.
The third chapter discussed the themes of knowledge and love within the context of
Islam. More specifically, knowledge and love were examined within the context of al-Ghazālī’s
works. His intellectual story begins with a disillusionment towards his intellectual past and this
led him into a personal journey through the various disciplines of Islam in order to discover what
is the proper path to the afterlife. For nearly ten years al-Ghazālī lived a hermetic and ascetic life
and emerged from the journey convinced he had found the true way. But this path was not
wholly synonymous with what had come before. It was shown that al-Ghazālī’s refined view was
a new synthesis of both mystical and philosophical traditions. Al-Ghazālī saw both the strengths
and weakness of each and developed from them his own system for attaining Paradise. This
system begins logically with knowledge and for al-Ghazālī this was the starting point of a
fundamental aspect of spiritual progress – polishing the heart. Knowledge of Allah is knowledge
of his attributes. For Muslims, these attributes are the model from which one should form his/her
character. Al-Ghazālī described this process as polishing one’s heart so that the human will fades
away and the heart reflects Allah’s attributes. Knowledge of Allah also lead to a love for him.
Love for Allah is manifested through the acquiring of His attributes. It is in these moments of
polishing wherein love for Allah is reciprocated. According to al-Ghazālī, when Allah sees
himself reflected in the mirror, he then reciprocates the love of that individual.
The fourth chapter centers on the Christian tradition and combined the three themes of
afterlife, knowledge and love into one chapter. Beginning with the characteristics of Heaven, it
was suggested that faithful conceptions of heaven must include a dynamic embodied state. The
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Medieval Scholastics, especially Aquinas, had become too influenced by Greek conceptions of
the afterlife and as a result, their teachings of heaven were quite static and disembodied. 492 There
is a growing shift in modern evangelicalism which considers Heaven as not being something that
Christians go to and leave the earth behind. Rather, the final scene of the eschaton entails heaven
and earth coming together. Heaven is where God is and thus heaven will be on earth as God rules
and reigns with the saints and the angels into eternity. The remaining two themes are quite
important at this point. The potential for knowledge and love in Christianity are quite different
than in Islam. The Triune God of Christianity is a god who reveals and communicates. But the
Triune God does more than reveal and communicate in an indirect way, he does so by entering
into space and time and revealing himself through the second person of the Trinity, the Wordmade-flesh – Jesus Christ. It was in the life and actions of Jesus wherein the love of God was put
on full display. We see the triune God loving humanity first at a time when humanity was an
enemy to God. Furthermore, this love is relational. Not only did God demonstrate his love
through creation, he did so in a way that invites human creatures to know and be known. One
fundamental distinction here which makes this a possibility is the fact that the triune God is a
plurality of persons yet singular in essence and being. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the
premier persons and have shared in a dynamic, communicative, self-giving and other focused
reciprocating relationship. And, when God created man, he endowed human creatures with
personhood as well. The Godhead is unified yet dynamic and communicative. It is because of
these distinctions that true knowledge and love of God can be obtained and shared by humanity.
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This has been a brief summary of the study thus far. What follows are the comparative
analysis and apologetic responses to Islam from the Christian perspective. We begin first with
the application of the Inside/Out Approach.
The Inside/Out Approach
The Inside/Out approach is an apologetic methodology intended to generate healthy and
meaningful dialogue between two opposing views. The process begins with the Christian
attempting to go inside of the Muslim’s worldview, to try and understand their theological
perspective. Within this space there is room for agreement and affirmation. At the same time,
however, there is also room for disagreement and critique. The Inside portion of the method
seeks areas in which the worldview can be affirmed but also critiques the inherent limitations of
the view’s logical conclusions. Once that is done, the conversation moves Outside of the
worldview under examination and the Christian begins to explain how Christianity better
explains/accounts for those affirmation made at the beginning. Throughout the study there have
been two main themes as it relates to the divine/human relationship within the respective
religions – knowledge and love. The next two sections will apply the Inside/Out method to these
two fundamental themes.
Transcendence and Knowability
INSIDE
The transcendence of God is one of the positive attributes both Christians and Muslims
affirm. God or Allah is unlike any other being in the universe. Anselm of Canterbury’s infamous
pronouncement “God is that which nothing greater can be conceived” is a stalwart example of
rightly capturing the transcendence that is due God in these two traditions. Nothing compares to
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God’s greatness and majesty and this is seen reflected in both Islamic and Christian Scriptures. 493
From such passages the doctrine of transcendence is rightly applied to God for he is above all
else. This should be welcomed in both Islam and Christianity. At the same time, however, the
respective Scriptures also name God. They describe what God is like. 494 These two statements –
God is utterly transcendent and God is knowable – confront each religion at a crossroads. Both
Christianity and Islam affirm that their respective revelations are from the Triune God or Allah
and are therefore true and trustworthy. But in this case, what does it mean for the revelatory
content to be true? How can God be both transcendent and known? There is a seeming
contradiction in those two affirmations. 495 The problem though is not on the part of the divine
being and what he knows about himself; rather it is the capacity of finite human creatures.
Human creatures are limited by language and mental capacity to know and explain that which is
above all naming. It is thus posited that any human attempt to bring God down to our level, to
describe him in human language, delimits the divine and creates a god in our own image. At the

From the Bible: “No one is like you, O LORD; you are great, and your name is great in might.” (Jer.
10:6) “There is none like you among the gods, O Lord, nor are there any works like yours.” (Ps. 86:8) “There is no
one holy like the LORD, Indeed, there is no one besides You, nor is there any rock like our God.” (1 Sam. 2:2) From
the Qur’ān: “There is nothing like Him…” (Q 42:11) “Say, ‘He is God the One, God the Eternal. He begot no one
nor was He begotten. No one is comparable to Him.’” (Q 112:1-4)
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From the Bible: “…for he is a God of justice.” (Ps. 50:6) “Our God is a God who saves…” (Ps. 68:1920) “…God is light, in him there is no darkness at all.” (1 John 1:5) “God is spirit, and his worshippers must
worship in the Spirit and in truth.” (John 4:24) “…because God is love.” (1 John 4:8) From the Qur’ān: “The Most
Excellent Names belong to God: use them to call on Him” (Q 7:180) “Say [to them], ‘Call on God, or on the Lord of
Mercy – whatever names you call Him, the best names belong to Him.” (Q 17:110) In Q 59:22-24, Allah is called
“Lord of Mercy,” “Giver of Mercy,” “the Controller,” “the Holy One,” “Source of Peace,” “Granter of Security,”
“Guardian over all,” “the Almighty,” “the Compeller,” “the Truly Great,” “God is above anything they consider to
be His partner.”
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Cragg rightly notes, “The problem of meaning in language exists for all religions and is not unique to
Islam.” It is true that the problem of meaning applies to all religions. As we will see, Islam has much more difficulty
addressing this problem than does Christianity. Cragg’s thoughts on this will be significant in the Outside portion of
this section. Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), 55. Tennent’s
chapter on God and Islam (ch. 6) in Christianity at the Religious Roundtable is a fantastic source for understanding
the challenge of transcendence and knowability. Furthermore, it is a fantastic example of healthy dialogue between
interlocutors who fundamentally disagree on the nature of ultimate reality.
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same time, revelation in the respective holy texts are believed to be just that, a revelation of the
divine being. So, do we possess knowledge about God or do we not? The philosopher David
Hume, through the empirical interlocutor Cleanthes, poses an interesting perspective on
knowledge of God that highlights the challenge at hand. He writes:
I can readily allow, said Cleanthes, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity
of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete
Mystics, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their
opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be
allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension;
yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely
incompatible with that intelligent nature. 496
Hume’s observation suggests that emphasizing perfect simplicity in the nature of God is
synonymous with saying that god does not exist. It would not necessarily be an ontological
atheism but an atheism in practicality and epistemology. One may still adhere to a belief in
God’s existence but practically speaking, nothing may be known about it.
The attribution of divine simplicity is one of the fundamental tenets of tawḥīd. Along
with simplicity, it is also affirmed that Allah is utterly unique and unknowable (mukhālafah). A
warranted question thus arises from these positive attributions, can one truly know what Allah is
like? Furthermore, what does it mean for a name to belong to Allah in this context? Muslims
affirm that the revelation of Allah is true but true in what sense? By true does it mean that this
statement is an accurate proposition of whom the referent is Allah? Or by true is it meant that
this statement is profitable for religious living and thus true practically? These language
questions are long outstanding questions for the Muslim community that were a source of
argument and disagreement since the early inception of Islam. 497
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This discussion highlights the relationship between Allah’s essence and his attributes. The traditional
distinctions in this discussion are between two groups – the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. Across the spectrum are
two extreme poles – tashbīh and taʿṭīl. The first term – tashbīh – refers to comparison of attributes. In this reading of
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It may be suggested that the mystic is in some way able to overcome the language
impasse through an immediacy of direct revelation. This is perhaps the case with some Sufi
orders but not so with al-Ghazālī. In fact, it was the very same Sufi premise which al-Ghazālī
sought to avoid in his methodology. For al-Ghazālī, mysticism is not an independent source of
revelation about Allah. Instead, it is a moment of epistemological affirmation and internalization.
Recall the three levels of tawḥīd – professing, internalization, tasting or naql, ʿaql, dhawq.498 The
mystical experience is not one of new revelational content separate from that which is revealed
in the Qur’an. Shehadi suggests the term mystical revelation is a bit misleading and a better way
to describe the experience, and a more accurate description of al-Ghazālī’s view, is “mystical
disclosure.”499 In this mystical experience, the truth of Islam, and more specifically the truth of
tawḥīd, is presented immediately to believer. This apprehension of truth is non-inferential nor is

the relevant Qur’ānic texts, the attributes of Allah are either anthropomorphized or compared to created things.
Obviously, this is shirk and unacceptable in classical Islam. The second term – taʿṭīl – refers to the emptying of all
attributes. In this reading, Allah’s attributes are subsumed into his essence and thus he is divested of all attribution.
On taʿṭīl, the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions notes, “they [Allah’s attributes] cannot belong literally to his
own nature or being, and simply reflect our perception of his dealings with us.” John Bowker, ed., “Tashbīh,” in The
Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), (Accessed June 6,
2018), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780192800947.001.0001/acref9780192800947-e-7248. The Muʿtazilites affirmed tashbīh which made knowledge of Allah virtually impossible.
Al-Ashʿarī, for whom the Ashʿarites are named, rejected tashbīh and instead affirmed tanzīh. The practice of tanzīh
which sought to keep God pure and transcendent while at the same not divesting Islam of any meaningful language
about Allah. Al-Ashʿarī rejected any anthropomorphisms relating to Allah by affirming tanzīh but also maintained
an “agnostic acceptance of the language bilā kayf, without knowing how it is to be taken” (“Tashbīh”). Al-Ashʿarī
purported that God’s words about God, his own revelation in the Qur’ān, “set up the directives by virtue of which
reasoned judgments about the essence—attributes question are to be measured.” Nader El-Bizri, “God: Essence and
Attributes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. by Tim Winter, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521780582.007. (Accessed June 6,
2018) In other words, the fact there is language about Allah in the Qur’ān revealed by Allah himself, there must be a
way forward to speak meaningfully about Him while at the same time avoiding any form of idolatry. Al-Ash‘arī
advocated for the distinction between Allah as he is in his essence versus as he is in his acts. He purported that Allah
can be known through his actions. For example, the Qur’ān states that Allah will forgive those who believe. From
that action it can be inferred that Allah is forgiving. While the attribute doesn’t reach Allah’s essence, from a
creaturely perspective, Allah is forgiving, is a valid statement about Allah. The difficulty with this position is that it
still precludes any analogous statement truly referring to Allah. There is no comparison. So, the question of whether
or not this tension can be overcome will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
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it mediated in any way. But the content is not new, only the relation of the knower to the content
has changed. This is the highest level of tawḥīd wherein the subject knows that there is none
truly Real save Allah.
The distinction here concerning mystical revelation and disclosure is significant but at the
same time the knowledge/attribute problem is still present. Al-Ghazālī’s mystical experience is
not a bypass of revelatory content; rather, it is a direct and unmediated internalization of said
content. The Qur’ān is the final authority but the problem of knowability remains. If Al-Ghazālī
is correct in his description of this experience, the Muslim becomes certain that truth has been
affirmed but again we may ask who or what is the supposed truth really referring to? Even if this
disclosure is a direct act of Allah, the content which is affirmed does not correspond to Him.
This is problematic because al-Ghazālī has stated that closeness to Allah “lies in attribute rather
than in physical location.”500 Moreover, conceptual longing for Allah is a quintessential function
of Islamic religious life, especially in Paradise. But again, we must ask, what is the thing which
Muslims must long for if language does not attain Him?
If conceptual longing reaches its climactic level in Paradise, being sustained at that level
by the never-ending self-disclosure of Allah, would it not then be problematic if that which is
being conceived is not analogous to who Allah truly is? According to classical Ashʿarite
theology, human language and human conceptions about Allah are subjective conceptions that
do not objectively correspond to Allah. Though he is given divine names, Mercy never reaches
Him, Benevolence never reaches Him, Justice never reaches Him, Love never reaches Him. 501
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These attributes were capitalized for rhetorical force. They are some of the 99 names of Allah. By
capitalizing the attributes it demonstrates that the very names of Allah are not names about Him directly. They do
not reach him.
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All such attributes are merely equivocations between human conceptions and Allah’s true
character. Consequently, the human perception of what is disclosed in Paradise, the Vision of
Allah, which is to be the source of unending bliss, is to some degree illusory. Furthermore, it is
curious that what is bringing them bliss is what has rightly been identified as virtues. Love of
God really seems to be love of the virtues. These virtues are the ones Allah has revealed about
himself to Muslims in the Qur’ān. But again, if Allah is unique and unknowable, the virtues
themselves, however good and noble, do not reach Him. Therefore, I would submit that what
Muslims actually love are abstract objects, or various conceptual virtues, which then form a
purely subjective image of Allah in each individual Muslim believer. But this is extremely
disconcerting for orthodox Islam because what is being set up by this religious language is an
image other than Allah. Loving something other than Allah is shirk. It would seem that all
religious language about Allah is necessarily guilty of it, that is, guilty of some form of idolatry.
Al-Ghazālī was a theologian within the tradition of al-Ashʿarī and so therefore affirmed
that Allah was unique and unknowable but at the same time, religious language was still
meaningful in some sense. From the onset, Al-Ghazālī appears to be locked in a logicalepistemic tension with a razor thin margin much akin to the eschatological bridge (as-sirāt) that
all people are fated to cross. That Allah is truly unique and unknowable seems to contradict any
positive-attribute statement made of Allah. Either Allah is truly unknowable in any sense or He
can be known and thus compromises tawḥīd.502 Al-Ghazālī appears to have anticipated this
problem and purports that “disclosure of that which cannot be disclosed in this world will

As Scalise points out, it would seem that even saying that Allah is one, a simple affirmation of tawḥīd is
problematic because it said with creaturely language and creaturely conceptions. He writes, “[human language]
infringe[s] upon tawḥīd itself for how else would a Muslim understand a radical oneness apart from creaturely
analogy.” Scalise, “Tawḥīdic Allah,” 6.
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actually be possible [in that world].” 503 But why think that is the case? This assertion contradicts
the already established notion that Allah is unique and unknowable. Al-Ghazālī cites Surah 66:8
as a proof text for disclosure in the life to come: “Their light will shine in front of them and on
their right, and they will say: ‘Lord, perfect our light for you and forgive us’.” This was the
Ashʿarite position also supported by a hadith which states “a veil shall be lifted, and the believers
shall gaze upon the face of God.” 504 For al-Ghazālī, the beatific vision was the full disclosure in
the life to come, the completion of what can be experienced to a limited degree in this life.
The link between knowledge and the beatific vision highlights the importance of the
revelatory content in the Qur’ān. While al-Ghazālī affirmed that revelation was authoritative and
necessary for knowledge about Allah, there still is the seeming contradiction between these two
statements: Allah is utterly unique and unknowable and positive-attribute statements about Allah,
both of which are found in the Qur’ān.505 Al-Ghazālī posits that what can be known can only
come from that which is familiar. Since Allah is unfamiliar to anything experienced in this life,
creaturely characterization cannot reach Him. Fadlou Shehadi sees the difficulty in these
statements and works through al-Ghazālī’s thought to see if there is a true contradiction, an
aporia, or if the two statements can be reconciled. In Shehadi’s analysis of al-Ghazālī’s thought,
he concludes there is no inconsistency between these two statements. It is true that al-Ghazālī
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affirms a knowable aspect of Allah through his acts in creation but at the same time he also
affirms that this knowledge is inadequate since those attributes are understood in creaturely
terms and Allah is utterly unlike that which is known to human beings.506 Shehadi summarizes it
this way, “Thus to know God amounts to understanding the authoritative language about God
which is expressed in human terms.” 507 Creaturely language used to describe God is
authoritatively given because it comes from the Qur’ān but insofar as said language refers to
Allah as a positive-attribute statement, that statement is descriptively false. According to
Shehadi, however, this does not mean that the contradiction persists. 508 There apparently is value
in these creedal statements for they are what Allah has chosen to say about himself and their
application to one’s life adds value. The religious language purportedly adds practical religious
value by providing virtues for all people to emulate. But in the end, the positive attribute
statement Allah is X, does not reveal Allah as He is in Himself, this point must not be forgotten.
Both al-Ghazālī’s reasoning and Shehadi’s analysis are unsatisfying responses to the
problem of knowability in Islam. It is troublesome to consider that for al-Ghazālī, the unending
bliss of Paradise, the highest level one can attain, consists of the full-disclosure of Allah. What is
actually being disclosed for the veil itself cannot be lifted. What is it then that will satisfy human
creatures for all of eternity if God cannot be disclosed? The matter becomes even more puzzling
when we consider al-Ghazālī’s mirror analogy and the impetus for God’s love. Recall back to alGhazālī’s thoughts on the heart and how Muslims are to become like polished mirrors which
reflect the attributes of God. God’s love for man it was argued is merely God’s love for himself

Al-Ghazālī writes, “…Or, consider, how in the world of sense, which is the highest to which your
knowledge can rise,” Mishkāt al-Anwar, 121
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On the apparent contradiction Shehadi writes, “We have seen that the first inconsistency is unreal, for
what God reveals is a guide for man and not, strictly speaking, a self-description.” Ibid., 121.
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as he sees himself in the mirror. But if that which man emulates is descriptively false then that
which is reflected in the mirror is descriptively false. What then does Allah see in the mirror and
why, if it is descriptively false, does he love what he sees? There are at least two possible
responses to this question. First, perhaps Allah loves the virtues he sees reflected in the mirrors.
But right away this option will not do because if Allah loves that which is descriptively false,
then these virtues are not part of the divine self and thus Allah would be loving something other
than Himself which he does not do. Second, if he does not love what he sees in relation to the
content reflected, perhaps he loves the human effort to love Him. This is possible but at the same
time it seems to defeat the purpose of even becoming a mirror in the first place. Reflecting Allah,
or at least the subjective conception of Allah, thus seems trivial because these attributes do not
even describe him. He cannot love what is reflected in the mirror only that there were human
attempts to reflect the divine Image.
The divine knowledge/human language impasse is problematic for Islam. Not only is
language cut off from the Divine but so too is knowledge and subsequently any meaningful
experience or relationality. No matter how creative or valiant the effort, the affirmation that God
is utterly unique and unknowable means there is an incomprehensible chasm between the human
creature and Allah. Instead of being able to affirm that God is like X with a humble confidence,
Muslims are forced into a voluntarist corner. Islamic theologians are compelled to affirm that
creedal statements concerning Allah must have religious value and religious significance but that
assertion rests on a faith that is not really based in evidence but through sheer sustenance of the
will.
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The transcendent chasm cannot be crossed by human effort and interestingly it cannot be
crossed by Allah either. 509 In some respects, Allah is a prisoner to his own transcendence. It is
something he cannot overcome. Furthermore, the reality of this impasse, has a profoundly
negative impact on Paradise. If Allah is the highest Good, and if Muslims are to enjoy unending
bliss in Paradise as they are in proximity to Allah, then what is there to truly hope for? Religious
language is cut off from Allah which seriously delimits its objective spiritual value. The attempt
to explain a theological union has fallen short. For Muslims, there does appear to be much space
for hope in terms of union with the Divine. As a result, the goodness of Paradise appears
compromised.
OUTSIDE
Christianity likewise affirms that God is transcendent and is a doctrine both Christians
and Muslim can agree upon. Like Islam, there is a mystical tradition within Christianity which
emphasizes the transcendence and hiddenness of God. Meister Eckhart, a medieval mystic and
theologian, once wrote in a sermon, “let us pray to God to be free of God.” 510 This prayer may
initially seem puzzling, but the concern in Eckhart’s petition demonstrates a healthy caution
when thinking about God. It may seem that he is praying to be free from God in a relational or
experiential way, he is not and does not wish to distance himself from the divine. Rather, his
prayer focuses on the knower, on himself personally, and the petition aims at ridding the subject
of all mental conceptions about God that are not-God. Perhaps the prayer would have more
clarity if the subsequent clause was included: “…that we may gain the truth and enjoy it
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eternally.” Eckhart’s prayer is made clearer when re-worded this way, “let us pray to God that
He will help to illuminate within us those areas in which our thinking about God is incorrect and
has become idolatrous.” Eckhart highlights the challenge human creatures face when speaking of
and theorizing about God. We can quickly and all to easily create in our minds a mental image of
God that is not-God, an image that has become muddled by our selfish will and desires. The
caution is warranted and welcomed. 511
Michael Sells suggests that Eckhart’s prayer invites us to “reconsider the conventions, the
logic, and the paradoxes of the distinctive mode of discourse it embodies.” 512 The mode of
discourse Sells is referring to relates to the “dilemma of transcendence” as he calls it. 513 The
dilemma begins with the phrase “God is beyond all names” for in doing so God has been named
as that which is beyond all naming. That which is above naming receives a name and, just as it
was with Islam, an aporia forms. 514 I would submit that Sells is correct to some extent.
Christianity is not automatically free from the implications of transcendence and the need for
theological development regarding language about God persists. However, within Christianity, is
an aporia truly present and warranted? No, it is not.
We have seen that religious language about God has the possibility of being an
equivocation of terms. In this manner, words do not reach their referent, although it is argued by

While Eckhart’s words are a helpful reminder here, I am not affirming his mystical methodology which
is further spelled out in this homily. It is interesting to note, however, that much of what Eckhart advocates is very
much in line with the mystical traditions in Islam. There appears to be a mutual consensus in the mystical traditions
– both Islamic and Christian – on the need for emptying the self, especially of its will and desires. It is only when
one becomes poor in spirit (i.e. emptied) that an ‘at-oneness’ with God may be achieved.
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Sells does not work around through the aporia but rather develops the ideas of mystical language that
have emerged from the apparent dilemma. He states that there are traditionally three options when faced with the
dilemma of naming: silence, distinguish between God-as-he-is-in-himself and God-as-he-is-in-creatures
(communicable vs. incommunicable attributes), and finally, embracing the aporia but instead of it leading to silence
a new mode of discourse is introduce – negative theology. Ibid., 2-3.
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Muslim mystics they do so in in some mystical and indirect manner. 515 Another possibility with
religious language is the suggestion that the phrase “God is love” is univocal, the human
conception of the love of God capturing the essence of divine love in its entirety. This option is
rightly rejected by both orthodox Christianity and orthodox Islam, and for good reason. Human
beings are finite creatures and neither our mental capacities nor our language has the potential of
fully grasping the divine. This is not a negative affirmation, we should not expect to be able to
fully grasp the divine, nor should we want to be able to do so. If human beings could fully
comprehend God, if creaturely language could capture the divine, then God would not be God
and definitely not an object worthy of worship. The fact that human creatures cannot
comprehend God fully was cause for thankfulness for St. Augustine, he writes, “Well, God be
thanked that He said, ‘If you believe not,’ and did not say, ‘If you comprehend not.’ For who can
comprehend this?”516 The God of the Christian tradition does not say come and comprehend
fully but he does invite humanity to come and know.
This leads to a third option for religious language – analogical predication. Although
Scripture affirms human beings “see through a glass dimly,” it is implied we still can see. 517 I
would submit that human language about God, the positive attribute statements derived from
Scripture, are not an equivocation or univocation of terms. Instead, they are an analogical
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predication. According to Baggett and Walls, analogical predication is a long-standing Christian
tradition, “according to which God’s goodness, though recognizable as such, is nonetheless
infinitely greater than human goodness.”518 Analogical predication avoids the pitfalls of both
equivocation and univocation for it suggest that we do know something of God’s nature yet it is
not fully comprehend. Consider this analogy from C. S. Lewis which helps to capture this idea:
“The Divine ‘goodness’ differs from ours, but it is not sheerly different: it differs from ours not
as white from black but as a perfect circle from a child’s first attempt to draw a wheel. But when
the child has learned to draw, it will know that the circle it then makes is what it was trying to
make form the very beginning.”519 This analogy demonstrates the relation between human
knowledge of divine attributes as they relate to the divine itself. The knowledge is best
understood not in terms of contrast (equivocation) but as correspondence.
Perhaps more significant than the language correspondence is the human capacity for
knowledge and rationality. Kenneth Cragg has rightly pointed out that the problem of language is
a problem for all religions but then suggested: “It can only be solved within the conviction that
the Divine and the human are truly meaningful to each other: only in the confidence that the
relationships God has with man are really indicative of His Nature. 520 When Christians affirm
that “God is love” there is a level of confidence and this affirmation is warranted for a few
reasons. First, there is some a priori reason that God’s intentions will correspond to reality. It is
reasonable to believe that if God wills our well-being (our salvation) and He is the source of that
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well-being – in both this life and the life to come – then access to God would be possible. 521
Second, the Triune God of Christianity is inherently personal and relational. Furthermore, a
fundament anthropological doctrine within Christianity is that human beings have been created
in the image of God and that part the image entails possessing personhood. The God of
Christianity is not an abstract “it” but a personal “Thou” who reveals Himself through the Word
and the Scriptures. This leads to the third reason, that is, the revelation of God Himself in the
second person of the trinity, the “word made flesh,” Jesus Christ. 522 The second person of the
Trinity, left heaven and became incarnated, taking on human flesh, becoming fully human while
remaining fully God. Jesus taught that he was and is the full revelation of the Father. 523
Examining the life and teachings of Jesus reveals what God is like. Through Jesus’s teaching and
demonstration we see that the nature of God is loving, caring and relational. One can see that the
God of Christianity deeply cares for creation to the extent that one of the persons of Trinity was
willing to sacrifice His life so that all of humanity might live. Humanity is extremely valuable to
God, and it is with this conviction Christians can affirm that God has made himself known.
Furthermore, Christians can rest assured that when Jesus stated eternal life was knowing God,
not only are they able to truly know this good God but that He is good, personal and loving. 524

Richard Swinburne writes: “IF there is a God who wills men’s eternal well-being and chooses to allow
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The beatific vision of heaven is the reality of heaven and earth, God and man coming together in
a loving relational union where all persons will know and be known by their Maker.
Love and Relationality
INSIDE
This section considers the second of the two important stations of the path – love.525 One
of the Ninety-nine names of Allah is al-Wadūd or the “objectively loving One.”526 As such, love
forms an integral part of the divine attributes of Allah. Nasr has argued that non-Muslim sources
have a skewed perception of Divine love in Islam. To support his argument that Allah is
fundamentally loving he cites a well-known hadith which states “On the Throne of God is
written, “Verily My Mercy and Compassion precede my Wrath.” 527 Allah has wrath, indeed, but
this is preceded by his love and Nasr calls for a healthy balance when considering the attributes
of Allah. Nasr emphasizes the correlation between Allah’s compassion and the act of creation.
He purports that Allah’s compassion and mercy form the ethical causality of creation. Allah
loved to be known and because of this the world is permeated with the divine attributes. Thus,
from the observation of creation, the divine names are manifested and revealed. According to
Nasr, these names reveal “the inner dimension of the Divine Reality,” and as such, they “take
precedence when it comes to the inner life of the soul of the Muslim.” 528 As created beings, the
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substance and root of human existence entails the essence of Allah’s compassion, love, peace,
and beauty. Love for Allah is found and understood as reflected in the love between Himself and
the Prophet. The Prophet loved Allah’s attributes and pursued the absolute adherence and
reflection of them. Love for God is displayed then in the love of His attributes.
Islam is not monolithic concerning the expressions of love and it remains a topic of
divergence. Orthodox Muslims have tended to understand love as obedience but as Schimmel
points out, for Sufis the term was too complex to be bound into one conception. For Sufis, love
was a personal and existential commitment, an experience of the divine that began with
obedience but also transcended it.529 Love is a process of purification where in the self is
completely submersed in the divine attributes. Love for Allah is a process of purification wherein
the self is completely submersed in the divine attributes. As one plunges the depths of the divine,
s/he becomes more enraptured with Allah and experiences intimacy, proximity, longing, and
desire.530 It is in this state that the self is slowly annihilated as all creaturely distinctions fade out
of view and only the divine attributes remain. In relation to the afterlife, love reaches its
culmination in the Beatific Vision.
From a Christian perspective, attributing love to Allah is a positive attribute statement to
be welcomed. It would seem that having the option to worship a deity that is either loving or not
loving, one would be warranted to desire the former. And not only is it warranted; it also seems a
rational proposition to believe if this deity is to be called Good. Both Christians and Muslims can
agree that God or Allah being loving is good. Perhaps Nasr is correct in pointing out that nonMuslims have tended to emphasize Allah’s wrath and judgment over and against his compassion
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and mercy. Miroslav Volf has tried to mend the gap of understanding concerning love but from
within the Christian tradition. Like Nasr, he highlights divine love within Islam and points out
that both Muslims and Christians share similar convictions: “God loves, God is Just, God’s love
encompasses God’s justice and human beings should love their neighbors as themselves.”531
Furthermore, Volf notes that both faiths agree that God loves in a compassion, giving manner.
Creation, especially of human creatures, is an instance of this mutual affirmation of compassion.
But Volf also rightly notes there is theological distinction in the respective conceptions of the
Divine. Christianity is fundamentally trinitarian while Islam emphasizes tawḥīd. Applying the
propositional statement God is love within Christianity and Islam respectively, is, as we have
seen, fundamentally different. Volf is correct that we have a comparison of loves – self-love
within Islam and love for the other in Christianity. 532 Furthermore, the implications of these
loves are profound as they extend even to the very foundational fabric of reality. As we will see
below the implications of tawḥīd and love have a profound impact on otherness and distinction.
Further agreement can be found towards orthodox Islam as well. With orthodox Muslims,
Christians can affirm that part of what it means to love God entails keeping his commandments.
Jesus explicitly stated that if a person loves God then that person will also keep God’s
commandments.533 Saying that one loves either Allah or God without also demonstrating that
love through obedience is a demonstration of mere lip-service. The words without corresponding
action become vacuous. Common ground can also be found with the Sufis as well – and
specifically al-Ghazālī. Christian conceptions of love are more than mere obedience to God’s
commands. While love for God is certainly not less than obedience, there is a more robust
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understanding of the nature of love. As the robustness is explored however, the differences
between the two traditions emerges and the divergence is revealed. Schimmel’s analysis of love
within Sufism shows that its philosophical thought is highly subjective. Focused is placed on the
experience of the believer in connection to Allah. Not much is said of Allah’s love for man
beyond his merciful bounty and the removing of the veil. This limited amount of information is
also seen in al-Ghazālī’s work as well. In reality though there is not much that can be said. Allah
is self-contained unity and as such the Sufi believer experiences Allah in some mystical,
existential yet impersonal way in both this life and in Paradise. But without a strong foundation
of mutual personhood coupled with there being no internal distinction in Allah, mystical love
finds its culmination in singularity and annihilation. As the subjective self loves and pursues the
Divine Singularity, less and less of that individual self remains. I champion Volf’s efforts here
both in his intention and content, there is much need for greater understanding by people of both
religions. However, as well will continue to see, the fundamental fabrics of divine reality are
entirely distinct and, unlike Volf’s assertion, deeper than many people think. We will now look a
little more in-depth at the culmination of love in Islam and the negative consequences of the
Beatific Vision.
The Niche of Lights is an esoteric commentary written by al-Ghazālī about the esoteric
and mystical verse of light in the Qur’ān. 534 In the commentary, al-Ghazālī discusses the levels
of Paradise and how this verse translates to each corresponding level. For al-Ghazālī, those who
attain to the highest levels of Paradise are divided into two groups. The first group of those who
are brought near, their reward is eternal contemplation of the Divine. 535 For these faithful few, al-
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Ghazālī writes, “Everything the sight of one group perceives is burned up, effaced, and
annihilated.”536 It seems that body and all of its wants or desires are done away with for they
naturally cloud one’s perception, detracting from the perception of Allah. What remains of the
person is the soul, left to contemplate, as al-Ghazālī states, “the absolute Beauty and Holiness,”
as well as reflect on the beauty which is conferred on the soul by the divine presence. 537 All that
is not-Allah is done away with save the soul, that which has the ability to perceive and reflect on
the divine countenance remains. 538
The second group, those who according to al-Ghazālī are the “Few of the Few,” enjoy an
even a closer proximity to Allah. This is the highest level of attainment and their reward is
annihilation. Al-Ghazālī writes that the “august glories of His face burn them up, and the ruling
authority of majesty overcomes them. In their essences they are effaced and annihilated.” 539 This
level of annihilation is beyond the previous group for whom contemplation still remained. Here
the proximity is all-consuming, there is no more contemplation because there is nothing more to
do with the individual self. Al-Ghazālī cites the passage from Surah 28:88 which states, “All
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perishes save His Countenance,” from which he purports that all will fade away – even the soul –
and be consumed by Allah. Such an event mirrors the earthly gradations of tawḥīd in which the
highest state is the direct and unmediated assurance of tawḥīd. Here in Paradise, the human
subject is once again caught up into tawḥīd but in this instance, the beatific vision is allconsuming. The individual self is infinitely overwhelmed and eternally overcome by the Divine
countenance that there is no space remaining for the self, there is only the Real, only Allah.
From the Unity, which was the reality in the beginning sans creation, the external created
distinctions now return. The climax of history is the return to Unity. This level of Paradise is the
highest goal one can attain and that which al-Ghazālī strove to achieve. Annemarie Schimmel
provides further insight into this final station on the spiritual path. In order to understand the
nuances of this final station two key terms must be explained – fanā and baqā. Schimmel notes
that the true meaning of fanā has been a controversial topic in the study of Sufism. Annihilation
of the self in Allah is a common understanding of fanā and this begins to capture the experience
of the self in which man takes on God’s attributes. 540 This process culminates in the immersion
in the wujūd or the “existence of God or, rather, the finding of God.”541 But the idea of
annihilation and immersion need further development for the self is not annihilated entirely nor
is the immersion an absorption or union. Schimmel purports that the best interpretation of fanā
and the following stage baqā comes from Toshihiko Izutsu: “the total nullification of the egoconsciousness, where there remains only the absolute Unity of Reality in its purity as an absolute
Awareness prior to its bifurcation into subject and object’ – the state the Sufis would call jamʿ,
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‘unification, collectedness.’”542 In the occurrence of fanā the self or ego-consciousness is not
annihilated as in destroyed; rather its practically annihilation or, as Izutsu suggests, nullified. The
creaturely will has, for all intents and purposes, been done away with and the Divine Will is all
that remains. This is the stage of baqā. There are no longer self-determinations, for the self does
not remain.
Attaining to that final stage of Paradise is what supposedly brings the utmost bliss. This is
the pursuit of Muslim mystics and it was the pursuit of al-Ghazālī as well. But what of its
qualitative nature for human creatures? Upon personal reflection, is practical self-annihilation
something to be desired above all else? Islamic philosophers and mystics who have arrived at
this conclusion are not at fault here. Their conclusions, and the conclusion of al-Ghazālī
specifically, are merely the logical outworking of a faithful adherence to tawḥīd. William Keepin
offers sound insight here; he notes, “Taking refuge in tawḥīd is the very realization of the
supreme oneness – the one God that is the sole Reality,” therefore, he can logically conclude,
“Taking refuge in this Reality entails renouncing the illusion of separate selfhood.” 543 The stage
of baqā answers the question of how finite creatures are supposed to relate and find enjoyment in
a being that is utterly unique and unknowable in whom there is extreme unicity and no
distinction. There is no relation between Allah and the human creature as one human person
relates to another human person. Furthermore, there can be no more human-to-human
relationship because individual selves are nullified. Thus, eternal life is an entirely static reality
for the third level of believers al-Ghazālī mentions in the Niche of Lights. For the lesser of this
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group there is still some semblance of personhood remaining. For those closer to Allah in this
group all that is not-Real is annihilated and the Real (i.e., Allah) overwhelms and obliterates the
human self.
Commitment to the thesis that Allah is the ultimate Good leads to the highest stages of
bliss in Paradise resulting in the annihilation of the individual. This is what the highest love for
Allah achieves. As human creatures advance in proximity to Allah the more all else fades away
save the divine. I would submit that the question naturally arises of whether or not this is good
and worthy of an entire life’s pursuit. According to al-Ghazālī every human creature should
strive their entire life so that they can be eternally obliterated by the divine presence. Is bliss
even possible at that point? It would seem that an individual self would need to remain in order
to experience the euphoria of such proximity to Allah. The goodness of this quasi-annihilation is
something entirely foreign to the human experience of goodness in this life. Human beings are
inherently relational and have experiences of a certain kind of love that is a fundamental part of
our existence. It is a qualitative love akin to agapē which goes beyond the self and seeks to
elevate the other. But more than just elevating the other, it loves the other without seeking
anything in return. Mothers have agapē love for their children. A mother’s love is instinctual and
is given without the need for reciprocation. It is not contingent upon the child loving her first.
Contrast that kind with the love of Allah. How does the love of Allah manifest? There are
numerous passages throughout the Qur’ān which state that Allah’s love is contingently given. He
loves those who love Him first. But as we have seen, what is called love for the other is merely
love of the Self with an odd quasi-extension of supposed compassion. In reality, Allah continues
to only love Himself, for he is the only true Real. The love of Allah is a radical self-love which
eternally turns in upon itself in an egoistic self-reciprocating action. Human creatures do not
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truly matter, there is no space for them to meaningfully matter for there is no distinction in
Allah’s self-love. For those who have been brought near, eternal life is an eternally static
existence. Proximity to Allah entails singularity and it is here that Muslim theologians are
expressing the highest levels of consistency in both their theology and eschatology.
Reciprocal love between Allah and mankind simply does not exist. But human beings
crave that kind of love and flourish when they encounter it. Love such as this is powerful and
transcends time, distance, separation, etc. Now, if this type of love exists, and one would be
justified in affirming its existence, then it must have a source and causal explanation. We are
operating under the assumption in this study that this is a theistic world. Both Islam and
Christianity are monotheistic religions and as such they claim that God exists, that he is one in
being, and that he is the creator of all there is. If God is the creator of all things good, and love of
this kind is a good, then it must be God to whom we attribute love’s existence. What then would
be the implications if the existence of this love cannot be attributed to him? This love between
two persons is a good that the divine does not and, assumedly, cannot possess. Nor is it a good
which seemingly originates either in or from Him.
Muslims finds themselves in a bit of a dilemma because Allah is ultimate unity and there
is nothing lacking in his nature. Because this kind of relational love requires the existence of the
other, then it could not have been manifested prior to creation nor could this love been part of the
purview of love in God’s essential nature. Allah’s love was not lacking prior to creation. The
expression of His love must then be perfect goodness. Does it become problematic for Muslims
when this existential reality is present – relational love – but their God is perhaps not the source
of it? In light of this consideration, Walls’s words are helpful; he writes, “The question of
whether we believe in God is another form of the question of whether the fleeting glimpses of
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joy we experience in this life are intimations of a deeper wellspring of happiness, or whether
they are tantalizing illusions, shadowy hints of a satisfaction that does not really exist.” 544
Although Walls writes within the Christian tradition, he words equally apply within an Islamic
context. Applying Walls’s questions to Islam, let us consider the human experiences of love and
relationality, truly knowing and being known by another self. Is this experience an intimation of
a deeper “wellspring of happiness” or is a “tantalizing illusion?” It seems that Muslims are
caught in a dilemma. For, on the one hand, if they maintain that love is an intimation of love to
come in the afterlife, a good worth retaining, then what is the source of the experience of the
good in Paradise. The source is not Allah for he only loves himself. Muslims can suggest that
Allah is loving but it has been shown in the tradition of al-Ghazālī that Allah’s love for man is an
extension of loving himself alone. This love is a tangential, impersonal extension so that Allah
can see himself reflected in human creatures and continue to love himself. That kind of love is in
no way analogous to the kind in question and one can reasonably ask if Allah can be the source
of the love experienced between human beings. Thus, if relational love is a good and worth
retaining, then what is the source of that love in Paradise? One can suggest that human beings
will continue to love each other in the manner they do now, an even more refined and robust love
because their moral character will be perfected. Perhaps this is the case, but this assumption
seems problematic for at least two reasons: first, it suggests that there is a finite, external
mechanism designed to satisfy for an eternity. Can the love shared between finite creatures, even
in an enhanced moral state, satisfy eternally? Perhaps, but it does seem interesting to assume that
this problem was felt by Muslim philosopher and theologians and it led to the developing
tradition of a myriad multiplication of the virgins of paradise. Love, or at least a certain
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manifestation of it, must be spread out so that it does not become exhausted on the plane of
eternity. Second, and deriving from the implication of the first point, it seems then that there is a
good which exists external to Allah since it does not derive from him. In this sense, Allah can be
said to be a great Good but he cannot be the ultimate Good for there is something good outside
of and external to his nature from which humans derive a measure happiness and satisfaction of
which there is nothing analogous in the divine essence.
On the other hand, it can be suggested that love, as it is shared by human creatures in this
life, is a tantalizing illusion. 545 This would seem to necessarily follow from the line of
theologizing present in the previous point. If Allah is to be maintained as the ultimate Good, the
source from which all satisfaction derives, then the experiential and conceptual goodness that
human beings now possess in relational love is ultimately not real. The foundation of the family,
the love between spouses, the love of parents for children, all of it is merely an illusion. This
undoubtedly poses an existential problem for the love between human creatures is so palpable
and fundamental to existence. What sort of qualitative Creation would this reality be, if it were
all a mere illusion? What other sorts of experiences could we no longer trust? A radical
skepticism would no doubt begin to set in among human beings who were told this manner of
love was not real.
Existential considerations aside, the question of origination persists even if it is an
illusion. How would such an idea, that relational love between individuals, arise in the first
place. If one suggests that the illusion is from God, that seems problematic for a couple of
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reasons: first, it suggests that a fundamental aspect of human existence and experience is false
which is extremely deceptive and cruel. Second, and perhaps more problematic is the logical
consistency of Allah creating such an illusion. Is it even possible for Allah to conceive of loving
the other as a great good? Remember, the doctrine of tawḥīd is vital for understanding the
essential nature of Allah. The teachings of tawḥīd are unequivocally emphatic, Allah is an
undifferentiated unity possessing no distinction within the divine essence. In light of the
teachings of tawḥīd, can it not then be said that the idea of love for the other could not have
logically derived from such a unitary mind. Perhaps one could suggest that relational love is the
product of rational and emotive human beings living in relation to one another. True,
relationality could have been an evolutionary biproduct-of-sorts arising out of rational creatures,
but this assumption would come at a theological cost. In order to be consistent, one would have
to say that not only did Allah not plan this manifestation of love, he could not have even
conceived of it. This manifestation would have caught him by surprise. Furthermore, it would
seem that Allah could not even be able to understand this kind of love because he certainly could
not have experienced it first-hand.
OUTSIDE
As the apologetic methodology moves outward, the Christian perspective is again
considered. Within the Christian perspective there is robust space for the notion of divine love
and relationality. The doctrine of the trinity affirms that within the God-head there is both unity
and distinction. There is logical space for other-seeking, self-giving love because of the
distinction of persons present from all eternity. Divine love within Islam is self-seeking and
singular. The radical self-love of Allah raises serious ethical concerns regarding the fundamental
elements of reality. As the eternal form of love, self-love is the highest good and this seems to go
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against all creaturely moral intuitions. This ethical dilemma does not exist within the Christian
conception of God’s love. A. E. Taylor argues that there is indeed an ethical nature to the
doctrine of the Trinity which is foundational to the notion of an agapē, self-giving love.
Considering the ontological nature of the trinity, he purports that a mere economic distribution of
the divine life “does not make giving as fully and inwardly characteristic of the divine life as it
requires to be made.”546 A doctrine of giving, and self-emptying may indeed be a real function of
the God-head, but if understood as merely an economic function, then this action will remain
“something external,” as Taylor emphasizes, “an incident arising from the relation of the Creator
to a creation.”547 The act of self-giving would thus be an accidental property, arising only in
relation to creation. If this is the case, Taylor suggests that the knowledge of God humans
possess would not be able to “penetrate the inmost depths of the divine life.” 548 We simply
would not know who or what God is truly like. He could at his core be a self-centered deity. A
deity who, being the ultimate Good, thus withholds that goodness from creation for it is not
shared. Or, consistent with the divine nature, the ultimate Good is self-centeredness, in which
case that which is purported as goodness by human creatures is not the ultimate Good of reality.
Taylor further suggests this is the reason that Christian theologians would not rest until
they had “declared that the ‘personal’ distinctions are eternal, internal, and essential to the divine
being itself.”549 This commitment is not merely due to the conviction that the divine life must
have had activity which was from the beginning, prior to creation. The commitment stems rather
from the relation between God and human creatures, namely, in what can be communicated to
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finite human creatures. Taylor rightly points out that God can communicate only so much of the
divine self to humanity without humanity ceasing to be the creatures they are. If God’s
communicable attributes are depended upon human creatures to be exercised then the “riches of
the divine nature must remain as good as uncommunicated; in its foundations the divine life must
be egoistic.”550 This would implicate the nature of divine love for in reality it would be a surface
attribute of God, not indicative of the inner life of God. The fundamental revelation “God is
love” would only be fundamental insofar as human creatures know and relate to God. In
hindsight, what is traditionally viewed as fundamental appears to not be quite so. For God to be
fundamentally love, fundamentally self-giving, there must be in the divine essence itself the
capacity for such activity in which said activity is fully and not trivially realized. Taylor’s
concluding remarks on this thought are worth nothing:
And since such isolated selfhood is unethical, there is no room for the ethical in
the inmost life of God, when it is conceived thus. To make room for the ethical
we have to think of the divine, even apart from its relation to the creatures, as
having a life in which there is, within the Godhead itself, an object adequate to the
complete and absolute reception of an activity of giving which extends to the
whole fullness of the divine nature, so that there is nothing which is not imparted
and nothing which is not received. Because the mutual love in which each party
bestows himself freely and completely and is freely and completely received is
ethically the supreme spiritual activity, the life of God is thought of as involving
an internal distinction as well as an internal unity, in order that the whole activity
of the divine life may be one of perfect and unlimited self-bestowal.551
Taylor’s thoughts are helpful and they direct theological inferences from the perspective of a
premier ethicist. The ethical implications of the divine life point to the need for internal
distinction and internal unity. The tri-unity of persons called God may challenge human logic –
though not illogical itself – but from an ethical perspective, the doctrine of the trinity addresses
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the relational concerns which would arise from a divine being within whom there is utterly no
distinction (i.e., tawḥīdic Allah).
Trinitarian love is the fundamental fabric of God’s nature. Instead of this love remaining
an abstraction, unknowable through human perception, the triune God acted in human history
manifesting the quality of divine love in full display. Contrary to Allah’s contingently given
love, the love of the triune is given without condition. While humanity remained enemies to God
and hostile to his lordship, the Word-made-flesh descended into creation to save and redeem all
things.552 Through Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross, the quality of God’s immense love was
demonstrated. In that moment, humanity was given a glimpse of the quality of love that has
existed within the Godhead from eternity past. It is this kind of love that Christians identify as
part of the ultimate Good. And not only is that love freely given, it made a way for humanity to
experience true relationship with God. To know and be known, to love and be loved. The triune
God’s love for man is a non-mystical reality, grounded in the very nature of the Godhead.
Christians love God because, in a very real and direct expression, God first love us!553 Humanity
can embrace those good aspirations of love and relationality both because it is how God created
human beings to be and because the God of Christianity has demonstrated it to the world in
human history.
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Abductive Considerations
Alongside the apologetic nature of the study, the other stated purpose was to make a
comparative judgment of the two monotheistic traditions. In order to make this final assessment,
let us return to the two problems which were labeled the Qualitative Gap Problem (QGP) and the
Teleological Gap Problem (TGP). The QGP stressed the importance of the quality of the afterlife
and the need to meet the demands of eternal duration. The QGP was then linked to the TGP
which considered the multi-dimensionality of human creatures. If the demand of the QGP is to
be objectively met, then the quality of the afterlife will meet and surpass the evident ends (i.e.
TGP) of the human subject thus leading to everlasting human flourishing. Both faith traditions
believe their doctrines of heaven meets those demands and there are no real intimations of
trouble with the afterlife so conceived. Assurance that heaven will be eternally satisfying stems
from the teachings that the respective deities of Christianity and Islam have prepared Heaven and
Paradise for human creatures to enjoy. But, is one tradition more desirable than the other? I
would submit yes.
In making an abductive inference, the best explanation will be that which meets a number
of criteria. Three criteria will be used to make the qualitative judgment: explanatory scope,
explanatory depth and simplicity. Furthermore, let us reconsider the three facts of the TGP which
highlighted and emphasized the multi-dimensionality of human creatures:
1. Human beings have a physical dimension.
2. Human beings have a mental/spiritual dimension.
3. Human beings have a social/relational dimension.
These are the teleological facts which are in need of explanation. If the mystic’s Paradise or the
revised Heaven is to be desired over the other, it will be because these subjective dimensions,
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which form our fundamental longings and aspirations, are met. Let us now consider each of these
dimensions in relation to the abductive criteria. First, human beings have a physical dimension.
The depiction of the Christian heaven which was presented entailed an embodied existence in a
physical reality. It is a scene where heaven and earth come together in a glorious harmony of the
physical and the spiritual. The highest stages of Paradise according to al-Ghazālī are for all
intents and purposes disembodied. His view on an embodied afterlife, while initially consistent
with orthodox Islam seems to have become consistent with the cosmology of the philosophers –
disembodied and static. 554 At the very least, there is no practical space for a physical existence as
flourishing and bliss are not linked to the body.
Second, human beings have a spiritual/mental dimension. Heaven is reality wherein the
human person persists and remains. Christian theology is replete with doctrine affirming that the
individual will be resurrected into a renewed spiritual body. This entails that our personhood is
retained as well for Christian anthropology suggests human creatures are embodied souls.
Moreover, glimpses of the afterlife suggest that human creatures will be in relation with not only
other humans but with the Godhead as well. This implies human agency will remain intact. For
Al-Ghazālī, the highest levels of Paradise, leave no space for human agency or will. The
penultimate experience in the gradation of the Beatific Vision entails a practical agency for the
sole purpose of contemplating Allah. The ultimate level, the one in which unending bliss ensues,
the individual self is overcome and annihilated so that none but Allah, the True Real, remains.
All that is other-than Allah, fades away (including individual human agency and will).
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Third, human beings have a social/relational dimension. Again, Christianity teaches that
human creatures will be in relationship in heaven. These relationships are with other human
beings who are there, but it also entails being in direct relationship with God. 555 Moreover, this
relationship is mediated in a very direct way through the person of Jesus Christ. Scripture teaches
that Jesus Christ was resurrected with a spiritual body and ascended into heaven with the same
body. This suggests that Jesus remains in this body even today. The incarnation was a permanent
putting-on of humanity. Jesus Christ is not only the salvific bridge to God but in some very real
way, he is also the relational bridge to God. The inhabitants of heaven will enjoy personal
relationship with the very God who created them. Contrast this depiction with al-Ghazālī’s view.
Again, the highest levels of Paradise do not include human agency and so they definitely do not
include a social dimension either. In fact, because Allah is the only True Real, and there is no
distinction within him, it should not be expected that relationship exists the closer one gets to
Ultimate Reality.
The Christian view of Heaven presented here coupled with the nature of the Triune God
is a more desired reality. This assessment is based on the three abductive criteria. The Christian
view has the greater explanatory scope of the three facts of the TGP. The teleology of heaven
better accounts for and meets the needs of the multi-dimensionality of human beings. Each of the
components of the subjective experience in this life are fundamental aspects of the life to come.
The Christian view also has greater explanatory depth. Within each human dimension is vast
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The atheist philosopher Luc Ferry writes on this component of Christian afterlife and suggests it was a
very strong motivation for people to believe Christianity was true. Ferry rightly notes that as relational creatures, we
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theological richness wherein the nature of the triune God of Christianity is present as the
coherent grounding for each component. Lastly, the Christian view is also the simpler
hypothesis. Simplicity in abduction refers to the one that is more natural and that which instinct
suggests.556 Human creatures are, at their core, relational beings who love and are loved. From
this foundation flows all other goodness. But these aspirations are not random and subjected to
chance, they are part of God’s design and thus part of his good intentions for humanity. Walls
agrees and comments on this point:
The important point here is that fully meaningful life must be one that suits our
aspirations, one that answers to our deepest longings and desires. I argued…that
some doctrine of heaven follows from the claim that God is good, for a good God
would not create us with the aspirations we have and then leaven them frustrated
and unfulfilled. This argument is only enhanced and enriched by the Christian
vision of Trinitarian love. A God whose eternal nature is mutual and reciprocal
gift and reception; could not but deeply love any creatures he made and would
surely be committed to fulfilling the natures he had given them. 557
Human creatures have the desires and longings that they do because within the Christian
tradition, that is what they were designed for. The telos of design aligns with the telos of eternity.
Furthermore, it seems that Islam not only fails to meet these abductive criteria in the way
Christianity does, but also, the QGP and TGP create an inherent dilemma in Islam. On the one
hand, if the QGP (the objective problem) is to be met it will entail proximity to Allah. But as we
have seen, proximity to Allah entails the annihilation of the human subject which doesn’t meet
the TGP (the subjective problem). On the other hand, if the TGP is to be met, it will entail a
removed proximity to Allah. In the physical depictions of Paradise, the TGP, the multidimensionality of human creatures, is met. But, at the same time, the QGP is not met because
any meaningful experience with the divine is removed.
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Areas for Further Research
This study has only begun the comparative conversation concerning the afterlife
traditions of both Christianity and Islam. Al-Ghazālī was chosen as a dialogue partner because he
focused his attention on proximity to God in Paradise. It was assumed that the best chance either
of the faith traditions had at overcoming the QGP would entail experience of the divine. There
were a few areas for further research that need to be addressed in relation to al-Ghazālī’s view
specifically and the mystical tradition in general. One such consideration is the dichotomy
between the few and the many. The esoteric nature of the mystical traditions makes the Beatific
Vision not attainable by all people. Few people within Islam have both the freedom and capacity
to attain to the highest levels of paradise. In fact, it would seem that the highest levels are not
attainable by the masses. Haleem comments on this noting the words of the great Islamic
philosopher Ibn Rushd (Latinized: Averroes):
As Ibn Rushd points out, this view is more suitable for the educated since the
spiritual existence is permanent in the concept of the return of the soul and a new
body avoids such publications as the objection the worldly body turns into dust, is
fed upon by plants, which for than eaten by other people, from whose bodies
come the bodies of their descendants, etc.
The representation of existence in the afterlife as being also bodily and not merely
spiritual, explains Ibn Rushd, is more suitable as it makes it more understood and
more moving for the majority of people; spiritual representation might be suitable
only for speculative thinkers in their argumentations, but the majority are the
prime targets of religion.”558
For those Muslims who do make it to Paradise, only the fewest of the few would actually attain
to the level of perfect bliss. And, it seems, it would be through no fault of the masses. For their
simple minds, an embodied existence is more understandable. But it is not problematic that what
they believe is the best for them in the afterlife does not correspond to reality? For the many, the
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best they can hope for based on their mental capacities and the lack of time available to devote
themselves to formal learning and ascetic practices is a lesser Paradise.
Another area for further study considers the Paradox of Hedonism as it stands in relation
to the pursuits of Islamic Paradise. I agree with the traditions in Islam which aim towards a
higher spiritual experience in Paradise rather than a purely sensual one. The Paradox of
Hedonism becomes relevant when the goal of Paradise is considered. If a literal reading of the
Qur’an leads to an emphasis on the physicality of Paradise, then can it be said that the highest
good in Paradise is the pursuit of pleasure or pleasure fulfillment? If so, it would seem that the
hedonic nature of Paradise falls prey to the Paradox of Hedonism. In The Method of Ethics,
Henry Sidgwick addresses this tension between one’s aim or pursuits and the objective realities
necessary for attaining said pleasures. He posits that if we seek pleasure or happiness as our chief
end, what he calls Egoistic Hedonism, that this egotism might defeat itself. He writes, “There can
be no doubt, I think, that the danger thus indicated, of Egoism defeating itself, is not imaginary:
that the concentration of the mind upon pleasure as an object of pursuit tends to diminish the
fullness and flavor of the pleasures actually experienced.” 559 Sedgwick is suggesting that seeking
pleasure as a first-order aim creates a paradox due to the mind objectifying pleasure instead of
focusing on external objective realities from which pleasure typically derives. To objectify
pleasure potentially diminishes the actual pleasure one may gain from external sources. Thus, the
first-order pursuit of pleasure becomes frustrated and one does not actually achieve the desired
end. In order to avoid this paradox, Sedgwick posits the general principle of the Paradox of
Egoistic Hedonism: “that in order to attain the end we must to some extent put it out of sight and
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not directly aim at it.”560 Sedgwick’s solution to the paradox is to not make the pursuit of
pleasure a first-order aim but a secondary one. Attaining pleasure should not be the aim; instead
focus on some other pursuit of interest and pleasure will be achieved. 561
Following his time in a concentration camp, Viktor Frankl affirmed something similar to
Sedgwick although it was less egoistically motivated. Happiness, he proposed, must come from
without, an indirect experience achieved when someone looks outside themselves. He writes,
“success, like happiness, cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the unintended
side-effect of one’s personal dedication to a cause greater than oneself or as the by-product of
one’s surrender to a person other than oneself.” 562 This perspective of how one achieves genuine
happiness conforms perfectly to the Christian ethic of love God and love others. I believe the
same holds true in the heavenly reality. The love of God and others will lead to a lasting and
eternal happiness. Those who seek their own end of happiness and pleasure will not find it.
Those who, as Jesus states, “loses his life for my sake will find it.” 563 The teaching of Jesus
confronts the paradox of hedonism and the solution is a paradox of its own. If you wish to find
happiness, freedom, love, joy, you will not find it in conventional ways. No, one must lose
his/her life to find it, which is equivalent to saying a person must remove himself from the throne
and submit to the sovereignty of the true king. Only then will eternal joy ensue.
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Closing Thoughts
If human beings retain their humanity in the Afterlife not only is love central to their
current state, even more so will love be central in the eternal state. It then follows that eternal
flourishing will depend on humanities’ ability to love and be loved. The earlier thesis that eternal
joy requires a maximally great being in order to eternally satisfy, coupled with humanity’s need
to love and be loved, it stands to reason that the quality of the afterlife significantly depends on
God’s love for humanity and the ability to of the divine to reveal not only love but aspects of
itself. The mystical traditions of Islam aim to the final stages of the mystical path – knowledge
and love – as that which will bring them eternal bliss. This is their solution to the problem of
eternity but as it has been shown, this view is problematic. For Christianity, the solution is love
but not in the sense that the Divine be reduced to a mere means by which to experience love;
rather, the solution is Love in that God is Love. In the life to come, knowledge and love abound
from God as both the telos of humanity and the means by which they will experience eternal joy.
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